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Abstract
This thesis examines a number of aspects of a government 
policy of rescuing firms or enterprises that are in 
difficulties, with particular attention to the East 
European context.
The first part of Chapter 2 examines a concept introduced 
by Janos Kornai, the "soft budget constraint", and argues 
that it should be interpreted as a state policy of 
bailouts of enterprises in financial difficulties. The 
second part of the chapter examines the effect on 
incentives of a state policy of bailouts, arguing that in 
principle a bailout policy has an ambiguous effect on 
enterprise performance.
Chapter 3 looks at the causes behind a government policy 
of bailouts. A game-theoretic model is presented in 
support of the argument that a cause of a bailout policy 
may be that the government is unable to make a credible 
commitment not to bail out an enterprise. The model also 
shows that if the government can acquire a "reputation for 
toughness", its threat of "no bailouts" may be credible. 
The phenomenon of "storming" or rush-work to meet a 
deadline is also analysed.
In Chapter 4 a model of economic natural selection is 
developed. The model demonstrates that profit- 
maximisation does not "summarise appropriately" the 
conditions for firm survival. If firms have market power, 
profit-maximisers are not necessarily the best survivors. 
The economic model presented derives from the biologists' 
"evolutionarily stable strategy" (ESS) model. An appendix 
presents a version of the ESS model for finite 
populations.
Finally, the thesis looks at empirical evidence on 
financial bailouts using data from the 500 largest 
enterprises in Polish industry, 1983-88. Chapter 5 
discusses the data and the tax/subsidy system. Chapter 6 
looks at how these enterprises were subsidised, and 
presents evidence, based on econometric estimates of 
government subsidy policy, that subsidies were used to 
rescue loss-making enterprises.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis examines a number of aspects of a government 
policy of rescuing firms or enterprises that are in 
difficulties, with particular attention to the East 
European context. Other subjects discussed in the thesis 
are Janos Kornai's concepts of the "soft budget 
constraint" and "paternalism"; "storming" or rush-work to 
meet a deadline, a typical feature of socialist economies; 
and "economic natural selection" and evolutionary game 
theory. The last part of the thesis is an empirical 
investigation of bailouts of Polish enterprises in the 
1980s.
Chapter 2 serves as an extended introduction to the 
subject. In it I make two separate points. The first 
concerns a concept introduced by the Hungarian economist 
Janos Kornai, the "soft budget constraint". The "soft 
budget constraint" has sometimes been interpreted by other 
economists in different ways; I argue that the 
interpretation most consistent with Kornai’s writings is 
that socialist enterprises are bailed out by the state if 
they run into financial difficulties. The second part of 
the chapter examines the effect on incentives of a state 
policy of bailouts. I argue, in contrast to a number of 
writers on this subject, that in principle a bailout 
policy has an ambiguous effect on enterprise performance. 
The formal models used to demonstrate this point also show 
that empirical studies of bailout policies will face an
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observation problem: if firms do not run into difficulties 
then state subsidies to rescue firms will not actually be 
paid out, but a bailout policy may still exist and have 
real effects on firm behaviour.
Chapter 3 looks at the causes behind a government policy 
of bailouts. A game-theoretic model is presented in 
support of the argument that a cause of a bailout policy 
may be a government credibility problem: the government 
may be unable to make a credible commitment not to bail 
out an enterprise. The model also shows that if the 
government can acquire a "reputation for toughness", its 
threat of "no bailouts" may be credible. An interesting 
feature of this model is that the enterprise exhibits a 
"storming" work pattern, i.e. the work tempo speeds up as 
the production deadline approaches. Existing explanations 
of the storming phenomenon have not always been 
convincing. I explore this point briefly in the main text 
of the chapter, and then in more depth in the second of 
two appendices to the chapter (the first appendix presents 
the complete list of equilibria for the main model of the 
chapter).
Since under a government policy of bailouts no firms go 
bankrupt, such a policy means "economic natural selection" 
does not operate: all firms survive, the "fit" as well as 
the "unfit". A natural subject to investigate is the 
effects of suspending the process of economic natural 
selection in this way. Evolutionary economic modelling is
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not very well developed, however, and in particular the 
logically prior subject of the effects of allowing 
economic natural selection to operate has not yet been 
fully investigated. It is this latter subject that I turn 
to in Chapter 4. A model of economic natural selection is 
developed, drawing on theoretical work by evolutionary 
biologists. The model demonstrates that the well-known 
conjecture of Milton Friedman and others that profit- 
maximisation 11 summarises appropriately" the conditions for 
firm survival is not generally true. If firms have market 
power, profit-maximisers are not necessarily the best 
survivors. The economic model presented derives from a 
now-standard model in evolutionary biology, the 
"evolutionarily stable strategy" (ESS) model of John 
Maynard Smith. This latter model was originally developed 
for studying infinite populations; in the appendix to this 
chapter, I present a version of the ESS model for finite 
populations. The economic model presented in the chapter 
is essentially a modified version of the ESS model for 
finite populations.
Finally, the thesis looks at empirical evidence on 
financial bailouts in Poland. The source of the evidence 
is data from the 500 largest enterprises in Polish 
industry, 1983-88. Chapter 5 is essentially an 
introduction both to the data and to the tax/subsidy 
system in place in Poland during this period. Chapter 6 
then looks at how these enterprises were subsidied. In 
particular, I present evidence, based on econometric
9
estimates of government subsidy policy, that subsidies 
were used to rescue loss-making enterprises.
The main results and arguments presented in the thesis are 
summarised in the concluding Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2: Budget Softness and Enterprise Efficiency1
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, I will 
briefly examine the concept of the "soft budget 
constraint11, introduced by the Hungarian economist Janos 
Kornai. I will argue that the soft budget constraint 
amounts to a policy by the state to "bail out” or rescue 
enterprises that are in difficulties. Second, I will 
present two simple formal models which will explore the 
relationship between budget softness and enterprise 
efficiency. The point of these models is simply to show 
that this relationship may be more complex than is 
typically assumed in the literature on this subject. In 
the first model, budget softness can lead to improved 
efficiency; in the second model it leads to lower 
efficiency. The models also demonstrate that empirical 
studies of budget softness may face an observation 
problem: if enterprises do not run into difficulties then 
state subsidies to rescue enterprises will not actually be 
paid out, but budget softness may still exist and have 
real effects on enterprise behaviour.
Kornai*s "Soft Budget Constraint"
In his Economics of Shortage (1980, chapter 13), Janos 
Kornai introduced the concept of the "soft budget
11
constraint”. Enterprises in a socialist economy, he 
argues, do not go bankrupt if they overrun their budgets. 
Rather, the survival of the enterprise is ensured by a 
variety of instruments available to the state which are 
employed on the enterprise's behalf: free state grants,
tax breaks, price changes, and so forth. In his book 
Kornai applies the "soft budget constraint" notion to 
enterprises in centrally planned and Hungarian-type 
economies, but he points out that firms in Western market 
economies may also have soft budget constraints.
Kornai's main concern in his 1980 book is shortage, and 
"budget softness" plays a crucial role in his explanation 
of persistent shortage in socialist economies. In brief, 
he argues that the natural drive of enterprises to expand 
leads to an insatiable demand for investment and thus 
shortage of investment goods, which in turn generates 
shortage of goods generally. This insatiable demand of 
enterprises for inputs is possible only because the 
enterprise faces a soft budget constraint - its demand is 
not tempered by the possibility of bankruptcy.
Kornai's argument is criticised by Stanislaw Gomulka 
(1985b), who stresses the importance of the price system 
in determining the extent of shortage. Gomulka argues 
that in a hypothetical socialist economy where enterprises 
have soft budget constraints but where prices are more 
flexible than budget constraints and are set by 
enterprises in the market place, we would not observe
12
conditions of chronic shortage. Rather, the main 
consequence of budget softness in this economy would be 
inefficiency in enterprises. I will return to this latter 
point later in this paper.
In an article published in 1986 which is in part a
response to Gomulka's paper, Kornai (1986a) presents a
reformulation of the soft budget constraint concept.
Kornai redefines budget softness as follows:
The "softening” of the budget constraint appears 
when the strict relationship between expenditure 
and earnings has been relaxed, because excess 
expenditure over earnings will be paid by some 
other institution, typically by the State. A 
further condition of "softening" is that the 
decision-maker expects such external financial 
assistance with high probability and this 
probability is firmly built into his behavior.
(Kornai 1986a, p. 4)
It is important to note here the conditionality of the
means by which budget constraints are softened. A
enterprise with a soft budget constraint receives
"external financial assistance" only if it incurs "excess
expenditure over earnings". The subsidy paid by the state
is conditional on the enterprise making losses; if the
enterprise did not make losses, the subsidy would not be
paid. In contrast, an unconditional subsidy does not
soften the enterprise's budget constraint; if the
enterprise went into the red despite the subsidy, it would
still go bankrupt." In other words, a enterprise with a
soft budget constraint will be "bailed out" or rescued by
the state if it makes losses. This means, by the way,
that the mere existence of enterprise subsidies is not
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proof that budget constraints are soft, since the 
subsidies may not be conditional on loss-making.
The importance of the conditionality of measures to rescue 
enterprises is implicit in Kornai's 1980 formulation and 
explicit in his 1986 paper. In the latter, Kornai sets 
out four means by which a enterprise's budget constraint 
may be softened.
1. Soft subsidies by the state. "The subsidy is soft if 
it is negotiable ... and is adjusted to past, present or 
future cost overruns." (Kornai 1986a, p. 5)
2. Soft taxation. This does not mean a low rate of 
taxation. Rather, "[tax] rules are negotiable" and "the 
fulfillment of tax obligations is not strictly enforced: 
there are leaks, ad hoc exemptions, postponements, etc."
(p. 6)
3. Soft credit. This refers not to the magnitude of the 
interest rate but to the repayment terms: "the 
fulfillment of a credit contract is not enforced ... and 
postponement and rescheduling are in order." (p. 6)
4. Soft administrative prices exist if they are "set 
[bureaucratically] according to some permissive cost 
plus' principle that almost automatically adjusts the 
price to costs." (p. 6)2
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Since Kornai*s initial presentation, a second definition 
of the soft budget constraint has been used in the 
literature. This definition identifies budget softness 
with the existence of bargaining between the' state and the 
enterprise over financial resources. For example, this is 
the definition that Marrese and Mitchell (1984) use when 
they write that "firm management in the [Hungarian] 
postreform environment bargains with superior authorities 
about financial regulation (certainly this is the true 
essence of soft budget constraints) ** (p. 77). This is 
also the definition used by Gomulka in his critique of 
Kornai.
This confusion in the literature over exactly what is the
definition of the "soft budget constraint” is probably
mostly a result of Kornai*s exposition. His 1980 book
concentrates on the means by which budgets are "softened”
(the means by which enterprises are rescued), and not on
the conditions under which aid is granted (the enterprise
must be in financial difficulties). Indeed, Kornai
himself has sometimes suggested this as the correct
interpretation of "budget softness”. For example, in
Kornai (1987, p. 325) he writes that in Hungary
... fiscal redistribution is, to some extent, 
subject to bargaining. If a firm enjoys high 
profits, it keeps silent so that a supervising 
agency will be less likely to skim away the extra 
earnings. On the other hand, if a firm has 
financial troubles, laments will be heard by the 
authorities. ... I call this situation the 
"softening of the budget constraint .... [a 
firm*s] budget may expand or contract at the will 
of the authorities, who can add or subtract from 
the pretax, presubsidy profit as much as they want. 
... An important characteristic of the soft budget
15
constraint is leveling, which depresses the 
profitability of the successful firms, at the same 
time helping out the losers.
In this particular paper, Kornai not only identifies
bargaining as the central feature of the budget softness
phenomenon, but also states that the concept covers the
treatment of both loss-makers and profitable enterprises.
In his 1986 Journal of Economic Literature paper, Kornai
(1986b) appears to use both definitions of budget
softness. First he states (p. 1697)
Loss, even if long lasting, can be compensated for 
by different means; ad hoc or permanently favorable 
tax conditions or bail-out credits. The author ... 
coined the term soft budget constraint to describe 
this phenomenon.
This appears unambiguous: budget softness is identified
with bailouts/rescues. But then on the next page
(p. 1698) he writes
On the other end of the spectrum are the firms 
making large profits. ... [T]here is a peculiar 
egalitarian tendency operating to reduce the larger 
profits. The budget constraint is not only soft, 
but also perverse.
Nevertheless, in most of his writings Kornai uses the
first definition - budget softness as rescue in the case
of financial difficulties. Significantly, when he
presented a formal model of the soft budget constraint,
this was the definition used (Kornai and Weibull 1983).
This is now the usual interpretation used by other writers
(for a formal model using this definition, see Goldfeld
and Quandt 1988), and is the interpretation I will use in
the remainder of this chapter.
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It is worth noting at this point that, although it has
been Kornai who has recently focused attention on the
importance of bailouts/rescues in socialist economies, the
idea itself is not new. Ludwig von Mises wrote in 1920,
in practice the propertyless [i.e. socialist] 
manager can only be held morally responsible for 
losses incurred. And so ethical losses are 
juxtaposed with opportunities for material gain.
The property owner on the other hand himself bears 
responsibility, as he himself must primarily feel 
the loss arising from unwisely conducted business, 
(von Mises 1920, p. 122)
In other words, von Mises is arguing that socialist
enterprises/managers have soft budget constraints, and
capitalist firms/managers do not.3 And identifying the
soft budget constraint with bailouts/rescues makes the
connection to the existing literatures on
bailouts/rescues in Western/capitalist economies. (A
recent example of this literature is Hillman et al.
1987.)
Budget Softness and Enterprise Efficiency
Kornai does not discuss the relationship of budget 
softness and enterprise efficiency in his 1980 book.
This theme is taken up briefly by Levine (1983, pp. 254- 
5), who states that the soft budget constraint slows the 
diffusion of new technology“by allowing inefficient 
enterprises to survive instead of being replaced in a 
process of "creative destruction” (Schumpeter1s term), 
and by reducing the incentive to innovate provided by
17
the threat of bankruptcy. In his 1985 critique of
Kornai, Gomulka argues that efficiency and budget
softness are directly connected:
Budget constraints are softer when and Where 
tolerated economic inefficiency is greater, and it 
is relatively high efficiency losses, not chronic 
shortages, that are probably an unavoidable 
characteristic .... (Gomulka 1985b, p. 74)
Gomulka goes on to suggest that, at the enterprise level,
the degree of budget softness is "the unit resource loss
that is tolerated by markets and/or planners, taking the
unit resource cost that would obtain under a perfectly
competitive market structure as the standard against which
to compare the performance of firms” (Gomulka 1985b, p.
77). Total budget softness is "the total resource loss
that a firm incurs in the course of its economic activity
within the budget period" (ibid.).
In his 1986 paper, Kornai argues that budget softness
reduces innovation and efficiency:
If the budget constraint is hard, the firm has no 
other option but to adjust to unfavorable external 
circumstances by improving quality, cutting costs, 
introducing new products or new processes, i.e. it 
must behave in an entrepreneurial manner. If, 
however, the budget constraint is soft such 
productive efforts are no longer imperative.
Instead, the firm is likely to seek external 
assistance asking compensation for unfavorable 
external circumstances. ... The soft budget 
constraint protects the old production line, the 
inefficient firm against constructive destruction and 
thus impedes innovation and development. (Kornai 
1986a, pp. 10-11)
Kornai is thus in substantial agreement with Gomulka and
Levine.
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In this ctafter I shall argue that the effect of budget 
softness on efficiency may actually be more complex. My 
main point is that under certain circumstances a soft 
budget constraint may promote efficiency gains. A second 
point is that empirical studies of budget softness may 
face an observation problem: budget softness may affect
the level of efficiency of enterprises without any 
subsidies actually being paid.
Before proceeding, I should note that my main concern in 
this ck*|ster is with the direct consequences of budget 
softness for enterprise efficiency. For example, Kornai 
has argued that the soft budget constraint leads to 
shortage and a sellers' market, and incentives to improve 
efficiency in a sellers' market are weakened because 
enterprises do not find it difficult to sell their 
products. I will not discuss such indirect effects in 
what follows.
Budget Softness and Enterprise Efficiency: Another Look
We can distinguish between two direct consequences of 
budget softness on enterprise efficiency. First, 
unprofitable enterprises, obsolete or inefficient capital 
stock and techniques, etc., survive longer or more 
frequently, and their more efficient replacements thus 
diffuse less rapidly. This direct effect of budget 
softness is thus to slow the process of creative
19
destruction. The effect of this on aggregate productive 
efficiency is unambiguously negative. (It is not 
necessarily the case, though, that budget softness will 
mean profit-maximising behaviour is observed less 
frequently, because "economic natural selection" does not 
necessarily lead to the success of profit-maximisers, as 
we shall see in Chapter 4.)
Second, budget softness may affect enterprise efficiency 
via incentives at the enterprise level. However, the 
direction of this second effect is a priori ambiguous. 
This can be seen if we distinguish between "positive" and 
"negative" incentives for enterprises to improve their 
productive efficiency. Positive incentives are rewards 
for raising efficiency; they promote what might be called 
"greed-driven" improvements. Negative incentives are 
penalties for not raising efficiency; they promote "fear- 
driven" improvements. Budget softness can in principle 
increase positive incentives and decrease negative 
incentives.
Take the specific example of enterprise R&D, though the 
argument applies to any risky activity which can improve 
enterprise efficiency. Suppose that, since budget 
softness ensures the survival of the enterprise, the 
negative incentive of penalties for non-innovators is 
decreased. On the other hand, riskiness of R&D may deter 
enterprises from innovating; in this case, budget 
softness, by guaranteeing the survival of the enterprise,
20
effectively increases the reward to innovating (the lower 
tail of the probability distribution of the returns to 
innovating is cut off). Thus the net result may be more, 
or less, innovation.
The ambiguous effect of budget softness on enterprise 
productivity has important implications for how we measure 
budget softness; it means that measuring the degree of 
budget softness by its ex post efficiency effects on 
enterprise performance (as suggested by Gomulka) may be 
inappropriate. Rather, I suggest we define the degree of 
budget softness by reference to the ex ante probability 
distribution of state aid conditional upon the &ize of the 
actual loss experienced by the enterprise.4 In this 
framework, "complete budget softness" means that a loss of 
anv size will always cause the state to rescue the 
enterprise with a 100% matching subsidy.
Several points about this definition are worth noting. 
First, by the enterprise's "loss" I mean the excess of 
actual, ex post "profit" over planned, ex ante "profit".
A enterprise may be subsidised in order to ensure that its 
planned revenue matches its planned costs; but if this 
enterprise experiences a cost overrun which is not met by 
a further subsidy, then its budget constraint is not 
"soft" (though the existing subsidy may be evidence of 
bargaining between the state and the enterprise, i.e. 
definition 2 of "budget softness").
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Second, this definition of budget softness contains the 
notion of "conditionality” mentioned above; the state aids 
the enterprise only if the enterprise experiences cost 
overruns. The definition excludes state aid granted to 
the enterprise for reasons other than losses.
Third, the definition can accommodate Gomulka's notion of 
"marginal budget softness" (Gomuika 1985b, p. 78). For 
simplicity, let us define the degree of budget softness as 
the difference between the expected value of the state 
subsidy and the actual loss experienced by the enterprise, 
divided by that loss. In other words, the degree of 
budget softness is the fraction of the losses experienced 
by the enterprise which the state is expected to cover.
We can then write the degree of budget softness as a 
function of the size of the loss experienced by the 
enterprise. This would, for example, allow us to 
formulate situations in which the degree of budget 
softness declines with the size of the enterprise's losses 
- the larger the losses, the smaller the percentage 
covered by the state. In such cases we could say that the 
enterprise's budget constraint becomes increasingly "hard" 
at the margin.
Finally, this definition and the models I present later in 
the cK«fter implicitly link the fate of managers and 
enterprises. In other words, I do not allow for the case 
where the enterprise makes losses and is rescued by the 
state, but the manager is penalised as well. I would
22
argue that this managerial incentive structure contains a 
hard budget constraint; I will return to this point in the 
next chapter.
Kornai, in arguing that budget softness decreases
enterprise efficiency, has only "fear-driven" efficiency
improvements in mind. This is clear from the quote on
innovation cited above, and from his statement that
A hard budget constraint means that even if the 
firm tries hard to cut its losses, the environment 
will not tolerate a protracted deficit. The 
emphasis is on punishment. The budget constraint 
is hard, if persistent loss is a matter of life and 
death; the more the loss-maker is spared from the 
tragic consequences, the softer is the constraint. 
(Kornai 1986a, p. 8)
Several recent essays (Levine 1983, p. 255, Gomulka 1985a,
p. 25, McAuley 1985) have argued that the poor innovation
performance of enterprises in centrally planned economies
is due primarily to the absence of competition and of
penalties for non-innovators. Thus McAuley (1985, p. 37)
writes that "it is not the absence of the promise of
substantial financial rewards that discourage rapid
innovation. ... [S]luggishness in the diffusion of new
products and processes is to be attributed to the absence
of substantial penalties for laggards." The importance of
budget softness in explaining the innovation performance
of the socialist economies may therefore be considerable.
In the next two sections I will present two simple models 
budget softness and enterprise-level incentives. In the 
first model, efficiency improvements are "greed-driven"
23
and budget softness leads to more a higher level of 
enterprise productivity. In the second model, efficiency 
improvements are both "fear-driven” and "greed-driven" and 
budget softness leads to a lower level of enterprise 
productivity.
Budget Softness and "Greed-Driven" Efficiency: A Model
The utility-maximising manager of an enterprise is faced 
with the decision of whether or not to enter into an 
investment project with an uncertain return (or indeed to 
engage in any single risky activity). Only one project is 
available for consideration. The outcome of the 
activities of the enterprise which are not concerned with 
the project are known in advance with certainty; only the 
outcome of the investment project is uncertain. In other 
words, the enterprise earns a basic level of profit which 
is certain and known in advance to the manager; and the 
investment project yields an incremental profit which may 
be positive or negative and is uncertain.
Part of the manager's income is positively related to the 
performance of the enterprise. Thus the uncertainty of 
the investment project translates directly into 
uncertainty in the manager's income. More specifically, 
the manager receives, in addition to his/her basic salary, 
a bonus or penalty which is a fixed percentage of the ex 
post final profit (including subsidies) of the enterprise;
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i.e. the bonus or penalty is proportional to the sum of 
the certain basic profit of the enterprise, the actual 
incremental profit which the investment project has 
generated, and any state subsidy given to the enterprise.
To make things simpler, we assume that the size of the 
manager's bonus is insignificant compared to the 
enterprise's profits. In other words, we will ignore the 
component of the enterprise's expenses which is the 
manager's bonus.
To begin, assume the.manager is risk-neutral, i.e. his/her 
utility function is linear. Utility maximisation by the 
manager implies the manager will approve investment 
projects which mean to him/her a positive increment to 
his/her expected utility (i.e. an uncertain increment to 
utility whose ex ante mean is positive). The manager's 
risk-neutral utility function combined with the linear 
(fixed percentage) bonus scheme in turn imply that any 
investment project with a positive expected return has for 
the manager a positive expected increment to utility, and 
an investment project with a negative expected return has 
for the manager a negative expected utility increment.
The component of the manager's income which is determined 
by the enterprise's unrisky non-investment activities does 
not affect the manager's decision, since it has no effect 
on whether the marginal expected bonus resulting from the 
project is positive or negative. In short, the manager 
will approve projects which have positive expected
25
profits. The manager will not approve dubious, 
"uneconomic” projects with negative expected profits.
Now add budget softness. By this I mean that if the 
investment project's profits are so negative that the 
enterprise's ex post total profit is negative, the state 
will with some positive probability subsidise the 
enterprise; i.e. state aid is conditional on the failure 
of the enterprise to make positive profits. The effect is 
identical to stating that, beyond a particular level of 
losses incurred by an investment project, state subsidies 
may be forthcoming. .
Now, if there is no chance that the investment project 
will fail so miserably as to drag the enterprise's entire 
profits below zero, then the manager's investment decision 
is unaffected because the enterprise will never need to be 
rescued.
But if there is some positive probability that the state 
will need to rescue the enterprise if the project fails, 
then the introduction of budget softness has an effect on 
managerial behaviour. The manager is now willing to go 
ahead with some projects which he/she was unwilling to 
approve without budget softness - namely, those dubious 
"uneconomic” projects whose expected profit is negative 
but which now have for the manager a positive marginal 
bonus. Budget softness has led to more investment in the 
sense that the set of investment projects which the
26
manager finds acceptable has been enlarged.
This is because the introduction of budget softness 
shrinks part of the lower tail of the distribution of the 
returns to the enterprise (including subsidies) which 
result from the project. The effect is as if disastrous 
projects were less likely. The managerial income scheme 
means that budget softness also shrinks part of the lower 
tail of the distribution of the marginal bonus which the 
project yields to the manager. The manager is thus now 
willing to approve those projects which, in the absence of 
budget softness, had a negative expected profit, but 
which, in the presence of budget softness, now have a 
positive expected profit. And if the enterprise’s budget 
constraint is completely soft, meaning that losses of any 
size by the enterprise will always be rescued completely 
by the state, the manager will be willing to begin anv 
project. Thus in this very simple model of the investment 
decision, if we measure investment by the number of 
projects a manager is willing to start, at the enterprise 
level budget softness and investment are positively 
related.
Several points should be noted at this stage. First, if a 
dubious project (one with a negative expected profit) does 
not by some chance lead to losses large enough to drive 
the enterprise's ex post profits below zero, rescue by the 
state will not actually take place - but budget softness 
has still affected the behaviour of the enterprise by
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causing it to begin the dubious project. Here is the 
observation problem mentioned earlier - we observe no 
subsidy, but budget softness has affected enterprise 
behaviour. However, if we look at many enterprises at 
once or at one enterprise over time, we will expect to see 
some projects fail so badly that state subsidies are 
forthcoming.
Second, note we have assumed that the set of potential 
investment projects is independent of the degree of budget 
softness. This excludes the possibility that an economy 
with soft budget constraints will have available a smaller 
(or greater) number of potentially successful investment 
projects.
So far we have considered the effects of budget softness 
on the investment decision of a single enterprise. Turning 
now to the industry level, say that budget softness is 
introduced to all the enterprises in an industry. We will 
see more investment projects entered, but against this we 
must count the cost of rescuing failed projects. In fact, 
under the assumptions we've been using, these costs will 
be greater than the larger enterprise profits from the 
increased number of successful projects. This is because 
prior to the introduction of budget softness, managers 
approved all projects with an expected profit greater than 
zero. Budget softness causes uneconomic projects to be 
started, which in aggregate will yield more losses than 
profits. Thus while budget softness increases the number
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of investment projects started, it causes efficiency 
losses through dubious uneconomic projects.
Now, return to the case of the individual enterprise with 
no budget softness. If we now assume that managers are 
(identically) risk-averse, and that they cannot entirely 
avoid bearing the risk of an individual investment 
project, the picture changes considerably. Managers will 
not now approve investment projects which are too risky - 
they will not approve projects with a positive expected 
profit and corresponding positive expected marginal 
managerial bonus if this expected marginal bonus is not 
great enough to compensate the manager for bearing the 
risk. However, if budget softness is introduced, managers 
will now be willing to approve some of these risky but 
profitable projects. And if the degree of budget softness 
is not so excessive as to cause too many uneconomic 
projects to be started, then we will see an aggregate 
efficiency gain over the situation with no budget 
softness. The profits of the investment projects which 
the managers were not previously willing to start will 
now, in aggregate, be positive - the profits of the 
successful projects should exceed the subsidies to the 
failed projects. In effect, a policy of budget softness 
leads to efficiency gains through the state spreading risk 
and thus providing a form of insurance.5
It is important to note here that the conditional nature 
of the budget softness is crucial to the results of the
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model. An unconditional subsidy to the enterprise - a 
subsidy paid by the state to the enterprise even if the 
project isn't started, or regardless of the outcome of the 
investment project - would have very different effects on 
the manager's investment decision. Thus, if the manager 
is risk-neutral, an unconditional subsidy would have no 
effect at all on the investment decision. This is because 
an unconditional subsidy would leave the expected profits 
of investment projects unchanged, and since risk 
neutrality implies a linear utility function, the 
manager's expected utility increment resulting from an 
investment project would also be unchanged.
The problem of how to get managers in a socialist economy 
to engage in risky innovation is not new. Hayek wrote in 
1935,
If the penalty for loss is the surrender of the 
position of the "entrepreneur" will it not be 
almost inevitable that the possible chance of 
making a loss will operate as so strong a deterrent 
that it will outbalance the chance of the greatest 
profit? ... [Without the incentive of possible 
gains there would be] a sacrifice of all 
experimentation with new and untried methods. Even 
if progress is inevitably connected with what is 
commonly called waste, is it not worth having if on 
the whole gains exceed losses? (Hayek, 1935, p.
235)
Bergson (1978) has a good discussion of the problem of 
getting risk-averse managers to engage in risky but 
socially beneficial projects.
The soft budget constraint, it can be argued, may be an 
answer to this problem. The point is that by protecting
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managers from some of the penalties of failure, a soft 
budget constraint can remove some of the risk faced by 
managers and cause them to engage in risky but profitable 
innovation activity which they would otherwise avoid. We 
would then see an aggregate efficiency gain over the 
situation with no budget softness.6 Of course, 
introducing budget softness may well have negative 
consequences for incentives which outweigh the positive 
effects just described. I now turn to a small model which 
attempts to formalise some of these negative effects.
Budget Softness and 1 Fear-Driven11 and 11 Greed-Driven11 
Efficiency: A Model
We have a simple two-enterprise, one-period, game- 
theoretic duopoly model. The enterprises initially have 
identical production costs and sell identical products.
The managers of both enterprises must decide on whether to 
engage in a costly activity which will lower production 
costs. This activity could be, say, an investment or 
innovation project, or even just the application of extra 
managerial effort; for illustrative purposes I will use 
this last interpretation in the presentation below. Both 
the costs of extra managerial effort and the exact size of 
the cost reduction are known with certainty to the 
managers. There is only one possible level of extra 
managerial effort. The incomes of the managers are linear 
functions of the profits of their enterprises, and so 
managerial payoffs can be written in terms of managerial
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effort and shares of enterprise profits.
Notation is:
E Managerial effort
M Manager's share of the (monopoly) profit to the
enterprise with the hard-working manager if the other
enterprise's manager doesn't work hard
X Manager's share of the (exit) penalty to the
enterprise with the lazy manager if the other 
enterprise's manager works hard
p Probability that a manager will choose to work hard
S An unconditional subsidy
If both managers do not work hard, both enterprises earn 
zero profits in the market place - but since both managers 
have avoided expending managerial effort E, each manager 
has a final payoff of 0 (the lower right hand corner of 
Figure 2.1 below). If both work hard, their enterprises 
still earn zero profits in the market place, but since 
they have both expended effort, each has a final payoff of 
-E (the upper left hand corner of Figure 2.1). In other 
words, as long as the enterprises have identical
production costs, the profit they earn in the market place
is zero and independent of the production cost, but 
managerial payoffs depend on whether or not managers 
expended extra effort. This exact payoff structure is not 
crucial to the model, but it makes things much simpler.
It is also not as bad as it first sounds. For example, in
a simple symmetric Bertrand pricing duopoly model with no 
fixed costs and constant marginal costs, both enterprises 
engage in a price competition which results in both
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setting price equal to marginal cost, whatever that 
marginal cost is; in other words, profit is zero for any 
marginal cost.
Returning to the present model, say the manager of 
enterprise 1 works hard and the manager of enterprise 2 
doesn't (the upper right hand corner of Figure 2.1). 
Manager 1 does very well - say his enterprise monopolises 
the market and he earns a "monopoly bonus" M - but the 
manager gives up E for the privilege, so his payoff is M- 
E. Manager 2 does very poorly - say his enterprise must 
leave the market and he suffers a large exit penalty X - 
but he didn't give up E since he didn't work hard. So the 
manager's payoff is -X. Since the model is symmetric, the 
outcome is simply reversed if the manager of enterprise 2 
expends extra managerial effort and the manager of 
enterprise 1 doesn't.
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Figure 2.1: Pavoffs
Manager 2 
Work Hard Don't
Work Hard
Work Hard
Manager 1
Don't 
Work Hard
Notation: (manager l's payoff, manager 2's payoff)
The equilibrium of this game depends on the relative size 
of monopoly profits M, exit costs X and effort costs E.
If X > E > M, we have two pure strategy Nash equilibria 
and one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, none of which iso. 
dominant strategy equilibrium. In this situation the 
comparative statics exercises below using the mixed 
strategy equilibrium are not meaningful, and so I exclude 
this case.7 For the remaining possibilities, it can be 
shown that, if M^E and X^E, there is a unique Nash 
equilibrium which is an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
If M=E or X=R, but not both, then there are multiple pure 
strategy Nash equilibria, but one of these equilibria will 
be a dominant strategy equilibria. It is natural, 
therefore, to take as the solution to the game these 
dominant pure strategy equilibria and the unique symmetric 
Nash mixed strategy equilibria (and to-exclude the —  
possibilities that M=X=E or that X>E>M). This choice of 
solution may be justified by reference to Selten's concept 
of "perfect equilibrium". It has been shown that for all
(”E, -E) (M-E, -X)
(“X, M-E) (0, 0)
34
games with two players, an equilibrium is undominated if 
and only if it is perfect (see e.g. Van Damme 1987, 
Corollary 2.2.6 and Theorem 3.2.2).
Specifically, the solution of the game is for both
managers to expend extra effort with probability
p = 1 for M,X £ E but not M=X=E (1)
p = M - E  for M > E > X (2)
M - X
p = 0 for M,X < E but not M=X=E (3)
By varying M and X, we can engage in comparative statics 
exercises with p. Such exercises are meaningful for this 
specification of an equilibrium and these restrictions on 
the parameter values.8
When exit penalties exceed the costs of extra effort 
(X > E), both managers always work hard and this gain in 
enterprise efficiency is purely "fear-driven”; managers 
work hard entirely out of fear of the consequences of 
being left behind by their competition. Even if M = E,
i.e. the potential monopoly gains from working hard are 
matched entirely by effort costs, the managers will still 
always choose to work hard.
When M > E > X and the managers work hard only sometimes, 
they have both positive and negative incentives for doing 
so; in this case enterprise efficiency is both "greed- 
driven" and "fear-driven". This is reflected in 
comparative statics exercises with the equilibrium p.
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Taking the total differential of p, we have
dp = M-E dX + EzX dM (4)
(M-X) 2 (M-X) 2
Both the right hand side coefficients are positive. That 
is, an increase in penalties X increases the probability 
of working harder, as does an increase in the monopoly 
rewards M.
Now introduce budget softness into the model. We might 
regard this as a case of "market socialism” - the 
enterprises compete with each other to sell their 
products, but the state will, if necessary, aid the 
enterprise that would otherwise have to leave the industry 
or go bankrupt. In this model, budget softness means a 
subsidy which reduces the exit penalty X suffered by the 
manager. (Note the conditionality of the subsidy - it is 
paid to the enterprise only if the enterprise is facing 
the hardship of leaving the market.)
Budget softness affects payoffs and thus enterprise 
productivity in two ways. First, the exit penalty X is 
now reduced; the state eases the burden of leaving the 
market. If M < 0, both managers never work hard 
regardless of the value of X, so we consider only the case 
where M > E. If X > E both before and after the 
introduction of budget softness, we will still see both 
managers always working hard: p = 1, from equation (1).
But if X > E before budget softness is introduced and
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X < E after budget constraints become soft, then from 
equation (2) we can see that the probability p of working 
hard drops so that p < 1. In other words, if exit 
penalties become less than effort costs, budget softness 
causes a drop in "fear-driven” efficiency. The same is 
true if X < E before and after the introduction of budget 
softness. We can see this from (4) in which dX < 0, 
dM = 0, and, by assumption, M £ E, so that dp < 0.
Second, a large enough degree of budget softness will 
enable the enterprise with the lazy manager to stay in the 
market. The effect of this is to lower the monopoly 
reward M - the enterprise with the hard-working manager 
will no longer reap such large profits by driving its 
competitor out of the market. Consider the case where 
initially M > E. Again assuming X < E, the result is a\ 
further decrease in p, the frequency of working hard. For 
the case of the decreased M still greater than E, this can 
be seen from the coefficient of dM in equation (4). And 
if M becomes less than or equal to E, from equation (3) we 
see the result is p = 0; no extra managerial effort work
is ever observed. In short, budget softness causes in
this model a decrease in "greed-driven” efficiency as 
well.
It is worth noting the special situation in which M = E 
and budget softness causes X to drop below E (i.e. the 
potential rewards to working hard do not change and are
equal to effort costs E, and budget softness causes the
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large exit penalty X to drop below E). Without budget 
softness, we saw that if exit costs X exceeded effort 
costs E, both managers always worked hard even if the 
monopoly reward M was so low as to equal effort costs E. 
With X < E because of budget softness, however, the 
situation is exactly the opposite: if M = E, both managers 
never work hard. But in that case we will never see any 
rescues by the state. No subsidies will ever be paid out; 
but budget constraints will still be soft and still 
decrease enterprise efficiency. Here again we have the 
observation problem mentioned above: budget constraints 
are soft, affect enterprise-level incentives and decrease 
enterprise efficiency, but no subsidies will ever be 
observed.
Now consider, on the other hand, an unconditional subsidy 
paid to both enterprises, regardless of their actions. 
Managers are rewarded with a fraction of enterprise 
profits, so we say that the fraction of the subsidy which 
goes to the managers is S. I will consider two possible 
forms for the unconditional subsidy. First, the subsidy 
may be similar to managerial effort E in the sense that it 
isn't fungible, i.e. it cannot be spent in market 
competition. In other words, we add S to all the payoffs 
in Figure 2.1. It is easy to see that (with risk-neutral 
players) the equilibrium is completely unaffected by this 
unconditional subsidy, and so equations (1)—(3) are 
unchanged. Thus in this model, an unconditional subsidy 
of this form has no effect on enterprise efficiency.
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The second possibility is that the subsidy may be spent by 
enterprises in competitive activity (say they can wage an 
advertising war). Let's say that if the enterprises have 
the same production costs (i.e. both managers work hard or 
both don't work hard), enterprises spend the subsidy on 
such competitive activity and managers do not receive S.
On the other hand, if one manager works hard and the other 
one doesn't, both enterprises retain the subsidy and do 
not spend it on market competition, and both managers 
receive S. This is not unreasonable if we assume the 
subsidy is not so large as to be able to keep the 
enterprise with the lazy manager in the market. Since 
this enterprise must exit the industry, there is no reason 
for it to spend the subsidy on a hopeless competition; and 
in this circumstance there is no reason for the other 
enterprise to spend the subsidy in a competition it will 
win anyway.
The payoffs of the game are now as in Figure 2.2:
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Ficrure 2.2: Pavoffs
Manager 2 
Work Hard Don * t
Work Hard
Work Hard
Manager 1
Don't 
Work Hard
I will consider only the case where M > E > X, i.e.
0 < p < 1 both before and after the introduction of the 
subsidy. In this case the mixed strategy game is for each 
manager to work hard with p
(0, 0) (M+S, E-X+S)
(E-X+S, M+S) (E, E)
p = M-E+S (5)
M-X+2S
What will be the effect of introducing an unconditional 
subsidy of this form on the probability of working hard? 
Subtracting (2) from (5), we get
Ps>0 " Ps=0 = S * jfBzEL.— .(E-P) (6)
(M-X)(M-X+2S)
The effect on p is ambiguous, because we know only that 
(E-X) > 0 and (M-E) > 0; we do not know their relative 
magnitudes. The numerator of (6) may be positive or 
negative depending on the size of exit penalties relative 
to effort costs (the "fear-driven" incentive to work hard) 
and on the size of monopoly profits relative to effort 
costs (the "greed-driven" incentive to work hard). Thus 
an unconditional subsidy of this form, unlike budget
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softness, has in this model an ambiguous effect on 
enterprise efficiency.
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Notes to Chapter 2
1. This is a revised version of a paper presented to the 
SSRC Summer Workshop on Soviet and East European 
Economics, held at the University of Illinois, Urbana in 
July 1986. It is based upon work supported under a 
National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship. I would 
like to thank the National Science Foundation for their 
generous financial support, and Abram Bergson, Stanislaw 
Gomulka, Janos Kornai, Fyodor Kushnirsky, Mike Spagat, 
Peter Wiles, and the participants of the SSRC Summer 
Workshop for their many helpful comments and suggestions 
on an earlier version of this paper.
2. In his 1980 book, Kornai states that price-making 
behavior by a capitalist firm constitutes budget softness, 
because "by its price-making power it can almost
*automatically* guarantee its survival" (Kornai 1980, p. 
312). However, Kornai1s 1986 formulation mentions only 
bureaucratic price-making.
3. But see below in section III the problem of the 
distinction between the fates of firms and the fates of 
their managers.
4. A similar formal definition was independently proposed 
by Goldfeld and Quandt (1988).
5. If managers are risk-averse but not identically so, the 
analysis is more complicated but the basic point is _ 
unchanged - budget softness can lead to efficiency gains. 
The complication is that the same degree of budget 
softness may not be sufficient to cause a very risk-averse 
manager to engage in a profitable project, but may also 
cause a different, mildly risk-averse manager to approve 
uneconomic projects.
6. Of course, the degree of budget softness should not be 
too great; otherwise, considering all the investment 
projects caused by the introduction of budget softness, 
the losses from uneconomic investment projects would in 
aggregate exceed the gains from the risky but profitable 
ones.
7. Why X < E < M is excluded is best seen from an example. 
Say these inequalities hold, and the mixed strategy 
equilibrium is given by equation 2 below, and the total 
differential of p is given by equation 4 below. Then if, 
say, the exit penalty X rises, p paradoxically falls.
This is because, for p to be a self-sustaining mixed 
strategy equilibrium, players must be indifferent between 
the expected payoffs of the two pure strategies. If X 
rises, player 1 must believe player 2 will work hard with 
a lower probability if player 1 is to be indifferent 
between his expected payoff if he works hard and his 
expected payoff if he doesn't. See below and also the 
following note.
42
8. More specifically, the mixed strategy p (equation 2) 
gives the same solutions as equations 1 and 3 in the 
limiting cases. Consider the situation where M>E>X and 
equation 2 holds. As X->E from below, p->l; and if X=E, 
p=l from equation 1; so p is continuous here. Similarly 
as M—>E from above, p->0; and if M=E, p=0 from equation
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Chapter 3: The "Credible-Commitment Problem"
in the Centre-Enterprise Relationship1
Introduction
In the previous chapter, as in the existing literature on 
the bailout ("soft budget constraint") problem in 
socialist economies, I simply took as given the existence 
of a state policy of bailouts; I did not try to explain 
why the state might follow such a policy. In this chapter 
I offer one explanation of why the centre rescues ailing 
enterprises. The core of the explanation is that the 
centre may be unable.to make credible commitments about 
its future behavior toward an enterprise.
In perfect information versions of the simple model 
presented below, the centre is unable to prevent itself 
from rescuing the enterprise with additional resources,
i.e. it is unable to commit itself to a policy of "no 
bailouts". In one of these versions, the centre is also 
unable to prevent itself from making the enterprise's 
output target easier to fulfil. In the imperfect 
information version of the model, on the other hand, by 
acquiring a "reputation for toughness" the centre is able 
to credibly threaten a policy of "no bailouts". In the 
model, the "credible-commitment problem" can lead to the 
deliberate withholding by the enterprise of resources 
which the centre wants devoted to production. Perhaps 
surprisingly for such a simple set-up, the model also 
illustrates a rich variety of empirical phenomena and
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theoretical concepts regarding enterprises or firms in 
centrally-planned economies (CPEs), market socialist 
economies (MSEs), and capitalist economies (CEs): bailouts 
and rescues, plan revisions, storming, plan tautness, plan 
discipline, the role of reputations, the role of the 
planning horizon, Kornai's "soft budget constraint" and 
paternalism, and Gomulka's "budget flexibility". (NB: in 
this chapter, and in the rest of the thesis, I largely 
abandon the "soft budget constraint" terminology and refer 
simply to bailouts/rescues. This is mostly for clarity's 
sake.)
The model presented is a game between the centre and an 
enterprise. The basic model is as follows. Production by 
the enterprise takes place over two periods. The 
enterprise's personnel can influence the level of 
production by expending a variable amount of "effort" in 
each period. These personnel face a disutility of effort 
and all other things equal would prefer not to work hard. 
At the end of the second period, the personnel receive a 
reward or "bonus" only if enterprise production meets a 
certain target. The size of this reward is determined 
exogenously, outside the model. We can interpret the 
"enterprise's personnel" as either its manager(s) or its 
workers. In between the two production periods the centre 
may, if it chooses, give the enterprise additional 
resources to be devoted to production; i.e. it may 
"rescue" the enterprise. These additional resources can 
be material inputs, extra funds to buy inputs, tax breaks,
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etc. The centre's utility increases with increases in the 
output of the enterprise and falls with its expenditure of 
these additional resources.
Three perfect information versions and one imperfect 
information version of the model are presented. In 
version I, the target level of output is set exogenously, 
outside the model. In version II, the centre chooses the 
target before the first production period; it is unable to 
revise the target after period one. In version III, the 
centre chooses the target in between the two production 
periods. Version IV.is obtained by repeating version I 
over time and allowing for some uncertainty on the part of 
the enterprise as to whether the centre will rescue the 
enterprise. That is, the enterprise is unsure of whether 
the centre is "weak" or "tough".
The model has two natural interpretations. The first is 
that of the centre-firm relationship in an MSE or CE in 
which the centre or the state has the ability to rescue 
enterprises or firms. Here the state would rather not 
have to expend resources in order to rescue a firm that is 
in difficulties, but it also does not want the firm to 
"fail" by going out of business, or by having to lay off 
large numbers of employees in order to avoid bankruptcy. 
The firm's "personnel" may refer either to the manager or 
to the workers. The target level of output is the level 
below which the firm the firm would fail, and the reward 
or bonus received by the personnel is the reward of
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avoiding such a failure. The state does not set this 
target output level and so this MSE/CE interpretation 
corresponds to version I of the model. An alternative 
MSE/CE version I interpretation is also available. The 
level of effort is chosen by the manager, and the target 
level of output is the minimum output the firm must 
achieve for the manager to keep his job and not be fired 
by the owners of the firm (CE) or by the workers (labour- 
managed firm). In these MSE/CE interpretations of version 
I, we might argue that the target level of output is set 
by market competition; the greater the degree of 
competition, the higher is the target.
The second interpretation is that of the centre-enterprise 
relationship in a classical Stalinist-type CPE. Here too 
the enterprise's "personnel" may refer either to the 
manager or to the workers. The centre is a ministry, say, 
which desires high output levels from its enterprises, but 
which would rather not bail out enterprises and would 
prefer to conserve productive resources and force the 
enterprise personnel to exert the maximum possible amount 
of effort. The ministry can set the output target which 
an enterprise must meet before its personnel can receive 
their bonuses. This CPE interpretation corresponds to 
versions II and III of the model.
The requirement that equilibria be credible is met by 
invoking the criterion of sequential rationality (Kreps 
and Wilson 1982a). Recall that a player's strategy is a
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plan of action for every decision point in the game. 
Sequential rationality means that a player's strategy must 
prescribe behavior that is optimising at every decision 
point. By requiring sequential rationality, we exclude 
strategies that are not credible in the sense that if some 
decision point were reached, the player whose decision it 
is might not make his best move. That is, players are not 
allowed to threaten behavior in some situation where, if 
that situation were actually reached, it may not be in the 
player's interest to carry out the threat.
In versions I-III of-the model, the sequential rationality 
criterion is met by restricting attention to subgame 
perfect equilibria (Selten 1975), the natural sequential 
rationality equilibrium concept for games of perfect 
information: an equilibrium is subgame perfect if the 
equilibrium strategies of the players form Nash equilibria 
in all the subgames of the game. In version IV, which is 
an imperfect information game, subgame perfection is not 
adequate and we look instead at a subset of subgame 
perfect equilibria, sequential equilibria (Kreps and 
Wilson 1982a). In this formulation, players have beliefs 
regarding the uncertainty they face, i.e. regarding where 
in the game tree they really are. In a sequential 
equilibrium, each player's strategy prescribes behavior 
which at every decision point is optimal with respect both 
to these beliefs and to the strategies of the other 
players.2
48
The assumption that the centre is unable to precommit is 
crucial to the results of the model. It is also fairly 
realistic. It is reasonable to argue that the centre will 
often be unable to tie its own hands and prevent itself 
from taking a specific action in the future.3 Formal or 
legal mechanisms through which such precommitment could 
take place are not obvious; the centre, meaning the state 
or a branch of it, is often in a position to change laws 
or bend rules. Furthermore, the importance of informal, 
and thus to some extent extra-legal, mechanisms in 
limiting these precommitment possibilities should not be 
underestimated, particularly in socialist countries where 
Party connections, influence, the second economy, etc., 
can and do play a large role in resource allocation.
Several recent studies of the ratchet effect (Freixas, 
Guesnerie and Tirole 1985; Litwack 1987; Ickes and 
Samuelson 1987; Laffont and Tirole 1987, 1988), where the 
enterprise conceals its productive capacity from the 
centre in order to get a less demanding incentive scheme, 
have also used the sequential equilibrium concept. The 
equilibria in these models therefore also require that 
players* strategies be credible; but these models and the 
credibility problems that arise within them differ from 
those in this cW«f*er. The credibility problem in these 
studies takes the form of the centre's inability to commit 
itself to using a particular incentive scheme in the 
future. A very productive enterprise is reluctant to 
produce at full capacity this period, because by doing so
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it reveals its capacity to the centre and will face a 
tougher incentive scheme next period. The centre would 
like to be able to commit itself to avoid taking advantage 
of the enterprise in this way, but such a commitment is 
not credible. Here imperfect information is the source of 
the centre*s problems; in its absence, it would have no 
difficulty choosing the optimal incentive scheme for the 
enterprise.
In versions I-III of the model in this chafer, we have 
perfect information and the centre's credibility problem 
is acute. In version IV we have imperfect information, 
but here it is the enterprise which faces the uncertainty; 
it is unsure of the toughness of the centre, and this 
uncertainty is a solution to the centre's problems. The 
model in this dvyter is therefore in a sense a natural 
complement to the ratchet effect models. Another 
important difference between the ratchet models mentioned 
above and the model in this cKi|£er is that here the 
centre's problem is not to choose the "optimal incentive 
scheme" for the enterprise, but rather to choose an 
optimal course of action given the assumed form of 
incentive scheme. We will return in the conclusion to the 
possible political, practical and institutional 
constraints on the centre's choice of scheme, but for now 
we note only that the incentive scheme assumed here does 
have the virtues of simplicity and of capturing important 
features of real world incentive schemes.4
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The Model
In what follows I use "the enterprise" as a shorthand for 
"the enterprise's personnel".
Action Spaces; In production periods 1 and 2 the 
enterprise chooses its level of effort. It can, in either 
period, choose E (work hard) or e (take it easy). In 
between production periods 1 and 2 the centre can either 
devote resources R to a rescue of the enterprise, or 
devote 0 resources to a rescue, i.e. not rescue. In
, m  ,
versions I and IV of the game, the output target Y is 
exogenously given. In version II, the centre can also 
precommit before production period 1 to some output target 
Yt. In version III, the centre can only precommit to this 
output target in between periods 1 and 2, i.e. at that
• . T • •time it chooses YA and simultaneously decides whether or
, . T •not to rescue. Without loss of generality, Y is 
restricted to outputs that are technically feasible.
Production Technology: Output Y is a function of the 
enterprise's effort in production period 1, the resources 
supplied by the centre for a rescue, and the enterprise's 
effort in period 2. For simplicity, there are only four 
technically feasible levels of output. We write
=  Y(E,R,E)
Y2 = Y (E, 0, E) = Y (e,R, E) = Y (E, R, e) 
Y3 = Y(e,0,E) = Y(E,0,e) = Y(e,R,e) 
Y4 s Y(e,0,e)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
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According to (2) and (3), the rescue resources should be 
interpreted as an injection of resources that compensates 
for a low level of effort in one period. A natural 
restriction on the technology is that the marginal 
products of inputs are positive, implying that
so that a rescue will make economic sense for the centre 
in some circumstances. For most situations, (6) and (7) 
together are stronger than necessary; they are both 
assumed to hold throughout only for expositional
Enterprise^ Preferences: The enterprise suffers 
disutility of effort. It does not discount effort in 
period 2 vis a vis effort in period 1. If, after period
enterprise also receives a reward or "bonus" B. 
Enterprise preferences over outcomes, best to worst, are 
assumed to be as follows:
1. Bee - bonus received, expended little effort in both
periods
2. BeE and BEe - bonus received, expended little effort
only in period 1 or period 2, respectively
3. BEE — bonus received, worked hard in both periods
4. Oee - no bonus, expended little effort in both
periods
5. OeE and OEe - no bonus, expended little effort only
in period 1 or period 2, respectively
6. OEE - no bonus, worked hard in both periods
(5)
We also require
(6)
(7)
simplicity.5
2, actual output equals or exceeds target output YT, the
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The bonus is therefore the top priority of the enterprise 
and the level of effort the second priority. The implicit 
assumption here is that the reward for achieving YT is 
"large".
Centre's Preferences; The centre's goal is to maximise 
"net output", that is, total output Y minus any rescue 
costs. The reward B either is not paid by the centre, or, 
if paid, is small compared to Y and R and can be ignored.6 
The centre may value output for its own sake, or because 
output is correlated with something else the centre does 
value (e.g. the enterprise's level of employment).
Whatever the case, we interpret output Y as a measure 
representing also the value of the enterprise's production 
for the centre.
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Figure 3.1; Extensive Form of Version I
Enterprise moves:
Center moves:
Enterprise moves:
Node:
Output: Y a y3 y2 Y i
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Figure 3.2: Subaame Perfect Equilibrium of Version lb
Enterprise moves:
Center moves:
Enterprise moves:
Node:
Output: Y,
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Figure 3.3: A Non-Subaame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of 
Version lb
Enterprise moves:
Center moves:
Enterprise moves:
Node:
Output: V3 y2 Y2 Y1
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Table 3.1: Pavoffs
Node: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Output: Y4 Y3 Y3 Y2 Y3 Y2 Y2 Y1
Target Payoffs 
Ent Cent
Payoffs 
Ent Cent
Payoffs 
Ent Cent
Payoffs 
Ent Cent
Payoffs 
Ent Cent
Payoffs 
Ent Cent
Payoffs 
Ent Cent
Payoffs 
Ent Cent
yt=y1 Oee Y4 OeE Y3 Oee Y3-R OeE Y2-R OEe Y3 OEE Y2 OEe Y2-R BEE Y.J-R
yt=y2 Oee Y4 OeE Y3 Oee Y3-R BeE Y2-R OEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y^-R
yt=y3 Oee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y3-R BeE Y2-R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y1-R
-< « Bee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y3-R BeE Y2-R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y^ R
Enterprise "effort" level E = work hard, e = take it easy 
Centre*s move R = rescue, 0 = don*t rescue
Enterprise's payoff is bonus received (if any) and effort 
made e.g. OeE = no bonus, was lazy in per. 1, worked hard 
in per. 2
Centre's payoff is "net output" s output level - rescue 
costs e.g. Y2-R = output of Y2 - rescue costs R
Model Results
Figure 3.1 gives the extensive form of version I of the
m # #
game, where Y is given exogenously. The extensive form 
of version II, where the centre precommits to a YT before 
production period 1, is obtained by making this decision 
by the centre the first move of the game. The extensive 
form of version III is similarly obtained by having the 
centre choose YT when it chooses R. Table 3.2 summarises 
the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes for versions I-
57
III.7 The equilibria are fully described in Appendix 3.1.
Subgame perfect equilibria are calculated through 
backwards induction. This can be seen in Figure 3.2, 
which gives the subgame perfect equilibrium for version 
lb; the equilibrium strategy choices are indicated with 
bold lines. We begin with the enterpriser decision in 
period 2. It may find itself at any one of four decision 
nodes. Moving from left to right, at the first of the 
four, the enterprise has a choice of either playing e and 
ending up at node 1, or playing E and ending up at node 2. 
The former gives the enterprise the larger payoff, and so 
playing e at this node becomes part of the enterpriser 
equilibrium subgame perfect strategy. Similarly, at the 
second decision point from the left the enterprise has a 
choice of either playing e and ending up at node 3 or 
playing E and ending up at node 4. The latter gives the 
larger payoff, and so playing E at this node is part of 
the enterprise's strategy. The procedure is the same for 
the remaining two nodes.
We can now calculate the centre's subgame perfect 
equilibrium strategy. The centre may find itself at 
either one of two nodes. Moving from left to right, the 
centre has a choice of playing R or 0. Taking as given 
the enterprise's choices for period 2 as calculated in 
previous paragraph, we find that if the centre rescues it 
will end up at node 4 and if it does not rescue it will 
end up at node 1. The former gives the larger payoff, and
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so R is the centre’s equilibrium choice for this node. 
Again, the procedure is the same for the second of the 
centre's two decision points.
The last step is to calculate the enterprise's equilibrium 
choice of effort in period 1. Taking as given the 
enterprise's choices for period 2 and the centre's choices 
as calculated as above, we see that if the enterprise 
chooses e in period 1 it will end up at node 4, and if it
chooses E in period 1 it will end up at node 6. Node 4
gives the larger payoff, and so playing e at the period 1
decision point is part of the enterprise's strategy. This 
completes the calculation of the subgame perfect 
equilibrium of version lb.
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Table 3.2; Subaame Perfect Equilibrium Outcomes.
Versions I-III
T • .I. YA set outside the model, before the game begins
a. Play is E,R,E; outcome is node 8
Output is Y*l , target is achieved 
Enterprise's payoff is BEE 
Centre's payoff is Y1-R
b. Yt=Y2 Play is e,R,E; outcome is node 4
Output is Y2 , target is achieved 
Enterprise's payoff is BeE 
Centre's payoff is Y2-R
c. yt=y3
(i) Y2-R > Y3 Two equilibrium outcomes
(1) Play is e,0,E; outcome is node 2 
Output is Y3, target is achieved 
Enterprise's payoff is BeE 
Centre's payoff is Y3
(2) Play is E,R,e; outcome is node 7 
Output is Y2, target is exceeded 
Enterprise's payoff is BEe 
Centre's payoff is Y2-R
(ii) Y2-R < Y3 Two equilibrium outcomes
(1) Play is e,0,E; outcome is node 2 
Output is Y3, target is achieved 
Enterprise's payoff is BeE 
Centre's payoff is Y3
(2) Play is E,0,e; outcome is node 5 
Output is Y3, target is achieved 
Enterprise's payoff is BEe 
Centre's payoff is Y3
d. YT=Y4
(i) y3-r > y4
Play is e,R,e; outcome is node 3 
Output is Y3, target is exceeded 
Enterprise's payoff is Bee 
Centre's payoff is Y3-R
(ii) y3-r < y4
Play is e,0,e; outcome is node 1 
Output is Y4, target is achieved 
Enterprise's payoff is Bee 
Centre's payoff is Y4
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Table 3.2 (continued)
II. Centre has the first move and can precommit
to a choice of YT before period 1
Centre chooses Y^=Y^
Play is Y -Y1,E,R,E; outcome is node 8 
Output is Y t a r g e t  is achieved 
Enterprise's payoff is BEE 
Centre's payoff is Y1-R
. • TIII. Centre can precommit to a choice of YA only
before period 2 and after period 1; chooses
Yt and makes rescue decision simultaneously
(i) Y2-R > y3
outcome is node 4 
Output is Y2, target is achieved 
Enterprise's payoff is BeE 
Centre's payoff is Y2-R
(ii) Y2-R < Y3 Centre chooses YT=Y3 
Play is e,0 and YT=Y3,E;
outcome is node 2 
Output is Y3, target is achieved 
Enterprise's payoff is OeE 
Centre's payoff is Y3
Note: Nodes in the Table refer to terminal nodes in
the Figures and Table 3.1.
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Version I (MSE/CE)
The version which illustrates the main point of this clicyrter 
is Yt=Y2 (version lb in Table 3.2, and Figure 3.2). The 
enterprise takes it easy in the first period; it is able 
in this way to commit to some extent and so substitute 
rescue resources for effort. The centre is forced to 
rescue the enterprise, for only with this help will the 
enterprise be able to achieve the target output. If the 
centre did not rescue, the enterprise would not find it 
worthwhile to work hard in period 2, and final production 
would be very low at Y4. After obtaining the rescue 
resources the enterprise works hard in the second period, 
achieves the target Y2, and receives the bonus.
Note that there are Nash equilibria that are not subgame 
perfect and that the centre would prefer: in these
equilibria the centre has a strategy of f,no rescue", and 
the enterprise a strategy of "work hard in period 1; if 
not rescued, work hard in period 2 and if rescued, take it 
easy in period 2". One such equilibrium is given in 
Figure 3.3.8 The equilibrium outcome in these equilibria 
is node 6; play is "work hard in period 1", "do not 
rescue", "work hard in period 2", and output is Y2 i.e. 
the target is achieved. Why these equilibria are not 
credible is clear from Figure 3.3. Here the centre*s 
threat of no rescue is not credible; were the enterprise 
to actually take it easy in period 1, it would not be 
optimal for the centre to carry out this threat.
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The subgame perfect equilibrium of version lb may be 
interpreted as featuring what Kornai (1980, 1986a) has 
dubbed the "soft budget constraint"; firms that are in 
difficulties are helped by the centre. Kornai has argued 
that the source of budget softness is paternalism on the 
part of the state. As noted above, others who have 
analysed budget softness (Gomulka 1985b, Goldfeld and 
Quandt 1988) have typically assumed its existence and not 
explained why it may exist. The above model provides one 
possible explanation; the centre cannot credibly threaten 
not to rescue enterprises because of the costs of allowing 
firms to fail to meet targets or go bankrupt, and the 
enterprises realise this and take advantage of it.9 
Indeed, the preferences of the centre given above are 
paternalistic; the centre would prefer that the enterprise 
do well and not fail, and a "soft budget constraint” is a 
consequence.10 It is also worth pointing out that although 
budget softness is a financial notion, in Kornai*s 
analysis both financial assistance and grants in kind of 
inputs to production are the results of paternalism 
(Kornai 1980, pp. 561-5). Similarly, in the above model 
rescue resources R may be additional resources of any kind 
devoted to production.11
We also have here an illustration of Gomulka*s (1985b) 
notion of "budget flexibility", as well as a 
generalisation to the non-financial case. Flexibility may 
be limited because it takes time for the centre to make a
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rescue decision and carry it out; or because it takes time 
for the enterprise to make use of the rescue resources.
The model in this chafer is an example of the former; the 
centre has a limited flexibility in that it can decide to 
rescue the enterprise after period 1 but not after period
2. Complete flexibility would occur if the centre could 
rescue the firm even after period 2, at the last minute. 
Similarly, complete inflexibility would be the case where 
the centre is only able to decide to rescue before the 
enterprise begins production; although after that point 
the centre has both the resources and the desire for a 
rescue, and thus there is "softness", it lacks the 
flexibility to implement a bailout in time.
The case of complete inflexibility on the part of the 
centre is in fact the case of precommitment; the threat of 
no rescue is now credible because the centre lacks the 
ability to rescue. The Nash equilibrium in Figure 3.3, in 
which the centre1s strategy is "no rescue", is now subgame 
perfect and credible.12 If the centre were able, it would 
prefer to tie its own hands and be inflexible, and so 
achieve this equilibrium.
Note the work pattern of the enterprise in the model: 
first take it easy, then work hard to make the target.
This is the familiar phenomenon of "storming" or rush-work 
to meet a deadline. Recent empirical studies have argued 
that storming exists not only in CPEs but also in Hungary 
(Rostowski and Auerbach 1986, 1988; Laki 1980).
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Interestingly, it is the centre*s limited flexibility, 
rather than "softness” or paternalism per se, which causes 
storming in this model.13 By way of contrast, take for 
example version lb but with the modification that the 
centre, has complete flexibility and can rescue at the end 
of period 2. The calculation of the equilibria is left to 
the reader, but it is easy to see that with the centre 
having the last move, any time "take it easy in period 1, 
work hard in period 2", is an equilibrium work pattern for 
the enterprise, "work hard in period 1, take it easy in 
period 2" will be as well. The point is that, without 
further assumptions (for example, about the enterprise*s 
time preferences), the enterprise is indifferent to the 
choice of which period in which to exert more effort.
Connections between bailouts and "budget softness",
"budget flexibility", and "storming" have not been noted 
previously. While our model is not primarily a model of 
storming behavior, it suggests that the credibility 
problem may also contribute to storming in actual 
socialist enterprises. Indeed, theoretical explanations 
of storming have not always been convincing. Typically 
storming is blamed simply on the presence of a deadline by 
which time work must be finished.14 However, this is not 
sufficient to explain storming. Indeed, the following is 
a very simplified argument that, contrary to all empirical 
evidence, such deadlines should lead rational managers to 
storm at the beginning of the month; we could call this 
"anti-storming". Say that managers can devote a variable
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amount of effort to production, and output is subject to a 
stochastic shock which becomes known halfway through the 
production period, e.g. the actual level of material
supplies becomes known. The shock has a large variance,
so it is possible that, depending on the level of effort
in the first half, a very negative shock might make the
target unachievable for any feasible level of managerial 
effort in the second half of the period. Managers have 
the preferences described in this paper; they suffer 
disutility of effort, but receive a very valuable bonus if 
the production target is achieved or exceeded, and, for 
clarity, have a zero, rate of time discount. In this 
example, managers on average will work harder in the first 
half of the period than in the second, because their 
primary goal is to achieve the target and get the bonus; 
the stochastic shock means that if they take it easy in 
the first half, this goal may be unachievable.
In Appendix 3.2, I explore further the relationship 
between plan targets and storming. There I present two 
simple models where the stochastic shock to production is 
small (rather than large, as in the above example); and 
again, the presence of a production target does not 
necessarily lead to a storming pattern of production.
Version II (CPE)
In this CPE version of the model the centre, as the first
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move in the game, chooses the target YT. That is, the 
centre can precommit to a target; it lacks the 
"flexibility” to revise it. However, it still has limited 
flexibility with respect to the rescue decision, i.e. it 
can still rescue between the first and second periods. We 
could motivate these assumptions by arguing that co­
ordination requirements of the system of material balances 
limit the centre's ability to adjust output targets, but 
reserves of materials or funds can be directed to 
enterprises fairly quickly.
The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for this case is 
given in Table 3.2, part II: the centre chooses YT=Y1,
the firm works hard in the first period, the centre 
rescues with R, the firm works hard in the second period, 
and the target is achieved.15 The equilibrium is 
calculated simply by noting that of versions Ia-d, version 
la with its target of YT=Y1 gives the centre the largest 
payoff.
In this version the output target gives the degree of 
tautness of the plan. Note that the centre here chooses 
the most taut plan possible. This is true even if 
Y2 > Y^-R, i.e. even if the centre would prefer a less 
taut plan with no rescue. As pointed out earlier, the 
model with a less taut target of YT=Y2 has Nash equilibria 
but these equilibria are not credible i.e. not subgame 
perfect.
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It should be noted that the production technology 
assumption Y(E,0,E) = Y(E,R,e) in equation (2) plays a 
large role in the equilibrium for this version (and thus 
for version la as well). If Y(E,0,E) is slightly less 
than Y(E,R,e), the model results above do not change, but 
consider what happens if we assume both that Y(E,0,E) 
slightly exceeds Y(E,R,e), and also that Y(E,0,E) > Y ^  
R.16 The centre can now achieve its most favoured result 
by precommitting to a target of YT=Y(E,0,E). This target 
is achievable if and only if the enterprise works hard 
both periods, and because the target is credible this is 
the enterpriser subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. 
Since Y(E,0,E) > Y^-R, the centre prefers not to rescue, 
and final output is Y(E,0,E).
Version III (CPE1
In this CPE version the centre chooses YT after period 1 
and before period 2; it is able to commit to a target only 
then. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are given 
in Table 3.2, part III. There are two possible 
equilibrium outcomes, depending on whether Y2~R >< Y3.
If Y2“R > Y3, the firm takes it easy in period 1, the
T • •centre chooses YA=Y2 and simultaneously rescues with R,
the firm works hard in period 2, and the target is
achieved. The same equilibrium outcome was covered at
. . . . Tlength m  the discussion of version lb with Y =Y2, but
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some additional points are worth noting.
First, the centre now has not only a rescue decision 
credibility problem but also a target decision credibility 
problem. Both problems can be interpreted as plan 
implementation or plan discipline problems. Say the 
centre announces a plan that specifies no additional 
material inputs, i.e. no rescue. This plan is not 
credible; violation of plan discipline by the enterprise 
forces a plan revision of additional deliveries of 
materials to the enterprise.17 Similarly, say the centre 
announces a plan that specifies very taut targets. Again, 
this plan is not credible; the enterprise violates plan 
discipline and takes it easy the first period, making the 
plan target infeasible and forcing a plan revision of a
1 Rlower target. ° Note also the target actually chosen 
before period 2 can still be interpreted as "taut", since 
it forces the enterprise to work hard in the second period 
in order to achieve the target and receive the bonus.
The second possible equilibrium outcome arises when Y2- 
R < Y3. In this case the firm takes it easy in period 1, 
the centre chooses a target of YT=Y3 and does not rescue, 
the firm works hard in period 2, and the target is 
achieved. The intuition behind this is straightforward. 
The marginal increase in production from a taut plan, a 
plan which sets YT=Y2 and gives the firm additional 
resources R to make this target feasible, is Y2-Y3. This 
is less than the marginal cost of a taut plan, namely R.
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The centre therefore chooses a less taut target, but one 
taut enough to ensure the enterprise will work hard in 
period 2, and does not rescue.
In neither of these possibilities does the production 
technology assumption Y(E,0,E) = Y(E,R,e) in equation (2) 
have an important role, as it did in version II. This is 
because in version III the enterprise plays e in the first 
period, thus making impossible an output of Y(E,0,E) (or 
of Y(E,R,e)). In the subgame which follows the 
enterprise's choice of e in period 1, the centre can 
always elicit E from.the enterprise in period 2 through an 
appropriate choice of YT.
Version IV (MSE/CE): Repetition with Imperfect
Information19
Since the centre-enterprise relationship typically 
persists over time, there are large gains to be reaped by 
the centre if it can find a way to make its threats of "no 
bailout" credible. Intuition suggests that the centre 
should try to acquire a reputation for "toughness". Not 
rescuing the enterprise is costly, but if the centre
refuses to rescue and lets the enterprise fail now, it may
• • • • o odeter the enterprise from taking it easy in the future.
If we repeat, say, version lb any finite number of times, 
it turns out that such reputation-seeking is still not
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credible: the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome 
for the repeated game is simply the subgame perfect 
outcome for each of the repetitions. This peculiar result 
has been dubbed the "chain store paradox" (Selten 1978), 
and follows from backwards induction and the perfect 
information assumption. In the last period, subgame 
perfection implies the centre will rescue. In the next to 
last period, it is common knowledge that the centre cannot 
succeed in building a reputation for being tough in the 
last period, so again the centre will rescue. Continuing 
in this way, the game unravels to the beginning, with the 
centre rescuing every period.21
The perfect information assumption is crucial to this 
result; because both players are fully informed from the 
beginning of the game, there is no opportunity for 
learning to take place. If we relax this assumption, then 
the reputation effect comes to life. Say that the centre 
is either "weak" or "tough", and while the centre knows 
what type it is, the enterprise does not. If weak, the 
centre's preferences are those described above; but if 
tough, it will never rescue. A tough centre can be 
interpreted in a number of ways; for example, the centre 
may actually prefer to punish the enterprise if it 
violates the discipline of the plan; or the central 
planner may be penalised by his superiors if he allows a 
rescue; or the centre may actually lack the resources to 
rescue.
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If the probability that the centre is tough is large, then 
the enterprise will fear that a rescue is unlikely and 
therefore work hard. But even if it is unlikely that the 
centre is tough, the enterprise may still figure that no 
bailout is forthcoming and therefore work hard. Since a 
tough centre never rescues, once a weak centre does so it 
reveals itself as weak and the no rescue threat is no 
longer credible. This gives a weak centre an incentive to 
mimic a tough centre and not rescue. While not rescuing a 
failing enterprise is costly to the weak centre in the 
short run, it causes the enterprise to revise upwards the 
probability that the centre is actually tough; the 
enterprise then works hard in the future, and the weak 
centre recoups its losses.
We can formalise this argument by using Kreps and Wilson*s 
(1982b) model of Selten*s "chain store” game. The model 
was devised to study a problem in industrial organisation
theory, predation by a monopolist, but is easily adapted
• o ?to our centre-enterprise framework.
Version IV of the model is as follows. We repeat version 
lb N times. In the terminology of game theory, version lb 
is the stage game, and the N repetitions of version lb 
make up the repeated game, version IV. Recall that in 
version lb the enterprise chooses levels of effort for 
production periods 1 and 2. A natural interpretation is 
thus that there are N planning periods, and each planning 
period is divided into two "production periods", for
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example as annual plans are broken down into quarterly 
plans. The duration of the repeated game, i.e. the value 
of N, can be be interpreted as the duration of a 
particular centre-enterprise relationship. At the end of 
the game, say, the planner and/or manager move to 
completely new jobs. Alternatively, we can think of the 
end of the game as the extent of the players* subjective 
time horizons. For example, the game lasts one year; 
there are 4 quarterly planning periods (N=4) each of which 
is divided into monthly production periods; and the 
players discount the events of future years highly or 
entirely.
For convenience we index time backwards: the repetitions 
of the stage game are numbered N...n...l, and repetition n 
is the nth repetition from the end. Within each 
repetition of the stage game we index the production 
periods by i = 1,2; thus n,2 denotes the second production 
period in the (N-n)th planning period. Payoffs are 
received at the finish of each repetition of the stage 
game. There is no discounting of payoffs. With some 
small positive probability 6, the centre is tough: its 
only feasible action is "no rescue". With probability (1- 
5), the centre is weak, with a choice of whether or not to 
rescue and with preferences as in the previous versions of 
the model.
To apply the Kreps-Wilson results we need to redefine the 
version lb payoffs for the enterprise and the centre, both
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of which we assume to be risk-neutral utility maximisers.
For the enterprise, let UE(X) be its original utility as a
function of payoffs X. A linear transformation of UE(X)
is also a legitimate utility function. Let the
enterprise's new utility function be
VE(X) = _UE(X) - UeIBEEJ_
UE^BeE) - uE(Oee)
where UE(BEE), UE(BeE) and UE(Oee) are fixed numbers. The
centre's new utility function is
Vc(tt) = n, - (Y2-R)
<y2-r ) - y4
where 7r denotes net output, meaning output minus rescue 
costs if any, and was the centre's original utility. We 
can now adopt the following notation:
Vc (Y2) = a (8)
VE (BeE) b b (9)
The point of the transformations above is to ensure that 
a > 0 and 0 < b < 1, as required by the Kreps-Wilson 
model.23 Kreps and Wilson consider in their paper the 
case where a > 1, and so we also require this, i.e. we 
assume
_____ R > 1
(Y2-R) - y 4
As explained in the Introduction, we impose the 
requirement of credibility by calculating a sequential 
equilibrium for the model. In this, game a sequential 
equilibrium consists of a strategy for each player and a 
function p„ i for each choice of effort by the enterprise.
11 ,  X
The latter are the beliefs of the enterprise regarding the 
centre's type, i.e. in production period i of planning
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period n the enterprise believes the centre is actually 
tough with probability These beliefs plus the
players' strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium if
1. Starting from any point where it is the centre's 
move, the centre's strategy is a best response to the 
enterprise's strategy.
2. For each choice of effort by the enterprise, the 
enterprise's strategy is a best response to the 
centre's strategy, given that the centre is strong 
with probability p_
3. The game begins witfc Pm i - £•
4. Each pn  ^is computed ff-om the previous p and also 
from Bales' rule whenever possible.
Kreps and Wilson (1982b) show that the following
constitute a sequential equilibrium:24
Beliefs of the enterprise: (a) For n < N, set
pn#l = Pn+i 2* That is, the enterprise's beliefs at n,l, 
the first production period of planning period n, are set 
to the beliefs at n+1,2, the second production period of 
the previous planning period. (b) If the enterprise 
worked hard at n,l and this was followed by no rescue, 
then Pn 2 = Pnl* ^  enterprise took it easy at
n,l, this was followed by no rescue, and Pn l > °/ then 
F>n,2 = max(bn,pn^-j^) , where b is given by equation (9).
(d) If there is ever rescue in planning period n, or if
Pn,1 = °' then Pn,2 = °-
Strategy of a strong centre: By assumption a strong
centre never rescues.
Strategy of a weak centre: (a) If the enterprise worked
hard at n,l, then do not rescue. (b) If the enterprise
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took it easy at n,l and pn#i > b11"1, then do not rescue.
(c) If the enterprise took it easy at n,l and Pn i^ ^ bn_1, 
then rescue with probability pn  ^^ (l-bn_1) /b11”1 (l-pn  ^1) . 
Note that the probability of rescue is zero when Pn 1 = 
and one when either pn i^ = bn-1 or n=l.
Stratecrv of the enterprise; (a) If Pn+if2 > kn* then work 
hard at n,l. (b) If Pn+1^2 < k**' then take it easy at 
n,l. (c) If Pn+1^2 = k11' then randomise at n,l, working 
hard with probability 1/a. (d) The effort levels in every
production period 2 are as in the second production period 
in Figure 3.2 (version lb).
As the game is set up here, the outcome this equilibrium 
induces is in fact the unique sequential equilibrium 
outcome.25 Equilibrium play for the initial repetitions 
of the stage game consists of the enterprise always 
working hard, and a weak centre never rescuing and indeed 
never willing to rescue; only near the end of the game, 
when a weak centre's future benefits of a tough reputation 
are small, will the enterprise take it easy and a weak 
centre rescue. Note that as soon as a weak centre 
rescues, it reveals itself as weak, p is set to zero, and 
from that point onward we get the perfect information, 
subgame perfect result in each planning period; the
enterprise takes it easy, the centre rescues, and then the
enterprise works hard and gets its bonus.
The surprising fact about this equilibrium is the power of
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the reputation effect: even if 6 is very small, the fear 
that a weak centre will try to acquire a tough reputation 
is incentive enough for the enterprise to work hard for 
most of the game. In other words, a weak centre is 
initially able to achieve the credible-commitment outcome, 
despite the lack of formal commitment mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the point at which this no rescue phase ends 
is determined only by b and 6 and not by N. Thus for
large N, the centre's overall average payoff per
repetition is close to the credible-commitment payoff.
For example, if b=0.5 and 6=0,1, a weak centre will rescue 
with positive probability only within the last 4 planning 
periods, and the enterprise will only try taking it easy 
during the last 3 periods from the end, regardless of how 
many planning periods came earlier.
The results of this equilibrium are robust to a variety of 
changes in formulation (see Kreps and Wilson 1982b). In 
particular: (a) If 0 < a < 1, where a is given by equation
(8), the character of the equilibrium is the same (until
near the end of the game the enterprise works hard and the 
centre is unwilling to rescue) but the play at the end of 
the game is more complicated. (b) Say the centre 
discounts its payoffs by a factor r per planning period.
If r > l/(a+l), then again until near the end of the game 
the enterprise will work hard because the centre will not 
rescue. But if r < l/(a+l), the equilibrium is quite 
different: a weak centre will rescue the first time the 
enterprise takes it easy in a first production period, and
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the enterprise will do so if Pn#  ^< b.
We see therefore that a weak centre can reap large 
benefits if it can build a reputation for toughness. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons why this may 
be difficult to accomplish and why the perfect information 
/ subgame perfect / rescue outcome may be more plausible.
An important feature of the Kreps-Wilson model is that the 
enterpriser only source of information about whether the 
centre is tough or weak is the centre*s rescue decision.
In the chain store application of the model, it is 
reasonable to assume that the players observe only each 
others* actions; the market is impersonal. In the 
planning context, this assumption is less reasonable. ?he 
centre and the enterprise are typically in regular 
communication with each other over a wide range of 
matters: the enterprise*s targets, material supplies, 
bonuses, etc. The planner and the manager are likely to 
know each other personally; their relationship is an 
ongoing one; they may well both be members of the Party; 
and so on. In such circumstances it may be difficult for 
a weak planner to sustain a tough reputation. As time 
goes on, the manager may be able to gather information and 
eventually conclude that the planner is weak, even if the 
planner has not previously rescued the enterprise. This 
is not to say that reputation effects will never occur, 
only that in some plausible circumstances they may not 
occur; an enterprise may well often be confident that the
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centre is ”weakM.
Worth mentioning here again are Kornai*s concepts of the 
"soft budget constraint" and paternalism. Kornai explains 
why budget constraints are soft, that is, why the centre 
rescues enterprises, by arguing that the centre is 
paternalistic. Paternalism fits nicely into the Kreps- 
Wilson weak-tough framework; a paternalistic centre is 
weak. Kornai*s analysis, however, does not make use of 
imperfect information; rather, the enterprise knows the 
centre is paternalistic. The assumption of perfect 
information, and thus versions I-III, therefore seem more 
appropriate for a formalisation of these ideas of 
Kornai1 s.
Two more reasons why the perfect information / rescue 
outcome may often occur have to do with the planners* time 
horizon. First, while it is true that the centre- 
enterprise relationship is long-term, possibly lasting 
many years, this is less true of the planner-manager 
relationship. Personnel turnover in the planning 
apparatus means that a planner’s time horizon may actually
be fairly short in a significant number of cases. Recall
that in the sequential equilibrium above a weak centre 
will rescue and thus reveal itself to be weak in the late
rounds of the game. If planners have short time horizons,
late rounds, and therefore rescues, may predominate. 
Second, we saw above that if the centre discounts the 
future at a high enough rate, the equilibrium is very
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different; the enterprise will take it easy, and a weak 
centre will rescue it, if the probability that the centre 
is tough is small relative to the benefits to the 
enterprise of taking it easy and being rescued. Again, 
once the enterprise takes it easy, we have the perfect 
information outcome. It has been argued that in practice, 
planners tend to discount the future highly, being under 
pressure to come up with results today. This is another 
reason why the perfect information / rescue outcome may be 
relevant in some important circumstances.
Finally, the planned, economies of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union have by most accounts become less Stalinist, 
less disciplinarian, over time. In earlier days it was 
certainly sensible for enterprises to figure that the 
centre might well be "tough"; but now we often observe the 
pattern of frequent threats of bankruptcy and severe 
discipline which are not followed by actual implementation 
of these measures. This suggests that the imperfect 
information version of the model helps us understand the 
classical Stalinist system, and the perfect information 
versions the classical Brezhnevian system. A caveat is in 
order here, though. The rotation of managerial personnel 
under Stalin was fairly frequent (about three years), but 
this practice was abandoned. Thus under Stalin the "game" 
ended quickly. The time horizon argument above means 
that, other things held constant, frequent managerial 
turnover would have lead to more rescues and less plan
O  fZ .
discipline. For rescues to have been less frequent
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under Stalin one would have to argue that other features 
of the model differed under the Stalinist and Brezhnevian 
regimes. For example, it is reasonable to suggest that S, 
the initial probability that the centre is tough, was 
larger under Stalin.
Indeed, one could possibly interpret the history of 
central plan discipline in these economies in terms of the 
model in this paper. First, as Stalinist excesses moved 
further into the past, new centre-enterprise relationships 
would begin with a lower a priori probability that the 
centre was tough. Second, as the Party bureaucracy 
developed, personnel moved about and accumulated 
experience, personal connections grew, etc., the 
opportunities for an enterprise manager to discover what 
type of planner he faced also increased. Both these 
changes would make it harder for a weak central planner to 
build and maintain a reputation for toughness.
Concluding Comments
The root of the credibility problem in this model is the 
fact that centre can take actions after the beginning of 
the game. A strategy of no rescue or very taut target may 
not be credible in the sense that the firm may take it 
easy the first period and make threats subobtimal for the 
centre to carry out. One way the centre might overcome 
this problem is to try to build a reputation for
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toughness, but as we have seen this may not be feasible. 
What other options does the centre have?
One possibility suggested by the model is for the centre 
to take measures to decrease its flexibility. For 
example, the centre could pass a law against rescues and 
rely on the fact that repealing or evading the law would 
take time. Alternatively, it could set up a lengthy 
bureaucratic procedure through which all requests for 
bailouts must pass. Just how practical these measures 
might be is unclear. Such measures require the rule of 
law; the state must be unable to repeal or violate laws 
and rules quickly and at will. Implementing such measures 
also imply for the state a surrender of power, something 
which states generally do-not like to do. And although 
decreased flexibility might help with the credibility 
problem, it could entail economic costs through a slower 
rate of adjustment to changing circumstances.
A simpler and more direct step would be for the centre to 
modify the enterprise's incentive structure, i.e. change 
the bonus function. The centre could, for example, simply 
pay a separate bonus for each production period based 
either on output or on effort. This was in fact tried in 
the Soviet Union in the early 1940s; Berliner reports that 
in order to reduce storming, enterprise directors in some 
ministries were required to report daily on the preceding 
day's output (Berliner 1956, pp. 97-8). This scheme ran 
into predictable monitoring problems; for example,
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enterprises would deceive the centre by "prolonging the 
work day" and including some of tomorrow's production in 
today's output. Such imperfect information problems, akin 
to the informational problems in ratchet-effeet models, 
are outside the scope of the model in this paper, and are 
a possible subject for future research. Berliner notes as 
well the additional burden of the scheme on the 
administrative and planning apparatuses.
The bonus function does not, however, have to be modified 
in such a disaggregated way, because in general the 
centre-enterprise relationship is long-term. We saw in 
version IV above that the centre could take as given the 
enterprise's payoff structure and instead try to use this 
long-term relationship to build a reputation for 
toughness. In fact, more direct options may be available. 
For example, the centre could threaten to punish the 
manager if it ever saw the manager take it easy. Since in 
reality the centre is likely to face monitoring problems, 
one possibility for future research would again be to 
incorporate imperfect information into the model; in such 
a model, the centre could threaten to fire the manager, or 
withhold his bonus, or delay his promotion, if the manager 
seemed to come asking for help too often. This threat by 
the centre could often be credible in a classical CPE, 
although the administrative and informational requirements 
for such a scheme may be high. However, the nomenklatura 
system and widespread Party membership of managers may 
limit the centre's ability or desire to punish laggard
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managers. A similar constraint on the centre's choice of 
incentive scheme operates if the workers rather than the 
manager choose the level of effort. It is not easy to 
fire and replace a workforce, especially in an economic
« • • • 07system based on socialist principles.
It is important to note that these direct measures require 
the centre to have the power to manipulate directly the 
enterprise's bonus for meeting the target. This could be 
the case in a CPE, though the centre's freedom in choosing 
an incentive scheme for the enterprise will still be 
limited by political, social, institutional, and practical 
factors. The nature of the constraints to solutions to 
the credible-commitment problem, and how or even whether 
they can be overcome, are possible questions for future 
research. The centre's choices will be even more 
restricted in a decentralised MSE or CE where enterprises 
are autonomous and the bonus is interpreted as the reward 
of staying in business. In such decentralised economies 
the fates of enterprises and managers, and of enterprises 
and workers, are linked; it may not be easy for the centre 
to rescue the enterprise without rescuing the manager and 
the workforce as well. A decentralising reform that 
removes from the centre this power to determine the pay 
and bonuses of the manager or the workforce, without also 
limiting the power to rescue, will tend to make the 
credibility problem worse rather than better.
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Notes to Chapter 3
1. This paper was written while the author was supported 
by an IREX Developmental Fellowship, and appeared (in 
modified form) in the Journal of Comparative Economics 
(Vol. 13, No. 3, September 1989). The comments and 
suggestions of Stanislaw Gomulka, Richard E. Ericson, 
Joseph Berliner, Janet Mitchell, Josef C. Brada, the 
participants of the LSE Comparative Economics Seminar, and 
two referees, are gratefully acknowledged.
2. There are also some other conditions a sequential 
equilibrium must meet. For a very clear exposition of 
these and related game-theoretic concepts, see van Damme 
(1987).
3. Litwack (1988) makes the important point that in a CPE 
the need to monitor economic activity in order to co­
ordinate it rules out one practical possibility, 
commitment via a limited information structure.
4. If in the model below we allowed the centre complete 
freedom in choosing the incentive scheme, the model 
immediately becomes uninteresting. The centre has perfect 
information about the actions of the enterprise and so can 
simply dictate required levels of effort to the enterprise 
personnel, period by period.
5. It is worth noting, though, that if we subtract (7) 
from (6) and substitute using (l)-(4) we get
Y(E,R,E) - Y(E,0,E) > Y(e,R,e) - Y(e,0,e)
In other words, (6) and (7) together imply effort and 
rescue resources are cooperant factors of production.
6. This is the case in the MSE/CE interpretation above, 
where the reward B is the reward to the enterprise of 
staying in business. It also applies to the CPE 
interpretation if ministries do not keep unpaid bonus 
funds. This has been the case in the Soviet Union, for 
example, where unpaid bonus funds revert to the state bank 
(I am grateful to Rick Ericson for making this example 
known to me).
7. Table 3.2 gives equilibrium outcomes, and not the 
strategies which support these outcomes. This is because 
in versions la, Id, II and III the strategy choices off 
the equilibrium path, i.e. the strategy choices for 
situations which do not arise in the equilibrium outcome, 
are sensitive to the values of the parameters Y and R. 
This does not affect the interpretation of the equilibrium 
outcomes.
Version Ic has multiple equilibrium outcomes because 
the enterprise can be indifferent between possible 
outcomes. If, say, the enterprise preferred BeE to BEe 
because it discounted the future disutility of effort, 
this multiplicity disappears.
8. There are actually four Nash equilibria of this form.
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The reason is basically technical. A complete description 
of a player*s strategy must include planned decisions at 
nodes which will never be reached no matter what the other 
player does. Thus even though the enterprise chooses to 
work hard in period 1, its strategy must still include 
plans for what it would do if it took it easy in period 1. 
There are four possibilities: (1) if no R then e; if R
then e; (2) if no R then E; if R then e; (3) if no R then 
e; if R then E; (4) if no R then E; if R then E. The 
third is the example given in Figured; it is chosen as an 
example because, roughly speaking, it is subgame perfect 
if the centre is able to precommit to a "no rescue" 
strategy.
9. The use of the subgame perfect equilibrium concept to 
model the "soft budget constraint" seems particularly 
appropriate given Kornai*s statement that a condition for 
further softening of the budget constraint is that the 
enterprise "expects ... external financial assistance with 
high probability and this probability is firmly built into 
[its] behaviour" (Kornai 1986a, p. 4).
10. The broader interpretation of Y as the centre*s 
valuation of the enterprise*s production, representing the 
importance to the centre of the enterprise*s output, 
employment levels, etc., is probably closer to the spirit 
of Kornai*s analysis.
11. If the rescue resources are either additional material 
inputs or are used to obtain such, we see that the 
enterprise has succeeded in substituting materials for 
effort. A high material intensity has been observed in 
socialist economies (Gomulka and Rostowski 1988). One 
referee made an interesting comparison here: the 
credible-commitment problem in Western public utility 
regulation is usually viewed as inhibiting investment in 
fixed capital and thereby probably lowering the materials- 
to-labour ratio. The reason is that public utilities 
commissions cannot credibly guarantee a utility a fair 
rate of return on sunk investment.
12. Though strictly speaking we should draw a new game 
tree in which the rescue/no rescue decision is the first 
move of the game.
13. I am grateful to Janet Mitchell for stressing this 
point to me.
14. In Peter Wiles* terminology, this is the "hard time 
constraint".
15. Again we can interpret the rescue in terms of 
additional deliveries of material inputs and a consequent 
high level of material intensity.
16. This could be the case, say, in a more realistic model 
where the centre is not limited to only two possible 
levels of rescue resources.
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17. The model may help explain the practice of allocating 
materials to the reserves of the centre; in this view the 
centre anticipates the need for materials with which to 
"rescue". However, the initial allocation of materials to 
reserves takes place during the planning process, before 
production begins. This raises the possibility that the 
centre can successfully precommit to a low number of 
rescues by not allocating much to reserves.
18. On revisions of output targets in the USSR see Khaikin 
(1980).
19. I would like to thank one of the referees of the JCE 
for stimulating comments which led to the writing of this 
section.
20. For more detailed presentations of the reputation 
model in this section and the intuition behind it, see 
Kreps and Wilson (1982b) and van Damme (1987, Chapter 10, 
Section 7).
21. By contrast, if the game is repeated an infinite 
number of times, we have a different problem, namely that 
we have a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria.
Here subgame perfection has no bite: "rescue every period" 
is a subgame perfect equilibrium, but so is "no rescues 
ever" and indeed even "rescue some periods and not 
others". Since everything is now "credible", it is 
difficult to get any insight into the credibility problem 
in the infinitely-repeated version of the game, and so we 
concentrate on the finitely-repeated version in the text 
instead. See e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1982, Appendix 1) 
who present an infinitely-repeated version of the chain 
store game and reject it for these reasons.
22. The centre corresponds to the chain store in the 
Kreps-Wilson-Selten model; the enterprise in each period 
corresponds to a potential entrant who will compete with 
the chain store in a market; the effort level chosen by 
the enterprise corresponds to the entrant's decision of 
whether or not to enter; and the centre's choice of rescue 
vs. letting the enterprise fail corresponds to the chain 
store's choice of sharing the market with the entrant vs. 
engaging in cut-throat competition.
23. Note also that VP (Y9-R) = 0, VP (YA) = -1, VF(BEE) = 0, 
and VE(0ee) = b-1.
24. Actually, the proof is slightly different because the 
game here differs from the Kreps-Wilson game in that here
(a) the enterprise has a second production production, and
(b) if the enterprise works hard in the first production 
period, the centre can still decide to rescue. These 
additional moves do not change the nature of the game.
The proof of equilibrium follows Kreps and Wilson, with 
additions along the following lines. (a) In the 
equilibrium described the enterprise has no incentive to 
deviate from its strategy for effort levels in the second
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production periods. The centre's strategy for later 
planning periods does not depend on the enterprise's 
strategy for these effort levels, and so the enterprise 
should simply choose the effort levels which give it the 
largest stage game payoffs. These are given in Figure3.2.
(b) Using (a), backwards induction tells us that in any 
repetition of the stage game, if the enterprise works hard 
the first period, the centre has a choice between no 
rescue with payoff Y2 and rescue with payoff Y2-R. If it 
doesn't rescue, it has a higher stage game payoff; 
moreover, the beliefs of the enterprise do not change 
(intuitively, by not rescuing a weak centre reveals 
nothing about its type). Thus a weak centre has no 
incentive to deviate from the strategy of "no rescue" if 
the enterprise works hard in some first production period.
25. This is because we have assumed that a strong centre 
cannot rescue. In the original Kreps-Wilson formulation, 
a strong centre prefers not to rescue. This leads to the 
existence of other seguential equilibrium outcomes. These 
other outcomes are are not, however, very plausible, and 
can be ruled out by using a variety of criteria: see Kreps 
and Wilson (1982b) and van Damme (1987).
26. I am grateful to Joe Brada for making this point to 
me.
27. On the role of this constraint in bank and government 
bailouts of illiquid enterprises in Yugoslavia, see Tyson 
(1977) .
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Appendix 3.1: Description of Subgame Perfect Equilibria
Contents
Figure A3.1: Version la, Case A: Y3-R > Y4
Figure A3.2: Version la, Case B: Y3-R < Y4
Figure A3.3: Version lb
Figure A3.4: Version Ic(i), Equilibrium 1
Figure A3.5: Version Ic(i), Equilibrium 2
Figure A3.6: Version Ic(ii), Equilibrium 1
Figure A3.7: Version Ic(ii), Equilibrium 2
Figure A3.8: Version Id(i), Case A: Y2-R > Y3
Figure A3.9: Version Id(i), Case B: Y2-R < Y3
Figure A3.10: Version Id(ii), Case A: Y2-R > Y3
Figure A3.11: Version Id(ii), Case B: Y2-R < Y3
Figure A3.12: Version III(i), Case A: Y1-R > Y2
Figure A3.13: Version III(i), Case B: Y^-R < Y2
Figure A3.14: Version Ill(ii), Case A: Y1-R > Y2
Figure A3.15: Version Ill(ii), Case B: Y1-R < Y2
For Figures A3.l-A3.ll, subgame perfect equilibrium 
strategies are denoted by doubled lines.
For Figures A3.12-A3.15 a special notation is used. The 
enterprise's move in the second period takes as given its 
move in the first period and the centre's choice of both 
target and R/no R. This is denoted by underlining the 
payoff the enterprise receives given all possible 
combinations of enterprise first moves and centre choices 
of target and R/no R. For example, in Figure A3.12, given 
a choice of e in the first period, and a choice of Y =Y^ 
and no R by the centre, in period 2 the enterprise can 
either choose e, in which case it arrives at node 1 and 
receives Oee as its payoff, or it can choose E, in which 
case it arrives at node 2 and receives OeE. The former is 
preferred by the enterprise, so its strategy at that 
decision node is e. This is indicated by underlining the 
payoff Oee in the YT=Y1 row and the node 1 column. The 
centre's strategy is denoted similarly: the underlining
of the payoff in the YT=Y2 row and node 4 column indicates 
that if the enterprise chooses e in period 1 the centre's 
strategy is to choose R and Y =Y2 (the R choice is doubled 
as well for clarity). Finally, the enterprise's strategy 
for period 1 is indicated by a doubled line.
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Figure A3.1: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Version la
Case A: Y 3 -R > Y 4
Enterprise 
moves
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node:
no R no R
Output: Y4 Y3 Y3 Y 2 Y3 Y 2 Y 2 y i
Target Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs
Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent
y t =y , Oee Y4 OeE Y3 Oee Y j-R OeE Y2 -R OEe Y3 OEE Y2 OEe Y2 -R BEE Y.J-R
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Figure A3.2: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Version la
Case B: Y 3 -R < Y 4
Enterprise
moves
D
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node:
no R
e
7 8
Output: Y4 Y3 Y3 Y 2 Y3 Y 2 Y 2 Yi
Target Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs
Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent
y t=y , Oee OeE Y j Oee Y j-R OeE Y2 -R OEe Y j OEE Y2 OEe Y-,-R BEE Y ^R
91
Figure A3.3: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Version lb
Enterprise
moves
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node: 
Output:
Target Payoffs  
I Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
C\i
>-II
1—>- Oee Y, 4 OeE Y3 Oee Y3 -R BeE Y2 -R OEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y ^R
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Figure A3.4: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version Icfi). Y 2 -R > Y 3
Equilibrium 1
Enterprise
moves
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node: 
Output:
Target Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
y t =y3 Oee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y j-R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y^-R
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Figure A3.5: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version Icfi). Y 2 -R > Y 3
Equilibrium 2
Target Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
yT=Y3 Oee Y, 4 BeE y3 Bee Y j-R BeE y2 -R BEe Y j BEE y2 BEe y2-R BEE Y1-R
Enterprise
moves
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node: 
Output:
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Figure A3. 6 : Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version Icfii). Yo-R <
Equilibrium 1
Enterprise
moves
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
E
Node: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Output: Y4 Y3 Y3 Y 2 Y3
CM
Y 2 Y 1
Target Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
y t=y3 Oee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y3 -R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2 -R BEE Y1-R
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Figure A3,7: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version Ic(ii). Y^-R < Y 3
Equilibrium 2
Target Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
y t=y3 Oee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y j-R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y j BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y^-R
Enterprise
moves
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node: 
Output:
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Figure A3,8 : Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version Idfi). Y 3 -R > Y 4
Case A: Y2~R > Y 3
Enterprise 0
moves
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node:
no R no R
Output: *4 Y3 Y3 Y 2 Y3 Y 2 Y 2 y i
Target Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs
Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent
»T-V 4 Bee Y 4 BeE Y3 Bee Y3 -R BeE Y2 *R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y ^R
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Figure A3.9: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version Id(i). Y3-R > Y 4
Case B: Y2“R < Y 3
Enterprise
moves
D
Centre
moves
Ent
moves □
D
no R
D
Node: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Output: Y4 Y3 Y3 Y 2 Y3 Y 2 Y 2 Yi
Target Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
>4-
>-II
>—
>- Bee Ya BeE Y3 Bee Y3 -R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y.J-R
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Figure A3.10: Subqame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version Id(ii). Y3~R < Y 4
Case A: Y2~R > Y 3
Enterprise
moves
Q
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node:
no R
/X /X
Output: y4 Y3 Y3 Y 2 Y3 Y 2 Y 2 y i
Target Payoffs P ayoffs P ayoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs Payoffs
Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent Ent Cent
YT=Y4 Bee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y j-R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2 -R BEE Y ^R
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Figure A3.11: Subqame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version Id(ii). Y^-R < Y 4
Case B: Y2~R < Y 3
Ent
moves
Node: 
Output:
Enterprise
moves
Centre
moves
Target Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
y t=y4 Bee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y3 -R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y^R
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Figure A3.12: Subqame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version IIKi). Y2~R > Y 3
Case A: Y ^ R  > Y 2
Enterprise
moves
0
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node:
no R no R
>ut: Y4 ■3 Y3 Y 2 Y3 Y 2 Y 2 y i
Target Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
y t=y 1 Oee Y4 OeE Y3 Oee Y j-R OeE Y2 -R OEe Y3 OEE Y2 OEe Y2 -R BEE Y1ZR
y t =y2 Oee Y4 OeE Y3 Oee Y3-R BeE Y2 l R OEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y,j-R
y t=y3 Oee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y j-R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2 -R BEE Y^R
y t =y4 Bee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y j-R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y ^R
For an explanation of the notation, see the beginning of the 
appendix.
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Figure A3.13: Subqame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version IIKi ) . Y2~R > Y 3
Case B: Y1~R < Y 2
Enterprise
moves
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node: 
Output:
Target Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
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Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
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-< II 
i j
Oee Y4 OeE Y3 Oee Y j-R OeE Y2 -R OEe Y3 OEE Y2 OEe Y2 -R BEE Y^-R
YT=Y2 Oee Y4 OeE Y3 Oee Y3 -R BeE Y2 l R OEe Y3 BEE -2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y^R
y t=y3 Oee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y j-R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y^R
YT=Y4 Bee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y3 -R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2 -R BEE Y.-R
For an explanation of the notation, see the beginning of the 
appendix.
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Figure A3.14: Subqame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version IIKii), Y?-R < Y-
Case A: Y^-R > Y 2
Enterprise
moves
Q
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node:
no R
>ut: y4 Y3 Y3 Y 2 Y3 Y 2 Y 2 y i
Target Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
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P ayoffs  
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Payoffs  
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Payoffs  
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y t=y 1 Oee Y4 OeE Y3 Oee Y3 -R OeE Y2 -R OEe Y3 OEE Y2 OEe Y2*R BEE Y1^R
y t=y2 Oee Y4 OeE Y3 Oee Y3 -R BeE Y2 -R OEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2 -R BEE Y ^R
y t=y3 Oee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y3*R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y^-R
y t . y4 le e  Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y j-R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y j BEE Y2 BEe Y2*R BEE Y^-R
For an explanation of the notation, see the beginning of the 
appendix.
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Figure A3.15: Subqame Perfect Equilibrium
of Version Illfii). Y2-R < Y 3
Case B: Y-^R < Y2
Enterprise 
moves
Centre
moves
Ent
moves
Node: 
Output:
Target Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
P ayoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
Payoffs  
Ent Cent
y t =y 1 Oee Y4 OeE Y3 Oee Y j-R OeE Y2 -R OEe Y3 OEE Y2 OEe Y2-R BEE Y,j -R
y t=y2 Oee Y4 OeE Y3 Oee Y3 -R BeE Y2 -R OEe Y3 BEE - 2 BEe Y2*R BEE Y^-R
y t=y3 Oee Y4 BeE - 3 Bee Y3 -R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2 -R BEE Y^R
y t=y4 Bee Y4 BeE Y3 Bee Y j-R BeE Y2 -R BEe Y3 BEE Y2 BEe Y2-R BEE Y^-R
For an explanation of the notation, see the beginning of the 
appendix.
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9Appendix 3.2: A Note on Storming and Anti-Storming
In Chapter 3 I presented a very simple story that 
suggested that storming did not necessarily follow from
i
the presence of output targets. Indeed, the story 
suggested that enterprises would first work hard and then 
take it easy, a work pattern one might call "anti- 
storming". That simple story relied on the possibility of 
a "large" stochastic shock to production. In this 
Appendix I present two simple models in which the 
production uncertainty is "small"; and again, storming 
behaviour does not necessarily follow from the presence of 
output targets.
First, however, it is worthwhile to present a collection 
of quotes from the literature on storming. The view that 
output targets are the main or only cause of storming in 
socialist enterprises is rather common; my point is that 
this view is incorrect.
A Sample of the Literature on Storming
1. "Uncertainty of supply has many consequences.... The 
combination of supply delays and the need to fulfil a 
plan by a given date cause [sic] the phenomenon of 
shturmovshchina. 'storming'...." (Nove 1977, p. 102)
2. "It is partly caused by the common tendency for 
materials to arrive late, which is caused by 
shturmovshchina in the supplying enterprise which is 
caused by its materials arriving late, and so on." 
(Nove 1977, p. 222)
3. "... [T]he bonus structure has tended to penalize 99
percent fulfillment, but offers substantial rewards
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for 101 percent fulfillment. This discontinuous 
aspect of the bonus system, plus the other 
characteristics ... (especially supply inadequacy), 
lead to storming, or the production of a substantial 
portion of the monthly output in the final few days 
of the month." (Gregory and Stuart 1986, p. 221)
4. "... [E]mphasis on purely quantitative achievement 
tends to conflict with improvement of quality and 
with the introduction of new products. ... By 
encouraging myopic concentration on short-term 
results at the expense of long-term (one symptom of 
which has been the characteristic shturmovshchina. or 
'storming', in the final stages of a planning period) 
 " (Dobb 1966, p. 376)
5. "Rewards for plan fulfilment require not only a 
clearly defined measure of results, but also a time- 
period to which the results must be related. Hence 
the great importance of the calendar, and the 
phenomenon of 'storming' (shturmovshchina^, of a mad 
rush to fulfil the plan in the last few days of the 
month, quarter or year, followed by a slack and 
disorganized period in which production falls sharply 
until the next mad rush." (Nove 1968, p. 177)
6. "... [A] manager had to fulfil his plan in every
operational plan period - either one month or one 
quarter - in order to get regular bonuses and avoid 
trouble with superiors. The Micawber principle was 
in operation - 100.1 per cent fulfilment - happiness; 
99.9 per cent - misery." (Dyker 1976, p. 40) "The 
planning process is a temporal one, with its own 
calendar, and the rhythm of planning tended to react 
with the rhythm of production in a rather perverse
way. ... Once again the nub of the matter
rshturmovshchina! is the Micawber and ratchet 
effects. Operational production plans were monthly 
or quarterly, and it was important that the output 
plan should be fulfilled in each month, rather than 
there being an alternation between underfulfilment 
and overfulfilment by a considerable degree. If, 
accordingly, production was behind schedule with a
few days of the plan period to go, it is
understandable that an energetic manager would go to 
almost any lengths to ensure fulfilment, (p. 43)
7. "We should note now that under, the operation of the 
ratchet and Micawber principles managers will have an 
incentive to shturmovshchina irrespective of any 
supply uncertainty. ... [T]he concern to maintain 
even levels of plan fulfilment from one month to the 
next tended to exacerbate the tendency to sharply 
uneven tempi of production from one week to the 
next." (Dyker 1985, pp. 26-7)
8. "Because the performance of the enterprise is judged 
by the measure of fulfillment within the accounting
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period, it becomes vitally important to fulfill the 
plan before the end of that period. It is the 
crucial role of the accounting period which largely 
explains the persistence of the uneconomic practice 
of 'storming'." (Berliner 1957, p. 162)
9. "Called the val system, this output target served as 
the main measure of managerial success." (Goldman 
1968, p. 90) "Because waiting until the last minute 
is a universal trait, the val system also resulted in 
a very unbalanced production cycle. Like a student 
with a term-paper, no one cared at what specific time 
during the assignment period the task was completed 
as long as everything was finished at the zero hour 
on the last day. Consequently, in the Soviet 
factory, as in the dormitory, there seldom is much 
activity during the first twenty days of the month.
In part, it is necessary to rest up from the rush of 
the last days of the preceding deadline. ... This 
practice was called shturmovshchina." (p. 92)
10. "Because the fulfillment of the plan is so important 
both to the directors and workers, production tends 
to be unevenly distributed over the month. The rate 
of production tends to be stepped up to a fever pitch 
as the end of the month approaches and the output 
goal appears to be incapable of fulfillment. As a 
result of this accelerated activity, which is 
referred to as 'storming' in the literature, workers 
tend to be exhausted in the first part of the 
following month, so that storming again becomes 
necessary towards the end of the following period." 
(Turgeon 1969, p. 257)
11. "Operating with such a bonus function it is not too 
surprising that enterprises should practise 
'storming'; this involves peaks in production 
activity towards the end of a plan or bonus payment 
period, usually a quarter or a year. These peaks 
arise because 99.9 per cent plan fulfilment secures 
no bonus at all, while 100 per cent fulfilment earns 
substantial rewards. Thus, if plan fulfilment is not 
already assured a few weeks from the end of the 
relevant period, the marginal value of additional 
effort rises sharply. However, other factors also 
contribute to the phenomenon of storming, in 
particular the position in regard to material 
supplies, and the tautness of the initial plan, so 
that modifying the bonus function alone may not 
effect much change." (Cave and1 Hare 1981, p. 64)
A few additional comments are in order here. (1) Blaming 
storming in one enterprise on the late arrival of its
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supplies (Nove, quote 2) begs the question of what caused 
storming in the supplying enterprise. An explanation of 
storming along these lines is possible (for example, if 
substitutability between inputs is very limited, it takes 
only the late arrival of one input to cause the enterprise 
to storm) but ought to be set out explicitly.
(2) Blaming storming on managerial time preference (Dobb, 
quote 4 and Goldman, quote 9) requires unrealistic 
discount rates (see Alexeev 1989). A typical account of 
monthly storming would give a work pattern of about 10% of 
monthly output in the first ten days of the month, 25% in 
the second ten days,.and the rest in the last ten days 
(ibid.).
(3) The statement that if plan fulfilment is not already 
assured as the end of the planning period approaches, "the 
marginal value of additional effort rises sharply" (Cave 
and Hare, quote 11), begs the question of why the manager 
didn't work harder earlier.
I now turn to the formal models.
The Basic Model
The basic model is presented in two versions. In the 
first version, we assume a simple linear production 
technology and allow utility to be of a general form; in 
the second version, we assume utility is quadratic and
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allow technology to be general. Both versions share the 
following framework. Production takes place over two 
periods, denoted t = 1,2. There is a single production 
input which we can think of as managerial or worker 
"effort" or labour, L^. The enterprise’s personnel suffer 
(von Neumann-Morgenstern) additively separable disutility 
of the form U(LlrL2) a U(LX) + U(L2), where U* < 0,
U*' < 0. The enterprise faces a binding production target 
Yt for total production over the two periods. This target 
must be fulfilled or the enterprise suffers utility of -oo.
Production in each period is subject to a stochastic shock 
e, i.e. F(Lt) + e = Yt. The shock e is assumed to have 
the very simple bimodal point distribution
e = e with probability 1/2
= -e with probability 1/2 where e > 0
We assume e to be "small" (small enough, at any rate, to 
make Taylor approximations legitimate).
The sequence of events is as follows:
1. realised
2. allocated, Y^ produced
3. e2 realised
4. L2 allocated, Y2 produced
Thus in analysing the optimal plan of the enterprise, we 
can ignore e1 and start with no. 2 in the sequence of
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events. From now on we work only with e2 and suppress the 
subscript 2.
Version I: Linear Production Technology
With linear technology, we can simplify notation by 
working directly with labour input. Define LT to be the 
total labour required to fulfil the output target. Also 
normalise the stochastic production shock so that total 
output after period 1 production and the realisation of 
the second stochastic shock (i.e. after no. 3 above) is 
defined as + e.
Since after no. 3 in the sequence of events (i.e. after 
the realisation of the second shock) we know exactly how 
much labour will be supplied in the second production 
period, we can write 
L 2 =  I? ”  £
Note that 
el2 = LT - L-l
Expected utility over both periods is
EU = U(LX) + U(LT - Lx - 6)
i.e.
EU = U(L1) + %U(LT - Lx + e) + %U(LT - Lx - e)
Maximising this gives the first order condition 
2U,(L1) = U'(LT - L-l + e) + U'(LT - Lx - e)
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Taking a Taylor approximation around I^-I^ gives
U'(Lt - Lx + e) « \J'{!?-!>!) + eU" (I^-I^) + e2U' • • (1^-1^)
2
U'(LT - Lx - e) « U* (LT—Lx) - eU"(LT-L1) + e2U' • '
2
Plugging things into the FOC gives
U'fl^) - U ,(Lt-L1) = e2U*•'(Lt-Lx)
2
or
U'CL-l) - U'(EL2) = e2U ,,,(EL2)
2
Now, since U' and U'' are both strictly less than zero, 
sign { U'CL-l) - U* (EL2) } = -sign { 1^ - EL2 }
We are now able to say whether or not we will expect to 
observe a storming pattern in the allocation of labour.
It turns out that the third derivative of the utility 
function is the key. If U ,M is positive, then by the 
last equation L1 < EL2, i.e. we expect to observe 
storming. But if U ,M is negative, then L1 > EL2; "anti- 
storming”, i.e. working harder in the first period than in 
the second, will be typical. And if U** 1 =0, i.e. we 
have quadratic utility, we will expect to see an 
even allocation of effort across production periods.
Several comments are in order- here. First and most 
important, the model demonstrates again that the mere 
presence of output targets is not enough to generate 
storming behaviour. The fact that storming is in fact the
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rule in socialist economies means that something besides 
output targets must be behind this empirical regularity. 
Second, we usually have no prior prejudices about the sign 
of U*•1. Either storming or anti-storming is a priori 
reasonable in this model.
Version II; General Production Technology. Quadratic 
Utility
Regarding the disutility of labour, we maintain the 
assumptions that U' < 0, U'1 < 0, but now add the 
assumption that U' 1 1 = 0, i.e. we assume that the 
disutility of labour takes a quadratic form. The 
production technology F(L^ .) is however general; we require 
only that F* > 0 and F'' < 0. Define the inverse of F to 
be G(Yt). For a given output Yt, G(Yt) is the labour 
required to produce it. Note that G* > 0, G*' > 0.
As before,
y2 - F(L2) = yt - F(LX) - e 
and again note that 
EY2 = YT - F(L1)
Also note that 
L2 = G ^ - F ^ - e )
Now expected utility over both periods is
EU = U(LX) + ^UCG^-FfL-LJ+e) ) + %U(G(YT-F(L1)-e))
The first order condition requires
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2U,(L1) = U* (GCY^FCLj^J+e) )G'(YT-F(L1)+e)F* (Lx)
+ U' (GfY^’-FCL^-eJJG' (YT-F(L1)-e) F' (Lx)
Define
S(L1) = YT - 2F(LX)
If S(L^) > 0, we will expect to observe a storming pattern 
in the allocation of effort. If 8(1^) < 0, we expect to 
observe "anti-storming”. Note that
YT - F(L^) ■ F(L1) + [YT - 2F(LX)] 
a F(LX) + S(LX)
We now take a Taylor approximation to the FOC around 
F(L^). We begin with approximations to G and G*. The 
argument to 8 (1^ ) is suppressed.
G(YT-F('L1)+e) s G(F(LX) + S + e)
» G (F (Lx) ) + (S+e)G' (F (Lx) )
+ IS±el2G''(F(LX))
2
= Lx + (S+e)G>(F(L1)) + IS+el2G'«(F(LX))
2
G(YT-F(L1)-e) = G(F(L1) + S - e)
« GCFC^)) + (S-e)G' (F(LX))
+ ,(S-e)2G l 1 (F(L1) )
2
= 1^ + (S-e)G' (F(Lx) ). + IS^eL2G* • ( F ^ )  )
2
G« (YT-F(L1)+e) s G'CFC^) + S + e)
« G 1(F(Lx)) + (S+e)G11(F(Lx))
+ (S+e)2G 1'1(F(La)) 
2
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G' (YT-F(L1)-e) ■ G^Ffl^) + S - e)
* G'CFCI^)) + (S-e)G1'(F(Li))
+ IS=el2G'1•(F(LX))
2
Plugging G into U 1 and taking a Taylor approximation to U* 
around (remember U''* = 0), we get
U*(G(YT-F(L1)+e)) « U ' + (S+e)G1(F(L^))
+ .(S±eL2G ,»(F(L1)) )
2
* U*(Li)
+ { (S+e)G* (F(L1)) + IS±el2G* • (F(L1)) } U'• (I*i)
2
U'(G(YT-F(L1)-e)) « U*(Lx + (S-e)G*(F(Lx))
+ jS-e)2G*■(F(LX)) )
2
® U»(LX)
+ { (S-e)G*(F(L1)) + iS-e)2G»»(F(L1)) } U "  (1^ )
2
Substituting all this into the FOC, and suppressing the 
arguments to the functions (everything is taking place at 
L1), we get
2U» (L-l) « F' (Lx) *
{ [U, + (S+e)G,U l1 + fS+e)2G 1»U" ][G' + (S+e)G'l + (S+el2G >11]
2 2
+ [U, + (S-e)G'U',+jCS=el2G''U* 1 ] [G, + (S-e)G* ,+XSrel2G'' ' ] }
2 2
Multiplying this out is a bit messy, but note that within 
the {} we will get a 2U1(L^)G1(F(L^)) term. When 
multiplied by the F*(L^) term outside the {} this becomes 
2U1(L1), since F1*G1 = 1 by the inverse differentiation
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rule. This 2U* (1^ ) cancels with the same term on the left 
hand side of the equation, yielding 0 on the left hand 
side. Eventually we get (it can be simplified further, 
but it just makes checking the algebra more tedious)
0 = 2SF * G *'U'
+ 1 { (S+e)2 + (S-e)2 } F'U'G'"
2
+ 2SG'U'■
+ 3 { (S+e)2 + (S-e)2 } G " U ' '
2
+ 1 { (S+e)3 + (S-e)3 > U* *G* * *
2
+ 1 { (S+e)3 + (S-e)3 } F*G* *G*'U*'
2
+ 1 (S+e)4F'G*'U*'G''•
4
Note that
sign { (S+e)3 + (S-e)3 } = sign { S }
We are now able to say something about when the model
generates a storming pattern and when it generates an 
anti-storming pattern: it turns out to depend on G ff *, the
third derivative of the inverse of the production
function. If G ,M > 0  then must be such that S(L-L) <
0, i.e. we have anti-storming. If G* ' 1 < 0 then we imay
have either storming or anti-storming. Note, by the way, 
that things simplify a lot if we have linear utility,, i.e. 
U* * = 0. In this case, G* * * > 0 gives anti-storming,, G 1 ' '
< 0 gives storming, and G'*' = 0 gives even effort.
The lessons of this version are quite similar to those of
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version I. Again, most important of all, the model shows 
that more than just output targets is needed to generate 
storming behaviour. And again, we usually have no prior 
prejudice about the third derivative of the inverse of the 
production function. It is reasonable to expect a priori 
either storming or anti-storming in this model.
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Chapter 4: Are Profit-Maximisers the Best Survivors?
A Darwinian Model of Economic Natural 
Selection1
Introduction
In the previous two chapters I was concerned with the 
effects on incentives of a state policy of 
bailouts/rescues of enterprises, and how such a policy 
might arise. As I noted in passing in Chapter 2, though, 
a bailout policy has not only incentive effects but also 
what might be called "evolutionary” effects; enterprises 
which would otherwise leave an industry are able to 
survive with state support. In Schumpeterian terms, a 
bailout policy slows or stops the process of "creative 
destruction”; in more explicitly evolutionary terms, it 
slows or stops the process of "economic natural 
selection”.
One natural question to ask is what are the effects of 
halting "economic natural selection” via bailouts. 
However, evolutionary modelling in economics is still not 
very well developed; the natural predecessor to this 
question - what are the effects of the presence of 
economic natural selection - has not been thoroughly 
investigated to date. It is primarily this latter 
question that I will address in this chapter.
"Economic natural selection” has sometimes been cited in 
support of the conventional neoclassical profit-
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maximisation model of the firm. In this view, the
assumption of profit-maximisation by firms in formal
economic models is plausible because in the real world,
"economic natural selection” drives non-maximisers out of
the market. The most famous exposition of this position
is in Friedman's 1953 methodological essay:
The process of "natural selection" helps to validate 
the hypothesis [of "rational and informed 
maximization of returns"] - or, rather, given natural 
selection, acceptance of the hypothesis can be based 
largely on the judgment that it summarizes 
appropriately the conditions for survival. (Friedman 
1953, p. 22)
Though not without its critics (see e.g. Nelson and Winter 
1982), this argument-seems intuitively convincing. 
Nevertheless, if it is to be accepted as valid, "economic 
natural selection" would first need to be modelled 
explicitly. But when this is done, then, as I show in 
this chapter, the Friedman conjecture is shown to be false 
in some important cases. Specifically, only in perfect 
competition, when firms lack market power, are profit- 
maximisers the best survivors.
The main result of the chapter follows almost trivially 
from Darwinian definition of "economic natural selection", 
but nevertheless is at first surprising: absolute-profit
maximisation does not "summarise appropriately the 
conditions for survival". The intuitive reason is that a 
firm maximising its own profit may help its non-maximising 
competitors to do even better. Put another way, a firm 
which does not maximise its profit may still earn profits 
which are larger than those of its profit-maximising
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competitors, if the costs to itself of its deviation from 
maximisation are smaller than the costs it imposes on the 
maximising competitors. The Friedman argument that 
economic natural selection will lead to the survival of 
profit-maximisers fails in the presence of this positive 
externality.2 Only in the case of perfect competition, 
when firms have no market power and this externality 
disappears, is absolute-profit maximisation always an 
"appropriate summary". This result is a consequence of 
the Darwinian definition of economic natural selection, 
whereby it is the "fittest" firms which survive.
The above result is essentially an application to 
economics of Hamilton's theory of "spite" in evolutionary 
biology (Hamilton 1970, 1971). An act by an animal is 
"spiteful" if the animal harms both itself and another. 
Hamilton demonstrated that such a trait could be selected 
for if the population was not very large. The condition 
for the selection of a spiteful trait is that the decrease 
in an animal's own Darwinian fitness is smaller than the 
decrease in the fitness of the average member of the rest 
of the population; since the holder of the spiteful trait 
thus has a higher fitness than that of his intra-species 
competitors, the trait will be selected for.
The relevance of Hamilton's theory to the Friedman 
conjecture is straightforward. When firms have market 
power, the potential for "spiteful" behaviour exists. A 
firm which forgoes the opportunity to maximise its
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absolute profit may still enjoy a selective advantage over 
its competitors if its ‘'spiteful" deviation from profit- 
maximisation harms its competitors more than itself.
The simple formal model of economic natural selection 
which this chapter presents is derived from the 
"evolutionary game theory" (EGT) analysis used in 
evolutionary biology (see e.g. Maynard Smith 1982) and is 
Darwinian in spirit. The basic approach is directly 
analogous to that used in EGT to define an "evolutionarily 
stable strategy" (ESS). In the paper which first 
introduced the concept, Maynard Smith and Price (1973, 
p. 73) give the intuition behind the ESS: "Roughly, an
ESS is a strategy such that, if most of the members of a 
population adopt it, there is no 'mutant' strategy that 
would give higher reproductive fitness."
The standard EGT analysis assumes random pairwise contests 
between individuals drawn from an infinite population; two 
individuals are repeatedly chosen at random to play a 
given game. The intended application of the Friedman 
argument is firm behaviour in an industry, and so the 
model presented in this chapter is instead based on the 
special case of the ESS defined for finite populations in 
which individuals "play the field" (see the appendix to 
this chapter).3 "Playing the field" means all the players 
in the game compete with each other simultaneously, which 
is the appropriate analogy for the standard model of 
competition between firms in an industry; the finite-
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population case is analogous to oligopoly.
In the model in the chapter, the firms which are most 
likely to survive are not those which maximise the 
absolute level of their profits, but rather those which 
maximise their "relative profits” (in a sense discussed 
below). This result is directly analogous to the 
"spitefulness" of the evolutionary biology ESS in finite 
populations (see the appendix and Knowlton and Parker
1979). It can also be interpreted as a formalisation of 
Alchian's statement in his 1950 paper on evolution and 
economic theory that "success (survival) accompanies 
relative superiority” (p. 213, emphasis added). It must 
be stressed, however, that the model does not suggest 
maximisation of "relative profits" as the best strategy 
for survival. In Hamilton's theory of spite, spiteful 
behaviour imposes costs on an animal, but larger costs on 
its competitors. Similarly, in the model which follows, 
"relative-profit maximisation" can cause a firm to be less 
likely to survive; but it also means the firm is more 
likely to survive than its competitors.
An Example
Before presenting the general model, we begin with a very 
simple example of quantity-setting duopoly to illustrate 
the main ideas. We have two identical firms which have no 
fixed costs and identical and constant marginal costs.
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Firm 1 sells quantity and earns profit ir^ , and 
similarly for firm 2. The firms face a smooth, downward- 
sloping demand curve. When total supply equals Q*, price 
is equal to marginal cost and both firms earn zero 
profits.
Consider now a form of "economic natural selection".
After the firms produce and sell their quantities of 
output, "selection" takes place: with some probability p^, 
firm i may or may not "survive" to produce in the next 
period. We also require that 0 < p^ < lf so that neither 
firm can guarantee its "survival". The interpretation of 
a failure to "survive" is left open for now. It could 
mean that the firm goes bankrupt; or the firm is forced to 
leave the market; or the firm stays in the market but the 
manager is fired; etc. This probability of survival must 
be related to profits in a way which captures the 
Darwinian notion of "survival of the fittest". We 
formalise this by a very natural requirement of 
"monotonicity": pj, > pj if and only if > nj. This 
monotonicity requirement is fully in the spirit of 
biological models of natural selection: it means simply 
that if firm i has a larger profit than firm j, then firm 
i is more likely to survive than firm j.
Figure 4.1 shows the case where both firms sell Q*/2 units 
of output. The total quantity sold is Q*, price is 
therefore equal to the marginal costs of both firms, and 
profits are zero. This is the symmetric competitive
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solution. It is also a 11 symmetric evolutionary 
equilibrium" in the following sense: say firm 1 continues 
to sell Q*/2 units of output, but firm 2 deviates and 
sells some other quantity. No matter what quantity the 
deviant firm 2 chooses to sell, firm 1 will always have a 
higher probability of survival than firm 2. In other 
words, the strategy of selling Q*/2 units of output is 
analogous to the ESS of evolutionary biology in that a 
deviant ("mutant") firm which uses another strategy will 
always have a lower profit than a firm which sells Q*/2 
(compare the Maynard Smith and Price quote given earlier).
123
>cr
Figure 4.1
Price
MC
Quantity
Q */2
124
Figure 4.2
Price
MC
Quanti ty
Q */2
125
Figure 4.3
Price
MC
Quantity
126
This is illustrated in figures 4.2 and 4.3. In both 
figures, firm 1 sells Q*/2. In figure 4.2, firm 2 sells 
^2 < Q*/2 and therefore earns itself positive profits tt2. 
But firm 1 is selling a larger quantity at the same price, 
and so its profits ir1 exceed the profits of firm 2. 
Similarly, in figure 4.3, firm 2 sells q2 > Q*/2, driving 
price below marginal cost and thus suffering a loss. But 
firm 1 is selling a smaller quantity at the same price, 
and so its losses are smaller. In both cases firm 1 has a 
larger profit than that of the "deviant” firm 2, and 
therefore a higher probability of survival.
It is important to emphasise that the above argument holds 
even if survival is based on absolute profits. Say that 
firm i*s probability of survival increases with its 
absolute level of profits: p^ = f(7r^ ), 0 < f(#) < 1, 
f' >0. But f(*) conforms to the monotonicity assumption 
above, and so we are still guaranteed that firm 1 will 
have a selective advantage should firm 2 sell some deviant 
quantity.
Indeed, note that in figure 4.2 firm 2 is making positive 
profits. It is actually making larger profits than it 
would if it had continued to sell Q*/2 units. In fact, 
taking firm l*s quantity as given, firm 2 may actually be 
maximising its profit. But firm 1 is making profits which 
are larger still. This is an important point: the non­
prof it-maximiser is here more likely to survive than the
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profit-maximiser. What is more, say that the probability 
of survival is an increasing function of the level of 
profits, as in the previous paragraph. Then maximising 
profits also maximises the probability of survival. So in 
fact the non-surviva1-maximiser firm 1 is more likely to 
survive than the surviva1-maximiser firm 2! Firm 2 has 
improved its survival chances by raising, indeed 
maximising, its profit; but by raising firm l's profits 
even more, firm 2 now stands at a selective disadvantage.
I now move on to a demonstration of these points in a more 
general model.
The General Model
There are N players. In period t, all engage in G^, a 
play of the game G. The format of G^. is "all versus all"; 
all the players engage each other simultaneously. N is 
constant for all t. Players are identical except possibly
for their choice of strategy. Each player i has in each
period t a strategy s^ .^, drawn from the set of pure
strategies S, which it uses in G^ .. I will consider only
the case where s^^ = s^ for all t; the actual choices of 
strategy by individual players do not change as the game 
is played. Players are thus "born” with strategies and 
cannot change them in response to changing circumstances.
I am therefore assuming (non-rational) behaviour by 
players which is directly analogous to animal behaviour in
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the usual EGT approach. At the end of G^ ., each player i 
receives a payoff n which is a function of his strategy 
and the strategies of the other players in that period; I 
will usually drop the t subscript. I will sometimes also 
write 7T^  as 7r(s^  | s_^) , where s_^ denotes the strategies 
of the other players.
We could think of players as corresponding to firms, as in 
the duopoly example above. Another interpretation which 
is perhaps more appealing (given that the industry size is 
assumed constant) is as follows. Players in the game 
represent the managers of firms in an industry of size N. 
Each firm is in the industry permanently, and its owners 
regularly hire and fire a manager. The manager’s strategy 
determines the behaviour of the firm. Once hired the 
manager doesn't change his strategy, and the firm changes 
strategy by replacing the manager.
Entry. Strategy Choice, and Survival
It is possible to divide "economic natural selection" into 
three parts. First, there is the decision of whether or 
not to enter the game. In biology, this is the problem of 
whether to reproduce, and if so, how many offspring to 
produce. In economics, this is the "entry" decision, for 
both firms and managers. In the model, N is assumed 
constant. This means the entry decision by players is 
assumed away: as soon as one player is selected out of
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the game ("dies", Mgoes bankrupt", "is fired"), a new 
player enters.
Second, there is the "strategy choice rule", the rule 
which determines the choice of strategy by a new player.
In biology, the strategy choice rule is given by genetic 
inheritance and chance mutation. In economics, it is a 
much more difficult problem to address. For now we assume 
the following role for "mutation" in order to maintain the 
parallel between the model here and the standard 
evolutionary game theory model. Say we have a situation 
in which all N players share the same strategy. Now say 
one of the N players is selected out of the game and is 
replaced by a new player. This new player may with some 
positive probability choose any strategy in the strategy 
set S. I will return to the subject of the strategy 
choice rule later in the chapter, when discussing 
evolutionary stability.
Third, there is the "survival rule", the rule by which 
payoffs are associated with "survival". If players are 
interpreted as firms, the "survival rule" summarises the 
market forces which drive poor performers out of the 
industry. In the managerial interpretation of the model, 
the "survival rule" is the rule used by the owners of the 
firm to decide whether to fire the existing manager and 
hire a new one.
The survival rule in this model is applied to each player
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at the end of each period t; it determines p^-' the 
probability that player i survives to participate in 
the next play of the game. The main restriction on the 
survival rule is a form of monotonicity: p ^  > pj^ if and
only if 7 > Wjf This means, for example, firm i is 
more likely to survive market pressures than firm j, or 
the manager of firm i is more likely to keep his job than 
the manager of firm j, if and only if the profits of firm 
i exceed the profits of firm j. To ensure that some 
selection always takes place, we also assume that 
0 < p^t < 1, i.e. no player is ever guaranteed of survival 
or failure.4
The monotonicity assumption is compatible with a wide 
range of possibilities concerning survival. In 
particular, it is important to point out that monotonicity 
is compatible both with survival based on the absolute 
level of a player's payoff and with survival based on a 
player's performance compared to his competitors. For 
example, we could have p^t = f' > 0, so that
survival of player i is based on the absolute level of his 
payoff. Or we could have p ^  = f (7r^ .^/S7r) , f' > 0, so that 
survival is based on player i's share of the total of 
payoffs earned by all players.
This wide range of possible survival rules means we have a 
wide range of possible rationales for the model. Consider 
the managerial interpretation of the model. One 
possibility is in terms of principal-agent/imperfect
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information/moral hazard models. Unable to observe 
perfectly the actions of their manager, the owners choose 
an incentive scheme which determines whether or not the 
manager keeps his job. This incentive scheme may be based 
on the manager's absolute performance in generating 
profits for his firm; or it may reward the manager based 
on his performance relative to other managers (see e.g. 
Lazear and Rosen 1981 and Holmstrom 1982); etc. Another 
possibility is that the owners of a firm are boundedly 
rational (as opposed to the managers, who are non­
rat ional) ; unable to choose or control a manager 
perfectly, they use a rule of thumb in hiring and firing 
their manager. This rule of thumb may be based on the 
absolute level of the firm's profits; or it may be based 
on the firm's share of industry profits; etc. A similar 
range of rationales is possible if players are interpreted 
as firms.
Because players never change strategies, we can also think 
of the survival rule as operating on strategies. In other 
words, it is the fittest strategies which will best 
survive the process of economic natural selection. This 
is analogous to the EGT analysis in evolutionary biology, 
where genes determine strategies and the fittest genes 
survive.
Also analogous to the evolutionary biology analysis is the 
fact that because the model assumes that players do not 
change their strategies, the "rationality" of any results
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of the model will come from the survival and strategy 
choice rules rather than directly from the "rationality" 
of the players. The model is therefore, as already noted, 
Darwinian in spirit.
Definition of Evolutionary Equilibrium
The definition of the evolutionary biology finite-
population ESS comes in two parts: an equilibrium
condition, based on payoffs received when N-l players have 
the ESS strategy and.one mutant player has some other 
strategy; and a stability condition, based on payoffs when 
2 or more mutants have some other strategy. (Note that in 
a sense the equilibrium condition therefore has a notion 
of stability built into it.) The model in this chapter 
has been constructed so that the definition of a 
"symmetric evolutionary equilibrium" (SEE) can proceed in 
the same fashion as the definition of the equilibrium 
condition for the finite-population ESS. Stability is 
discussed later in the paper.
We begin with a population in which N-l players have the 
SEE strategy sSEE e S, and so each receives payoff 7rSEE. 
There is also one deviant player whose strategy sD e S is
qrp # n
one other than s , and whose payoff is n . For
convenience, say this deviant player is player number d.
So
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Definition; A strong (weak) SEE is given by a strategy 
sSEE e S which has the property that, if N-l players have 
this strategy and one deviant player has some other 
strategy sD, then for any deviant strategy sD e S, 
jtsee > (£) jtd (3)
where 7i and 77^  are given in equations (1) and (2).
In other words, a strong (weak) SEE exists where, in a 
population of N-l SEE players and one deviant player, the 
SEE players do strictly better than (at least as well as) 
the deviant player no matter what the deviant's strategy. 
The point is that, by monotonicity of the survival rule, 
the deviant thus has a lower probability of survival than 
his SEE strategist competitors. The intuition is 
identical to that behind the evolutionary biology ESS - 
see the Maynard Smith and Price quote at the beginning of 
the chapter.
It is of interest to compare the SEE to the Nash 
equilibrium concept. We are considering the symmetric
case, so we can define a strong (weak) symmetric Nash
• • • • equilibrium (SNE) as a strategy-• s ■- e S which, for any
alternative strategy sD e S, satisfies
The difference between the SNE and the SEE is that the NE 
concept compares the payoffs for a single player under 
different strategies (with the strategies of the other 
players unchanging), whereas the SEE concept compares the 
payoffs of different players (with the strategies of all 
the players unchanging). The symmetric evolutionary 
equilibrium concept is thus based on relative payoffs, a 
result which reflects the Darwinian nature of selection 
among players. This is true in spite of the fact that in 
the model, survival itself for a player may well be based 
on the absolute level of his payoff, a point illustrated 
in the duopoly example above. The Nash equilibrium 
concept, by contrast, is based on absolute payoffs. In 
non-Darwinian "evolutionary" economics models (e.g. 
satisficing models and learning models), Nash equilibria 
and "absolute profit-maximisation" will be candidates for 
"appropriate summaries" of the conditions for survival, 
or, perhaps, "appropriate benchmarks".5
It is useful to express the SEE as the Nash equilibrium of 
a different game. Say N-l players are identical strong 
SEE strategists. Again the single deviant player is 
player number d with strategy sD. The definition of a 
symmetric evolutionary equilibrium is equivalent to 
defining the SEE strategy as that sD which solves
mgx { ttd - 7TSEE } 
s £ S
(5)
Since the SEE is symmetric by definition, we can write the 
payoff to an SEE player given by equation (1) as the 
average of the payoffs of all the SEE players:
N
7tsEE B tt(s* | sj) for i f d = 1 E \ s_i) (6)
N-l i^d
Substituting (6) and (2) into equation (5) , we have 
rewritten the definition of the symmetric evolutionary 
equilibrium strategy sSEE as the symmetric solution to
N
max { 7r(sd | s_d) - _1_ S iris* | s_±) } (7)
sd€S N-l i^d
This is, in fact, the same definition as that for the
/
symmetric non-cooperative Nash solution to Shubik's zero- 
sum "beat-the-average" game (Shubik and Levitan 1980); it 
is easy to see how the game gets its name. The "beat-the- 
average" (BTA) game is a zero-sum, relative maximisation 
game. Since the solution concepts for this evolutionary 
game and the "beat-the-average" game coincide, we have 
here a demonstration that absolute-profit maximisation 
does not "summarise appropriately the conditions for 
survival", and that relative-profit maximisation (in this 
model at least) is a more appropriate summary.
More generally, there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between the SEE and the symmetric NE in the beat-the- 
average game. That any SNE in the BTA game is also an SEE
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can be demonstrated by assuming otherwise and showing this 
leads to a contradiction. Assume that there is an SNE in 
the BTA game which is not an SEE. Because it isn't an 
SEE, there exists a strategy sD which, if all but one 
player adopts sBTA and one adopts sD, means that 
ttd > 7rBTA. But then the player with strategy sD must be 
beating the average. So sBTA must not be a symmetric Nash 
solution to the BTA game, and we have a contradiction. 
Similarly, any SEE is also an SNE in the BTA game. Assume 
that there is an SEE which is not an SNE in the BTA game. 
Then there exists a strategy sD such that, if player d
n eppadopts su and all the other players adopt then
player d is beating the average,
7rd > 1 E Hi i.e. ttd > 7tsee
N-l i^d
O P T ?  , . . • •But then s^1^  does not fit the definition of a symmetric 
evolutionary equilibrium strategy, and again we have a 
contradiction.
Now, what happens to the SEE in the case when players lack 
strategic power and are unable to influence directly each 
others' payoffs? In other words, what is the SEE in case 
of perfect competition, when players have no market power? 
Returning to equation (7), say that player d cannot 
through his own actions change the payoffs of others; he 
lacks strategic power. Then the maximisation problem ■ 
becomes simply
max 7rd (sd | s_d) 
sdeS
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i.e. maximise the absolute payoff. In the absence of 
strategic power, and only in this case, the problems of 
maximising relative and absolute payoffs will always 
coincide. That is, only under conditions of perfect 
competition is absolute-profit maximisation always an 
"appropriate summary" of the conditions for survival.
Two points regarding this result should be noted. First, 
it applies only to choice variables which give players 
strategic power vis-a-vis each other. Whenever an agent’s 
decision regarding a variable has no effect on his 
competitors* payoffs, relative- and absolute-maximisation 
coincide with respect to that variable. For example, a 
firm*s choice of production technology may have no direct 
effects on its competitors, and so here absolute- and 
relative-profit maximisation (cost minimisation) coincide 
with respect to the choice of technology - even if the 
firm has market power via its choice of output.
Similarly, local managers of a large firm with regional 
branches may be unable to influence each other's payoffs, 
and when comparing the survival probabilities of the 
regional managers, absolute-profit maximisation will be an 
"appropriate summary" - even if a regional manager has 
market power vis-a-vis other firms within his region.
Second, the presence of strategic power is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient, condition for relative- and 
absolute-maximising behaviour to differ. Relative- and 
absolute-maximisation may coincide for some arrangements
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of payoffs, even when players have strategic power. For 
example, when the game is zero-sum to start with, the 
relative-maximisation SEE/BTA and the absolute- 
maximisation SNE coincide.6
It is worth noting that the SEE solution coincides not 
only with the symmetric solution to the "beat-the-average" 
game but also with the symmetric solution to the 
"maximise-profit-share" game (see Shubik and Levitan
1980). We can therefore also interpret the results of 
this section as providing an "evolutionary” argument for 
studying these two relative-maximisation games.
Stability and Dynamics
In this section we consider the question of "evolutionary 
stability” - the behaviour of the model out of 
"evolutionary equilibrium", with a mixture of SEE and non- 
SEE players.
The definition of the degree of stability used here is a 
natural extension of the definition of equilibrium, and is 
again borrowed from the analysis of the evolutionary 
biology finite-population ESS. We say that an SEE is Y- 
stable under a given strategy choice rule if, for a 
population with a total of anywhere from 2 to Y deviants 
with any deviant strategies, the payoff of an SEE player 
is strictly greater than the payoffs of all the deviants.
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An SEE is globally stable if this holds for any number of 
deviants up to N-l (since we need at least one SEE player 
for the definition to make sense). Note that equilibrium 
is defined so that a single deviant will be at a selective 
disadvantage relative to his SEE competitors; stability is 
defined so that 2 or more deviants will be at a selective 
disadvantage•
A natural question to ask is the following: will an SEE 
strategy be the most frequently observed strategy in the 
long run? The answer is "not necessarily", for four 
reasons. These reasons are particularly instructive 
because they apply both to the case of perfect competition 
(when the Friedman conjecture is valid) as well as to the 
case when players have market power.
1. The SEE may not be globally stable, or may not exist 
at all.
For example, payoffs may be such that "it pays to be 
different". Say that if most firms in an industry sell 
product A and a minority sells the close substitute B, B 
has "novelty value" and sells better; if most firms sell B 
and a minority sells A, A has "novelty value"; and that 
product-specific fixed costs mean a firm cannot sell both 
A and B. An SEE does not exist for this example, because 
the deviants always do better. An "evolutionary 
equilibrium" in such an industry would have a mixture of 
firms, some selling A, some B. The biological equivalent
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of this is a "genetic polymorphism" (Maynard Smith 1982-).7
2. The stability of an SEE depends crucially on the
strategy choice rule which determines the strategy a 
new player will use.
This is why the strategy choice rule appears in the 
definition of stability above. Consider the following 
illustration. We first specify two possible strategy 
choice rules: (i) imitation, as suggested by Alchian in 
his 1950 paper. Specifically, we begin in a population 
using at most two different strategies; if only one 
strategy is being used by all players, a new player can 
choose either that strategy or some other strategy at 
random from the strategy set S; and if two strategies are 
in use, a new player chooses one of the two. This 
specification conforms to the "mutation" assumption made 
earlier. The main feature of this strategy choice rule is 
that no more than two strategies will ever be in use in a 
population at any one time. (ii) random choice: new 
players choose their strategies at random from S, and 
their choice is not constrained. Under this strategy 
choice rule, any number of any of the strategies in S may 
be in use in a population at any moment.
The duopoly example at the beginning of the chapter is 
easily extended to the N-firm case. The SEE strategy is 
for each firm to sell Q*/N, which, as in the duopoly case, 
coincides with the symmetric zero-profit competitive 
solution. The proof that this is the SEE also proves that
141
the SEE is globally stable under the imitation strategy 
choice rule. There are two cases. First, say that some 
firms are selling the SEE quantity Q*/N, and the rest are 
selling some other deviant quantity qD < Q*/N. Price is 
now above marginal cost, and all firms are making profits. 
But the SEE firms are selling the larger quantity and thus 
are making the larger profits, and are therefore at a 
selective advantage relative to the deviant players. 
Similarly, say that some firms are selling the SEE 
quantity and the rest are selling qD > Q*/N. Price has 
been driven below marginal cost and all the firms are 
making losses; but the largest losses are being made by 
the deviants.
However, the SEE is not stable at all under the random 
strategy choice rule. Consider a population with N-2 SEE 
players, and two deviant players which sell quantities 
qD1 > Q*/N and qD2 < Q*/N such that qD1 + qD2 f 2Q*/N.
All the firms are now earning either positive or negative 
profits. But if positive profits are being earned, the 
largest belong to the deviant firm selling qD1; and if the 
firms are making losses, the smallest losses are being 
made by the firm selling qD2. The SEE players do not 
maintain their selective advantage when faced with such a
• , , o"simultaneous invasion".
The conclusions of evolutionary modelling can be very 
sensitive to behavioural assumptions; here, with respect 
to strategy choice. The model of this chapter with random
142
choice of strategy by new players is very much in the 
spirit of Friedman’s argument. The quote from Friedman’s 
methodological essay which begins this chapter is preceded 
by the statement, "Let the apparent immediate determinant 
of business behavior be anything at all - habitual 
reaction, random chance or what not." The random choice 
of strategy corresponds to "random chance", and the 
feature of the model that new players do not change their 
strategies corresponds to "habitual reaction". However, 
the preceding example demonstrates that the conclusions of 
the model can change drastically if choice of strategy is 
determined not by "random chance" but by "imitation" (or 
some other "what not").
3. Bias in the strategy choice rule.
The point here is straightforward. If new players 
predominately choose some non-SEE strategy and avoid 
choosing the SEE strategy, then naturally the former will 
be frequently observed and the latter will not.
4. The "absolute-payoff effect".
Say that the survival rule is a function of absolute 
profits, such that the probability of survival 
p^ j. = f(7Tj )^, f' >0. Say also that an SEE is globally 
stable under some strategy choice rule. An SEE player 
always has a selective advantage over a non-SEE 
competitor. But the payoff to an SEE player in a
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population of all or mostly SEE players may be very low on 
an absolute scale, and the payoff to a non-SEE player in a 
population of all or mostly non-SEE players may be very 
high on an absolute scale (though if he has any SEE 
competitors, they will have even higher payoffs). With 
the above survival rule, populations with many SEE players 
will not persist long, and populations with few SEE 
players will persist longer. To take an extreme case, it 
may be possible that the largest possible payoffs are 
earned when no SEE players are present; such a state could 
persist a long time. (This "absolute payoff effect" will 
not arise if the survival rule is a function of relative 
profits such as, say, p^t = f(7r^ t/S7r), f* > 0.)
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Consider again the duopoly example. The shaded area in 
figure 4.4 depicts the profit an SEE firm earns when his 
competitor sells nothing. This is the largest possible 
profit an SEE firm can earn. The two shaded areas in 
figure 4.5 are the profits earned by two non-SEE firms 
which are selling very small quantities; say that they 
have formed a cartel and are splitting the monopoly 
profits. At these low quantities, demand is very 
inelastic and the profits earned by a cartel member are 
larger than the largest profit an SEE firm could earn. If 
the survival rule is based on absolute profits, the cartel 
could persist a long time.
Indeed, let us relax the restriction on the probability of 
survival and say that a firm is certain to survive 
selection at the end of the period if and only if its 
profits equal or exceed one-half the monopoly profits 
(i.e. the symmetric cartel profits).9 Then an SEE firm 
will still always be at a selective advantage compared to 
a non-SEE competitor; but the cartel in figure 4.5 would 
last forever. Note that a member of the cartel could 
raise his profits even more by expanding output. But if 
he did, he would drive the profits of the other firm down 
so that the other firm would not survive indefinitely; and 
when the other firm is replaced, it could well be with a 
firm which sells an even larger quantity, driving down the 
profits of the first firm so that now it too could not 
survive indefinitely.
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The moral of this story is that a model of economic 
natural selection can have a Darwinian condition that the 
"fittest survive” and yet feature the survival, the 
evolutionary success, of firms which maximise neither 
absolute profits nor relative profits.10
Simple Markov Dynamics
We now turn to a dynamic analysis of the model.11 The 
focus will be on the frequency of occurrence over time of 
various industry "states”. The mathematical tool used is 
that of finite Markov chains, and so from now on I will 
assume that the strategy set S is finite. There are M 
possible strategies.
A population state is identified by the numbers of players
following each strategy. The number of possible
population states12 L is
L s , M+N-l x = (M+N-l)!
N N!(M-l)!
We start the population in some state. In the first 
period the players play the game . At the end of the 
first period we apply the survival rule. After choosing 
in this way the players to remove, we apply the strategy 
choice rule for each new replacement player and assign 
each a strategy. The "natural selection process” is now 
complete: the population is in a new state and ready to
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play the game G2 in the second period. The process is 
repeated for periods 2, 3, ..., etc.
This process can be analysed as a Markov chain. The 
states of the chain are the states of the population. 
Denote the set of all possible states as I. A transition 
probability q^j is the probability that, being in state 
i c I, in the next period the population moves to state 
j e I. To make things easier, I assume that the strategy 
choice rule is independent of past events; it depends only 
on player payoffs and player strategies this period. We 
therefore have a Markov chain with stationary transition 
probabilities; given a state, and knowing the survival and 
strategy choice rules, we can calculate the probabilities 
of transition to other states, and these transition 
probabilities are independent of time.
It is convenient to write the transition probabilities in 
matrix form. Call q this matrix; the entry in row i 
column j is q^j, the probability of transition from state 
i to state j.
If the above evolutionary process proceeds indefinitely, 
we can ask what proportion of the time will the population 
be in which state, i.e. what is its long-run or 
"stationary” distribution. Denote the stationary 
distribution by w, a row vector of L components. Each 
component w^ corresponds to a state i, and gives us the 
proportion of time spent by the population in state i.
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(Zw = 1, since the population is always in one of the L 
possible states.)
So far the set-up is rather general. Points (2) and (4) 
in the previous section can however be illustrated with a 
much simplified version. I narrow consideration to:
1. A population of only two players, i.e. N = 2.
2. A strategy set S with only two strategies, i.e. M =
2. One of these two is a strong and globally stable 
SEE, sSEE. The other strategy will be used to 
demonstrate the "absolute payoff" effect, and so I 
will call it sAP.
3. The two survival rules mentioned earlier in the
chapter. According to the first, player i's
probability of survival at the end of period t is a 
function of his level of payoff that period:
Pit = 0 < fO  < i, f' > o
According to the second, player i*s probability of 
survival at the end of period t is a function of his 
share of the sum of the payoffs of all players that 
period:
Pit = g^t/sir) ° < g(‘) < i, g 1 > o
4. The two strategy choice rules introduced earlier in
the chapter, "random choice" and "imitation" . 
"Random choice" here means that a new player will
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choose either of the two possible strategies with a 
probability of 1/2. "Imitation” here will have the 
following specific definition. Say that in the 
previous period both players had the same strategy
AP • •s" . Then a new player entering the game will adopt 
as his strategy s ^  with probability 1-6, e small,
, , , , qpp ,
and with probability e he will adopt s0£li:i as his 
strategy. Similarly, if in the previous period both 
players had sSEE, a new player will choose sSEE with 
probability 1-6 and sAP with probability e. If in 
the previous period one player had s°“  and one had
AP • • • •s" , a new player will choose each with a probability 
of 1/2. Note both strategy choice rules conform to 
the "mutation" assumption made earlier in the 
chapter. In fact, this form of the "imitation"
strategy choice rule corresponds fairly closely to 
the analogue used in biological evolutionary models, 
where like beget like except for a small probability 
of mutation.
We now calculate transition probabilities and examine the 
stationary distribution of states. We have two strategies 
and two players, so there are three possible states for 
the population:
state 1: (SEE, SEE)
state 2: (SEE, AP)
state 3: (AP, AP)
Corresponding to each state is w^, the frequency of 
occurrence of that state in the stationary distribution.
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The transition matrix q is 3x3; the entry in e.g. row 2, 
column 3, q23, is the probability of moving from state 2 
(one SEE player, one AP player) at the end of one period 
to state 3 (both AP players) at the beginning of the next 
period.
The payoff matrix for the game is the following:
Figure 4.6: Pavoffs in the 2-plaver game
sSEE
Player I ,_
SAP
Notation: (player I's payoff, player II's payoff)
We require s ^ ^  to be a strong and globally stable SEE 
strategy; here this means b > c. To bring out certain 
features of the model I will make two further restrictions 
on the payoffs. First, state 1, where both play the SEE 
strategy, is not a strong Nash equilibrium. This means 
requiring c > a. Second, state 3, where both play the AP 
strategy, is a strong Nash equilibrium. This means d > b. 
(Together these also mean that state 3 is the only Nash 
equilibrium.) Put all these restrictions together and we 
have
d > b > c >-a . (8)
Since the largest payoff occurs when both play the AP 
strategy, we are assured of an "absolute payoff effect".
Ssiiayer ” ap
(a,a) (b,c)
(c,b) (d,d)
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Case 1: Random strategy choice and absolute pavoff
survival rule
The transition matrix for this case is the following: (As
a shorthand I will write fa = f(a).)
q =
%(i+fa)2
*!(l+fb) (l-fc)
%(l-fd)2
%(l+fbfc)
^d-fd2)
%(l~fa)2
%(l-fb)(l+fc) 
%(l+fd)2
By (8) and the strict monotonicity of f, we have 
fd > fb > fc > fa (9)
Using this we can say the following about the elements of 
the transition matrix:
q21 > ^23
q33 > qll f11)
qi3 > ^31
q12 > q32 (13)
Equation (10) demonstrates the "Darwinian” character of 
the definition of an SEE, whereby the SEE strategy gives a 
player a selective advantage over a non-SEE strategist.
In state 2, with one SEE player and one AP player, the SEE 
player has a larger payoff; and so we are more likely to 
jump next period into state 1 (both SEE players) than into 
state 3 (both AP players).
Equations (11)-(13) demonstrate the "absolute payoff
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effect”. The payoffs of the AP players in state 3 exceed 
the payoffs of the SEE players in state 1. This is 
reflected in equation (11) - the probability of staying in 
state 3 is greater than the probability of staying in 
state 1. Similarly, from equations (12)-(13) we see that 
the probabilities of moving into other states out of state 
1 axe greater than they are for moving out of state 3.
These effects are also apparent if we look at the 
stationary distribution of the population. It turns out 
that the expressions for w^ are cumbersome, and it is 
easier to work with the ratio . If this ratio is
greater than 1, the SEE strategy will be the more
frequently observed strategy in the long run. It can be
shown that for any three-state Markov chain with 
stationary transition probabilities,
—1 = 331-^21 ^ 2 3  ^ ^32^21
w3 ^13(g21+q23^  + ^12^23
The "direct" absolute payoff effect is q13 > qj^; the 
population is more likely to go directly from state 1 to 
state 3 in successive periods than it is to go in the 
opposite direction. The result is to lower w1/w3. The 
"indirect" absolute payoff effect is q12 > <332'
population is more likely to go to state 2 directly from
state 1 than it is directly'?from starts 3. The Darwinian 
selective advantage effect is q21 > <323' P°Pulation is
more likely to go directly from state 2 to state 1 than it 
is to go to state 3. We can interpret <33 2^21 as the
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probability of going from state 3 to state 1 via state 2, 
and <112^ 23 as tlie Probability of going from state 1 to 
state 3 via state 2. Inequalities (10) and (13) above, 
the indirect absolute payoff effect and the Darwinian 
effect, mean that ^32^21 < ^12^23*
In fact, in this 2-player game with random strategy choice 
and the absolute-payoff survival rule, the absolute payoff 
effect dominates the Darwinian effect. That is, the AP 
strategy will be more frequently observed than the SEE 
strategy in the long run; w1/w3 < 1.
Theorem; In the 2-player version with random strategy 
choice and the absolute-payoff survival rule, w1/w3 < 1.
Proof: As a shorthand in the proof we will treat values
of the function f evaluated at the parameters a,b,c,d as 
parameters themselves, to avoid having to write f' when 
differentiating. Substituting the transition 
probabilities from the matrix q into (14), and engaging in 
some algebraic manipulation, we eventually get
Wi = 2(l-fbfcli lr_fd ) + (15)
w3 2(l-fbfc )(l-fa ) + (l-fa2)(fc-fb )
I now proceed to show that the expression in (15) is less
than 1. The first step is ter show increasing
in fb and decreasing in fc. The quotient rule of
differentiation plus some algebra eventually tell us that
d(w^/w3)/df^ has sign
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{ 2(l-fbfc)(l-fa)(l-fd2) - 2fc(l-fa2)(fc-fb)(l-fd)
+ 2(l-fbfc)(l-fd)(l-fa2) + 2fc(l-fd2)(fb-fc)(l-fa) }. By
(9) this is greater than zero. One can show similarly 
that d(w1/w3)/dfc has sign
{ (l-fd2(l-fa)(fb2-l) + (l-fa2)(l-fd)(fb2-l) >. By (9) 
this is less than zero.
Equation (9) requires fb < f a n d  fc > fa. But since (15) 
is increasing in and decreasing in fc, if we can show 
that (15) is always less than 1 for f^ = f<j and fc = fa, 
we have shown that (15) is always less than 1 for fb < fd 
and fc > fa. The second step is thus to substitute 
fjj = f^ and fc = fa into (15) and show the resulting 
expression is still always less than 1. Performing this 
substitution, then multiplying out and simplifying gives 
us
2 ...- 2 f a f d ^ - f C d ^ J L f a|d— (1«>
2 " 2fafd - fa " ^  + 3fa *-d “ fa3
This expression can be shown to be less than 1 in a
fashion similar to that used above. The quotient rule of
differentiation plus rather a lot of tedious algebra tells 
us the derivative of (16) with respect to fa has sign
2 (fd - fa)2(3 (1 - fd> - 3fafd d  " fd> + (fd " fa>
- f(j(f(j “ which is greater than zero for f^ > fa and
equal to zero for fd = fa. Thus the expression in (16)^15^
increasing in fa, and approaches a limiting value as fa ->
f^ from below. But setting fa = f^ in (16) gives us 1 as
the limiting value, so for fa < f^ the expression in (16)
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is strictly less than 1. This completes the proof.
This theorem suggests at the very least that some doubts 
are in order concerning the static evolutionary analysis 
in the first part of this chapter. Since the SEE strategy 
in this simple but straightforward example is not the most 
frequently observed strategy in the long run, we can 
legitimately question even the use of the term "symmetric 
evolutionary equilibrium strategy". These doubts are less 
strong, however, in the remaining cases analysed here.
Case 2: Imitative replacement and absolute pavoff
survival rule
The transition matrix for this case is rather ugly and is 
not reproduced here. It simplifies considerably, however, 
if we ignore second-order effects and assume that e2 « 0. 
This means that now q31 « q13 « 0 (intuitively, the 
chances are minute that a "double mutation" will occur and 
take us from "both play SEE" to "both play AP" or visa 
versa). Also, it can be shown that 
q32 « 2e(l-fd) 
and
qi2 « 2e(l-fa)
Lastly, in state 2 the strategy choice probabilities are 
1/2, 1/2 and so the transition probabilities for the 
second row of the matrix are the same as in case 1 above.
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We can plug all this into equation (14) to get
3 * 1  ~  1 1 + f  b ) , . (  l . T i f  c )..( l r f  d l
w3 (l-fb)(l+fc)(l-fa)
This ratio may be greater or less than 1. Thus if fd is 
close to 1, the ratio is close to 0 and SEE players will 
rarely be observed. Intuitively, state 3 is "nearly” an 
absorbing state (meaning once the system bounces into 
state 3, it will be a long time before it bounces out to a 
different state) because the payoffs of the AP players are 
large when they face each other. On the other hand, if fb 
is close to f^, and fc is close to fa, terms in the 
numerator and denominator will approximately cancel to 
leave (l+fb)/(l+fc) which is > 1. Intuitively, the 
advantage of an SEE player when facing an AP is large; 
this choice of parameters means fb-fc is close to the 
maximum difference permitted by equation (9).
Case 3: Random strategy choice and relative pavoff
survival rule
The transition matrix is exactly the same as for case 1, 
except with g's in place of the f's. But now 
ga = g(a/(a+a)) = g(l/2)
9b = g(b/(b+c))
gc = g(c/(b+c))
gd = g(d/(d+d)) = g(i/2)
As g is strictly monotonically increasing, we have
gb > ga=g<a > gc <17>
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Since ga=gd , we have qn=q 33, Sl2=<332' and ^13*^31* since 
gb>gc, q2i>q23* Plugging all this into equation (14), we 
find that > 1, i.e. the SEE is the more frequently
observed strategy. This is as expected; because payoffs 
are equal to 1/2 in state 1 (all SEE) and state 3 (all 
AP), the absolute payoff effect no longer operates to 
promote state 3.
Conclusion
The basic result of this chapter follows from an 
application of Hamilton's evolutionary biology theory of 
"spite" to the Friedman conjecture that profit- 
maximisation is an "appropriate summary" of the conditions 
for survival. In a Darwinian "survival of the fittest" 
regime, the Friedman conjecture is correct only in perfect 
competition. When firms have market power, the 
possibility of "spiteful" behaviour exists: a firm may 
forgo profit-maximisation and lower its profits and even 
its survival chances, but if the profits of its 
competitors are lowered still further, the "spiteful" firm 
will be the more likely survivor. This was formalised in 
a model using another theory borrowed from evolutionary 
biology, evolutionary game theory; other formalisations 
are also possible. The model also demonstrates the 
sensitivity of an economic natural selection model to very 
basic assumptions about the behaviour of agents and the 
character of the selection mechanism.
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Notes to Chapter 4
1. An earlier version of this chapter appeared in the 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (Vol. 12,
No. 1, August 1989). I would like to thank the editors 
and two anonymous referees of JEBO, Stanislaw Gomulka, 
Herbert Levine, David de Meza, Ariel Rubenstein, Max 
Steuer, John Sutton, and a number of seminar audiences for 
helpful suggestions and discussions. All remaining errors 
and omissions are mine.
2. Hansen and Samuelson (1988), in a paper which came to 
hand after this chapter- was written, have also 
demonstrated this point.
3. That the definition of the standard infinite population 
ESS is inappropriate for finite populations was first 
shown by Riley (1979). The approach to evolutionary 
stability in finite populations drawn on here is not that 
suggested by Riley but rather that proposed in the 
appendix to this chapter (and independently proposed by 
Knowlton and Parker 1979 and Maynard Smith 1988).
4. This condition is rather stronger than is actually 
necessary, since monotonicity ensures that in a population 
with heterogeneous payoffs not everybody will be 
guaranteed of survival. It is stated this way mostly for 
clarity's sake.
5. Examples of non-Darwinian satisficing models and 
learning models are Nelson and Winter (1982) and Canning 
(1988), respectively. By contrast, Friedman and Rosenthal 
(1986) and Samuelson (1987) present game theoretic models 
which are essentially Darwinian in spirit. In these 
models selection takes place among strategies, and the 
change in the number of players using a particular 
strategy depends on the payoff to players using that 
strategy compared with the payoff to players using a 
different strategy. Selection in these models is 
therefore similar to selection in the model in this paper; 
as noted above, we can think of the selection rule in our 
model as operating on strategies, with the fittest 
strategies surviving.
6. The proof is by contradiction. (1) Say we have a zero- 
sum game in which an SEE/BTA solution is not an absolute- 
maximisation SNE solution. Since it isn't an SNE, a 
player could increase his payoff by deviating. Since it's 
a zero-sum game, the sum of the payoffs of the other 
players must then decrease. But then the deviant is now 
beating the average. Thus the original situation must not 
have been an SEE/BTA solution, and we have a 
contradiction. (2) Say we have a zero-sum game in which 
an absolute-maximisation SNE is not an SEE/BTA. Then a 
player could beat the average by choosing a deviant 
strategy. Since the game is zero-sum, to beat the average 
the deviant must have increased his payoff as well as 
lowered the sum of the payoffs of his competitors. But
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since he increased his payoff, the original situation must 
not have been an absolute-maximisation SNE, and we have a 
contradiction.
7. Defining the stability conditions for a genetic 
polymorphism in a finite population is problematic, 
however; see the appendix.
8. This "simultaneous invasion” is similar to a 
simultaneous invasion in the standard EGT analysis 
(Maynard Smith 1982), except that in the latter a 
successful simultaneous invasion requires both deviants to 
have a higher fitness than the ESS players.
9. It is not necessary in this example to relax the 
monotonicity assumption as well. This is because, by 
assumption, the monopoly profits are the largest industry 
profits which can be earned. If firm 1 is earning more 
than one-half the monopoly profits, firm 2 must be earning 
less than one-half the monopoly profits; thus p ^  = 1 and 
p2t < 1- Only in the symmetric cartel will both firms be 
assured of survival.
10. A similar point is made in the context of a different 
model by Nelson and Winter (1982).
11. The analysis which follows is distantly related to 
that in Winter (1971). Probably the most important 
difference is the focus here on the case where players 
have strategic power; Winter looks only at the competitive 
Case, where firms are price-takers.
12. This is the problem of how many ways there are to 
place N identical balls in M urns.
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\Appendix 4.1: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies for a
Finite Population and a 
Variable Contest Size1
Introduction
In two papers in the Journal of Theoretical Biolocrv. Riley 
(1979) and Vickery (1987) re-examine in the context of 
finite populations the concept of an evolutionarily stable 
strategy (ESS) proposed by Maynard Smith (Maynard Smith 
and Price 1973; Maynard Smith 1974; Maynard Smith 1982). 
Both authors argue that "when interaction is between pairs 
of agents drawn at random from a finite population, a 
strategy which satisfies Maynard Smith's conditions may 
not be protected against invasion by a mutant strategy" 
(Riley 1979, p. 110).
In this appendix I show that this conclusion results from 
the fact that the standard mathematical definition of an 
ESS given by Maynard Smith and Price (Maynard Smith and 
Price 1973, p. 17; Maynard Smith 1982, p. 14) is 
inappropriate for finite populations. I suggest instead a 
more general approach which is faithful to the original 
idea as proposed by Maynard Smith and Price.2 The concept 
of an ESS is generalised to cover the cases of a finite 
population and in addition a variable contest size. It is 
shown that the Maynard Smith and Price definition-of an 
ESS is a special case of this generalised ESS with an 
infinite population and a contest size of two (pairwise 
contests). An important implication of the generalised
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ESS is that in finite populations we expect to observe 
"spiteful” behaviour (in the sense of Hamilton 1970,
1971). The appendix then proposes a notion of the degree 
of stability. The last part of the appendix consists of 
an extended example: a symmetric two-pure-strategies two-
player game for a finite population (the "Hawk-Dove" model 
is such a game). It is shown that a mixed strategy ESS is 
globally stable against invasion by any one type of mutant 
strategist, and that two different mutants can begin to 
invade if their strategies satisfy a certain condition.
The Standard ESS for Pairwise Contests and an Infinite 
Population
The definition of a standard ESS for pairwise contests in 
an infinite population is as follows. (See Maynard Smith 
and Price 1973, p. 17, and Maynard Smith 1982, p. 14; the 
presentation below draws heavily on Selten 1983, pp. 274-
7.) In a contest of any size, a strategy which maximises 
a player's payoff, taking as given the strategies of his 
opponents, is a "best reply" to his opponents' strategies. 
An "alternative best reply" for a player is some different 
strategy which is also a "best reply". A Nash equilibrium 
occurs in a contest if each player has adopted a "best 
reply".
Consider a large population of players, most of whom play
PCC
the ESS strategy s and a small number of whom are
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mutants who play the mutant strategy sM . The players 
engage in random pairwise contests. The expected fitness 
or payoff of an ESS player is denoted 7rESS, and that of a 
mutant player is tt1*. The strategy sESS is an 
evolutionarily stable strategy if (a) it is a Nash
• • • • • F^^ •equilibrium in a two-player contest, i.e. s i s  a best 
reply to itself; and (b) if sM is an alternative best 
reply to sESS, then the payoff to an ESS player who faces 
a sM player in a contest (denoted tt(sess | sM) ) is 
greater than the payoff to a sM player who faces another 
sM player in a contest (denoted tt(sm | sM) ). That is, 
sESS is an evolutionarily stable strategy if it satisfies 
the following two conditions.
(a) Equilibrium condition: sESS is a Nash strategy for 
the two-player game, i.e.
7T(SM | SESS) < 7T (sESS | sESS) (1)
for any alternative strategy sM .
(b) Stability condition: if sM is an alternative best
reply to sESS, i.e. we have
7T(sM I sESS) = 7T(sESS I sESS) (2)
then
?r(sM | sM) < »r(sESS | sM) (3)
for any alternative best reply s .
The rationale for this definition is as follows. Consider 
a large population of ESS players. -A-mutation^occurs, 
producing a small number of players with mutant strategy 
sM . The proportion of the population with this mutant 
strategy is e. Then
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7TESS = (l-e)7T(SESS I SESS) + €7T(SESS | SM) (4)
and
jt” = (l-e)ir(sM I sESS) + eir(sM | sM) (5)
The mutation will be selected against if 
< *Ess 
i.e. if
(1-€)tt(sm | sESS) + €7T(SM | sM) <
(l-e)7r(sESS | sESS) + e?r(sESS | sM ) (6)
The equilibrium condition (a) above follows from requiring
(6) to be satisfied for a sufficiently small e. The 
stability condition (b) comes directly from (6) for an sM 
which is an alternative best reply.
However, this definition and justification for the ESS 
holds true only for infinite populations. If the 
population is not infinite, the e in equation (4) is not 
the same as the e in equation (5). The probability that a 
sM player faces another sM player is smaller than the 
probability that an ESS player faces a sM player, because 
the sM player cannot play himself in a contest.
The Generalised ESS - (a) Equilibrium Condition
I first consider a generalised equilibrium condition for 
an evolutionary game. The population is of size N, and 
the players engage in contests of size C. The standard 
Maynard Smith ESS will be a special case of the 
generalised ESS with N = °o and C = 2. Notation is as
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follows: tt(sx | sY, sz, sz, ...) has as its C arguments
the strategies of all the players in a contest and denotes 
the payoff of the player with the first-named strategy 
(here strategy X). Ellipses indicate that all the 
remaining players in the contest have the last-named 
strategy (here strategy Z).
We begin with a population composed entirely of ESS 
players. Say that one ESS player is removed and replaced 
with a mutant sM player. The probability that an ESS 
player will have the mutant as one of his opponents in a 
given contest is (C-1)/(N-1). So equation (4) becomes
ttess = (1 - s=l)n(sw s  | sESS, sESS, sESS, ...)
N—1
+ C—Itt(sESS I sM, sESS, sESS, ...) (4')
N-l
Equation (5) is now simply
IT** = 7T(SM  | S E S S , S E S S , ...) (5')
because the single mutant will be playing only against ESS 
players.
The equilibrium condition (a) above now becomes 
(a*) Equilibrium condition:
< tfESS
for any alternative strategy sM, where 7tess and 7tm 
are given by equations (41) and (5 *)
In other words, in a population of N-l ESS players and 1 
mutant player, we do not expect the mutant to do better 
than a typical ESS player. Equilibrium condition (a') is
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thus faithful to the description of an ESS given by 
Maynard Smith and Price in their original 1973 article: 
"Roughly, an ESS is a strategy such that, if most of the 
members of a population adopt it, there is no ’mutant* 
strategy that would give higher reproductive fitness.” 
(Maynard Smith and Price 1973, p. 15)
Condition (a') is equivalent to saying that tt1*- nESS as a 
function of sM reaches its maximum value of zero when 
sMrrsESS. That is, sESS is a solution to
max 7rM - 7TESS (6)
SM
Substituting (4*) and (5*) into this maximisation problem, 
we see that sESS is a solution to
mgx 7T(sM | sESS, sESS, ...)
- C—1 7T(sESS | sM, sESS, sESS, ...) (7)
N-l
A s  N  -> oo, (7) gives us the Nash equilibrium, i.e. the 
equilibrium condition (a) for the standard Maynard Smith 
definition of an infinite population ESS. Equation (7) is 
an important result: it tells us that in a finite
population of all ESS players and no mutants, an ESS 
strategist is not in general maximising his 
payoff/fitness. Rather, in such a population he is 
maximising the difference between his payoff and the 
weighted payoff of a typical other ESS player. This kind 
of behaviour can be called "spiteful” (Hamilton 1970,
1971) in the sense that an ESS player pursues not only a
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larger payoff for himself but also a lower payoff for his 
competitors. From equation (7) we can see that the degree 
of "spitefulness" increases with a decrease in the 
population size, and so is most likely to be observed in 
small populations.
Equation (7) also tells us that the generalised ESS 
depends on the population size, and the ESS for a finite 
population game will not in general be identical with the 
ESS for an infinite population game. This is the source 
of Riley's and Vickery's peculiar result that a population 
of Maynard Smith "ESS” strategists can be successfully 
invaded by a mutant - the standard Maynard Smith "ESS" is 
not an ESS in finite populations.
The case of C=N is of some interest. Because the contest 
includes all members of the population, we may interpret 
the case of C=N as an example of what Maynard Smith (1982, 
pp. 23-7) calls "playing the field". The ESS in this case 
has a nice intuitive interpretation which can be 
demonstrated as follows. Substituting C=N into equation 
(7) yields
mgx 7T(sM | sESS, sESS, sESS, ...) (8)
- ir(sESS | sM , sESS, sESS, ...)
Now, number the players l...i...N. Denote by s_^ the set 
of strategies of all the players except for player i; and 
define 7r(s^ | s_^) to be the payoff to player i with 
strategy s^, taking as given s_^, the strategies of the
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other N-l players. Also say that the single mutant player 
is player number m. Thus ttess s 7r(s^ | s_^), i^m; and 
*  s ir(sm | s_m). Write the payoff to an ESS player as 
the average of the payoffs of all the ESS players:
nESS = __l_ s rr(s± | s-:L)
N-l i^m
Substituting for tt1* and ttess in equation (8), we have 
rewritten the definition of the ESS in the playing the 
field case as that sm which is a symmetric solution to
N
max 7T(sm | s_m) . - _1_ S Tr(s± | s-±) (9)
sm N-l i^m
(We require a symmetric solution because all the mutant's 
opponents share the ESS strategy.) Equation (9) is, in 
fact, the same definition as that for the Nash solution to 
Shubik's zero-sum "beat the average" (BTA) game (Shubik 
and Levitan 1980). (As in the evolutionary model of the 
preceding chapter, there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between the playing the field ESS and the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium in the BTA game. The proof is identical and 
is not repeated here.) It is easy to see how the "beat 
the average" game gets its name. The BTA game is a zero- 
sum, relative-maximisation game. In the C=N "playing the 
field" case, therefore, the "spitefulness" of the ESS can 
be interpreted in terms of zero-sum behaviour on the part 
of players.
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The Generalised ESS - (b) Stability Condition
I now turn to question of stability. Consider the 
following situation. Say a generalised ESS exists for 
some game with a finite population. This means, by the 
equilibrium condition (a') above, that there does not 
exist a mutant strategy such that, in a population of N-l 
ESS strategists and 1 mutant strategist, the mutant has a 
strictly larger payoff than an ESS player. However, if 
there are two identical mutant strategists, the mutants 
may have larger payoffs. More generally, it may be that 
an ESS is locally but not globally stable in the following 
sense: in a population with Y or fewer identical mutants 
and N-Y or more ESS players, n** < nrESS, but in a 
population with Y+l mutants and N-Y-l ESS players, ttm >
■pcq , . , , , ,
. This suggests a natural definition of stability. 
Denoting by M the number of mutants in a population, we 
have
(b*) Stability: A strategy sESS is Y-stable if, in a
population with a total of up to Y identical mutant 
strategists with any mutant strategy sM f sESS,
7TM < 7TESS for all 2 < M < Y
The ESS is globally stable if Y = N-l.
Note the similarity between stability condition (b1) and 
equilibrium condition (a*). Equilibrium has been defined 
with reference to a population with 1 mutant; stability, 
with reference to a population with 2 or more mutants.
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To find the degree of stability of an ESS in a given game, 
we must calculate the expected payoffs 7tess and
Denote by tt(sess | C-l-j, j) the expected payoff to an ESS
/
strategist in a contest of size C where he faces j 
identical mutant strategists and C-l-j other ESS 
strategists. Similarly, 7r(sM | C-l-j, j) denotes the 
payoff to a mutant when he faces such opponents in a 
contest. Making use of standard binomial coefficients, 
and assuming a large number of contests for each player, 
we have
ESS 0-1 (“) (N-1-*?) ESS ,7T = 2 i VC-l-i' 7T (s I C-l-j, j)
j=0 /N—1\
vC-l'
C—1 /M—1\ / N-M \
n** = s  j , C-1t1 ir(sM I C-l-j, j)
j=0 .N-l,
VC-17
An Extended Example - The "Hawk-Dove11 Game
Consider a symmetric two-pure-strategy two-player game. 
The payoff matrix can be written
strategy
player A
receiving
the payoff B
We assume that a < c and d < b. A player may adopt as his 
strategy either of the two pure strategies A and B; or he
opponent's strategy 
A B
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may play a mixed strategy, i.e. he may have as his 
strategy a probability of playing one or the other pure 
strategies. We will define a player's strategy s as the 
probability of playing pure strategy A. Maynard Smith 
(1982, chapter 2) shows that, if a < c and d < b, for an 
infinite population a mixed strategy ESS exists with the 
ESS probability of playing strategy A
sESS = (b-d) (10)
(b-d+c-a)
To calculate the mixed strategy ESS for the finite 
population case, we perform the maximisation in equation
(7) for C—2, i.e. we solve
max tt(sm  | sESS) - 1 7T(sESS | sM) (11)
sMc[0,l] N-l
where
7T(sm  | sESS) s sM (sEssa+(l-sESS)b)
+ (l-sM)(sESSc+(l-sESS)d)
7T (sESS | sM) = sESS(sMa+(l-sM)b) + (l-sESS) (sMc+(l-sM)d)
The first order condition for this maximisation problem is 
(after some manipulation)
(N-2)sESSa + ((N-l) - (N-2)sESS)b
+ (-1 -(N-2)sESS)c - (N-2)(l-sESS)d = 0 (12)
A little more manipulation of (12) gives us the mixed 
strategy ESS:
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SESS = N—2___________ N-2 (13)
b - d  + c - a
By setting sESS to the corner solutions 0 and 1 and still 
assuming c > a and b > d, we get the additional 
requirements for a mixed strategy: (N-2)(b-d) > (c-b)
and (N-2)(c-a) > (b-c).
A mixed strategy ESS has the property that, in a 
population of N-l ESS strategists and 1 mutant strategist, 
the payoff to the single mutant playing any mixture of 
strategies in the support of the ESS will always be equal 
to the payoff to an ESS strategist. In the contest we are 
analysing, the only pure strategies available, A and B, 
are both in the support of the ESS. This means that in 
this example, n** = 7rESS in a population with 1 mutant and 
N-l ESS strategists, for any mutant strategy sM . We will 
make use of this fact below. (It can be easily verified 
by substituting sESS from equation (13) along with the 
definitions for ?r(sESS | sESS), ?r(sESS | sM), 7t (s m  | sESS) 
and 7t (s m  | sM) into equation (6).)
N-l b - d -
It is of interest to compare the infinite population ESS 
with the finite population ESS. Subtracting (13) from
(10) gives us
(14)
In the Hawk-Dove model 
where s is the
s ^ ^  - s ESS n  = N-2___
b-d+c-a
which is > or < 0 as c > or < b. 
(Maynard Smith 1982, chapter 2),
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probability of playing Hawk, c < b. The implication is 
that in finite populations the ESS is to play Hawk more 
often than in infinite populations, and that the smaller 
the population the greater the probability of playing 
Hawk. Note that as N-x», the difference between the 
infinite and finite population mixed strategy ESS goes to 
zero.
I now show that the finite population ESS is globally 
stable against invasion by a single type of mutant. In a 
population with M mutants,
n E SS = (i__MJ7r(sESS | sESS) + M 7T(sESS | sM) (15)
N-l N-l
7^  = (l-Mrl)7T(sM | sESS) + Mzi tt(s M  | sM) (16)
N-l N-l
Subtracting (16) from (15) and engaging in a bit of
algebraic manipulation allows us to write
7TESS-7TM  = { (1-_1_)7T(SESS | SE S S ) + 1 TT(SESS | SM ) }
N-l N-l
- { tt(s M  | sESS) }
+ Mzi { 7T(SESS I SM ) + 7T(SM  | SE S S )
- 7T (SESS | SE S S ) - 7T(SM  | SM ) >
The first term in {} is the expected payoff to an ESS
strategist in a population with only one mutant 
strategist. The second term in {} is the expected payoff 
to a mutant strategist in a population with only one 
mutant strategist. These two terms must sum to zero 
because, as noted above, a mixed strategy ESS ensures that 
the expected payoff of the single mutant will always be
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equal to the expected payoff of an ESS strategist. 
Substituting the definitions for tt(sess | sM), 
jt(sess I sESS), jt(sm  I sESS) and jr(sM | sM) into the 
remaining term in {} and engaging in a fair amount of 
algebraic manipulation eventually yields
ttESS.^ _ (sESS-sM)2 (b-d+c-a) (17)
N-l
We required earlier that b>d and c>a, and so this 
expression is > 0 for all sM f sESS and all M up to N-l 
(since we need at least one ESS player in the population 
for the expression to make sense)• Equation (17) 
therefore demonstrates the global stability of a 
population of ESS mixed strategists against invasion by a 
single type of mutant.
I now show under what condition two different mutant 
strategists may begin simultaneous invasion of a 
population of ESS strategists. We have two mutant 
strategies, sM1 and sM2. In a population of N-2 ESS 
strategists and one of each type of mutant, we have
7TESS = (1 - _2_)7T(SESS | SESS) + 1 7T (SESS I SM1)
N-l N-l
+ 1 IT (sESS I SM2) (17)
N-l
7T =  (1 - 1 )7T(SM1 | S E S S )
N-l.
+ 1 7T(SM1  | SM 2 ) (18)
N-l
71 =  (1 “ 1 )7T( SM2 | S )
N-l
+ _1_ 7T(SM2 I sM1) (19)
N-l
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Subtracting (18) from (17) and once again engaging in a 
bit of algebraic manipulation yields
7TE S S -7rM 1  = { (1 " 1 ) TT (S ESS I SE S S ) + _ 1 _  7T(SESS | SM1) >
N-l N-l
- { 7T(SM 1  I S E S S ) }
+ 1 { 7T(SESS I SM 2 ) +  7T(SM 1  | SE S S )
N_1 - rr(sESS | sESS) - jt(sm1 | s«2) }
The first term in {} is the expected payoff to an ESS 
strategist in a population with one sM1 strategist and N-l 
ESS strategists. The second term in {} is the expected 
payoff to a sM1 strategist in the same population. As 
before, these terms sum to zero. Substituting the 
definitions of the payoff functions into the remainder of 
the expression and then simplifying eventually yields
ttESS-ttMI = _i_ (sESS-sM1) (sESS-sM2) (b-d+c-a) (20)
N-l
Note that equation (20) is completely symmetrical, and so 
the expression for 7rE S S -7rM 2  will be exactly the same.
We are interested in the conditions under which the 
mutants can begin to invade. Equation (20) tells us that 
the sM1 mutant strategist (and, by symmetry, the sM2 
mutant strategist) will have a larger payoff than an ESS 
strategist if and only if (sE S S -sM 1 ) ( s E S S -sM 2 )~ <" 0. That 
is, for the two mutants to both have a higher payoff than 
the ESS players, the two mutant strategies must "bracket11 
the ESS, with one mutant playing pure strategy A with a
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higher probability than an ESS strategist and the other 
mutant playing pure strategy A with a lower probability 
than an ESS strategist.
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
This appendix has presented a general formulation of the 
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) first proposed by 
Maynard Smith and Price (1973). The most important 
implication of this formulation is that ESS strategists 
may engage in "spiteful” behaviour in a finite population, 
and this tendency to spitefulness increases with a 
decrease in the population size. The empirical content of 
this implication remains to be seen.
A possible area for further work would be to extend the 
results of this appendix to the case of polymorphic 
populations with different "types" of players, each with a 
different pure strategy. However, this may not be 
straightforward. The problem is that we cannot simply 
begin by saying, as we can in the infinite-population 
case, that in an evolutionarily stable population state 
the different types of players will have equal expected 
payoffs. This is because in the finite-population case 
the relative proportions of players cannot be treated as 
continuous variables. (This is a flaw in Vickery's 
analysis of polymorphic populations (Vickery 1987, pp. 
137-8).) Take as an example the game analysed in the
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previous section. If the population is infinite and type 
A players have a greater payoff than type B players for 
some proportion of player types, then we can simply raise 
the proportion of A players until the payoffs of the two 
types become equal - any proportion is possible. If, 
however, the population is finite, the possible 
proportions of player types is restricted because the 
numbers of type A and B players must be integers. Since 
equality of payoffs of player types will not in general be 
possible in a finite population, it is not obvious how to 
define an evolutionarily stable population state.
Probably more rewarding would be to extend the generalised 
ESS to the case of a large or infinite population which is 
divided into '‘groups" of finite size. Say, for example, 
we have a species which is divided into groups (e.g., 
prides, packs, hives, ...). Say also that the groups are 
genetically and environmentally isolated, and roughly 
constant in size. In effect, these "groups" are, in the 
terminology of the appendix, "populations". This means we 
can interpret the "finite population ESS" presented in the 
appendix as a "finite group ESS" as well. That is, the 
"spiteful" behaviour which is evolutionarily stable in a 
finite population will also be evolutionarily stable in a 
population which is large or infinite but which is divided 
into such groups. Developing a theory which loosens these 
very strict assumptions about genetic and environmental 
isolation is a possibly important area for further 
research.
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Notes to Appendix 4.1
1. A version of this Appendix appeared in the Journal of 
Theoretical Biology (Vol. 132, No. 4, 22 June 1988). I 
would like to thank Stanislaw Gomulka, Ariel Rubenstein, 
Max Steuer, and an anonymous referee of the Journal for 
helpful suggestions and discussions on this subject. All 
remaining errors and omissions are mine.
2. I would like here to refer the reader to Maynard 
Smith's response to Vickery (Maynard Smith 1988), and the 
paper by Knowlton and Parker (1979), both of which came to 
hand only after this appendix was written. The reader 
will note that the approaches to the finite-population ESS 
used by Knowlton and Parker and by Maynard Smith in their 
analysis of very specific (and different) models, and the 
general finite-population ESS approach proposed in this 
appendix, are essentially the same. Knowlton and Parker 
also point out the "spitefulness" of the finite-population 
ESS in their model.
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Chapter 5: Redistribution of Profit in Polish Industry:
An Introduction to the "Lista 500" Dataset1
Introduction
The previous chapters in this dissertation have been 
concerned with theoretical aspects of bailouts and rescues 
of firms and enterprises. The remainder of the 
dissertation has a much more empirical orientation. The 
ultimate goal of this chapter and the next is to examine 
the evidence on whether a policy of bailouts and rescues 
of enterprises in financial difficulties was followed in 
Poland in the 1980s. The data on which this investigation 
relies is the "Lista 500". The Lista 500 is the annual 
list of the 500 largest enterprises in Polish industry 
published in the journal Zarz^dzanie. The Lista 500 
enterprises typically account for over half of nation-wide 
value added in industry. The industrial coverage is 
extensive, with the important omission of the Polish coal 
mining industry. The data available include not only 
measures of inputs (employment, capital stock) and outputs 
(sales, value added) , but more importantly for riuj 
purposes in this dissertation, figures on profits, taxes 
and subsidies. The data extend back to 1983, not long 
after the "first stage" of the Polish economic reform 
began in 1982, and has been published annually since. I 
will use data for the years 1983-88.
Details of the Lista 500 data, and of the financial 
accounts of Polish industrial enterprises, are not well
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known in the West. In this chapter I will therefore 
present a basic survey of the Lista 500 data, and in 
particular of the role of the tax and subsidy systems in 
the redistribution of enterprise profits. The next 
chapter will then take a close look at the specific 
question of bailouts/rescues of enterprises.
Data Definitions, and Tax and Subsidy Coverage
The tax and subsidy information in the Lista 500 are 
extensive but not complete. Some taxes and subsidies get 
lumped together, and some definitions have changed over 
time. We have used the following definitions.
1. Sales - Costs = "Profit 1"
"Profit 1” in Polish terminology is called 
"Accumulation". We will sometimes also call it 
"Original Profit".
2. "Profit 1" - Turnover Tax = "Profit 2".
Turnover tax is essentially a product-specific sales
tax.
3. "Profit 2" + Subsidy 1 = "Profit 3"
"Profit 3" in Polish terminology is called "Financial 
Result".
4. "Profit Tax Owed" = 65% of "Profit 3"
"Profit Tax" in Polish terminology is called "Income 
Tax".
5. "Subsidy 2" = Profit Tax Owed - Profit Tax Paid
The profit tax was originally intended to be a linear
tax, but in practice many exemptions from this tax
were available.
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6. “Profit 3” - Profit Tax Paid = "Profit 4"
"Profit 4” will sometimes be called "Final Profit”.
7. Profit rate = profit / real fixed capital stock.
The focus of the analysis will be the redistribution 
process that begins with "Original Profit" (Profit 1, 
Accumulation) and ends with "Final Profit" (Profit 4).
The Lista 500 tax and subsidy data is unfortunately not 
complete? some taxes are included in costs, and some are 
paid out of "Final Profit". Nevertheless, the two taxes 
for which we have data are the two most important sources 
of tax revenue for the state budget. Turnover tax and 
profit tax together typically accounted for over 70% of 
tax revenue from the socialised sector of the economy. 
There is an anomaly here, however, which has an important 
effect on the analysis, namely the taxation of alcohol.
In 1988, for example, turnover tax revenue from all 
enterprises was 3434.2 billion z^oty, and from industrial 
enterprises 2588.4 billion z^oty. Of this revenue, 1066.4 
billion z^oty was turnover tax revenue from alcohol sales, 
all of it generated by one firm, Polmos.2 For this reason 
I omit Polmos from the analysis of the Lista 500. I 
should also note here that in some years (1985 and 1987) 
the fertiliser producer Azoty W^oc^awek has anomalous 
profit/loss data, and in these years it too is excluded 
from the sample.3
What I call subsidy 1 contains most of the subsidies paid
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to state enterprises.4 It includes product subsidies, the 
"foreign trade compensation” subsidy, the "unfavourable 
difference in prices" subsidy, and "other balancing of 
negative profit" subsidies. In particular, food subsidies 
are included in subsidy 1 (they are paid to enterprises in 
the food processing sector and therefore figure in the 
Lista 500 data). I should note, however, that subsidy 1 
is calculated as a residual? it is not given directly in 
the Lista 500 data. For this reason subsidy 1 unavoidably 
contains a (fortunately small) "balance of extraordinary 
gains and losses item".5
Subsidy 2 (profit tax exemptions) was available to 
enterprises on the grounds of export sales, economical use 
of fuel and energy, and production of high quality goods. 
In practice these exemptions at the economy-wide level 
typically lowered the effective tax rate from 65% to under 
50%. Most of the enterprises in the Lista 500 benefited 
(to varying degrees) from these tax exemptions.
The original Lista 500 data give a mixed real/nominal 
fixed capital stock figure, except for 1983 when no figure 
at all is supplied.6 Data for the real and nominal fixed 
capital stock in socialised industry as a whole from the 
Rocznik Statvstvcznv is used to calculate approximate real 
fixed capital stocks valued in prices of the year 
concerned. For 1983 an even rougher approximation is 
used, namely the enterprise capital stock figures for
1984-88. A number of enterprises appeared in the 1983
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Lista 500 but not in these subsequent years? I do not have 
any fixed capital stock at all for these enterprises.
It is sometimes convenient to group firmsby their original 
profitability and by their final profitability. The 
categories for original profitability are taken, with some 
modifications, from Kornai (1986a, and personal 
communication with the author). His categories are based 
on all real assets, i.e. inventories are included. A firm 
with a profitability which is negative is designated a 
”loss-maker”? between 0 and 6%, a "low profitability" 
firm? more than 6% up to 20%, "medium profitability"? and 
above 20%, "high profitability". Data from the Rocznik 
Statvstvcznv on inventories held by enterprises is used to 
calculate roughly comparable categories based on real 
fixed capital only? my original profitability cut-offs are 
0%, 6.8%, and 22.7%. The cut-offs for the final 
profitability categories are obtained from the original 
profitability cut-offs with a correction for the average 
net tax rate? we multiply the cut-offs by final profit -s- 
original profit, the aggregate rate of retention of 
original profits. This method of calculating final 
profitability categories will be discussed again below, 
when cross-tabulations by profitability are presented.
Taxation and Subsidisation of Enterprises
1. The Lista 500 set of industrial enterprises in the
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period 1983-88 was, in aggregate and at the industrial 
branch level, profitable before taxes and subsidies, even 
when the hugely profitable Polmos is excluded (see Tables 
5.1-5.6). Roughly the same pattern holds when we look at 
all state-owned industrial enterprises.7 It is important 
to note that the observed branch profitability patterns 
were heavily influenced by government price controls. 
Observed pre-tax/subsidy profitability in this period is 
not a good guide to what profitability would have been at 
market-set prices. If energy and food prices had risen to 
market-clearing levels, for example, the observed 
profitability patterns would have changed markedly.
2. Polish industry was on the whole a significant 
generator of net tax revenue? considerably more was 
collected via taxes and than was paid out via subsidies, 
even when tax revenue from alcoholic spirits is excluded. 
Put another way, the net taxation rate of profit 1 was 
high. Define the net taxation rate of profit 1 as 
(profit 1 - profit 4) / profit 1. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show 
net taxation rates for the Lista 500 as a whole and by 
profitability categories, for the period 1983-88; the 
former uses all available data for all enterprises in each 
year, the latter uses data for only those enterprises for 
which we have data in all six years. Although the net 
taxation rate for the sample as a whole was rather high, 
it declined substantially over 1983-88, from nearly 70% to 
about 50% of pre-tax/subsidy profits. The pattern by 
profitability category shows a clearly progressive
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effective net tax. Loss-makers received on average a 
subsidy greater than the losses incurred (this is the 
meaning of a tax rate on losses exceeding 100%). The net 
tax rate for profit-makers was on average increasing with 
original profitability.
3. The ranking of industrial branches by original 
profitability is much different from the ranking by final 
profitability. That is, the cumulative impact of taxation 
and subsidisation on industrial branch profitability is 
severe. Tables 5.1 to 5.6 show the effects of the stages 
of profit redistribution on profit rates by industry and 
by profitability category for 1983-88. The tables also 
demonstrate the selective impact of turnover tax and 
subsidy 1 according to original profitability. The 
incidence of turnover tax is borne largely by those 
enterprises whose original profitability is high; the 
change in profitability moving from column 1 to column 2 
is very large for this category and quite small for the 
other three categories. Subsidy 1 mostly benefits loss- 
makers. Profit tax, by contrast, is not so selectively 
targeted by profitability.
4. Table 5.9 presents the distribution by industrial 
branch for those enterprises in the 1988 Lista 500 that 
were loss-makers before taxes and subsidies (i.e. 
according to profit 1). Several points regarding loss- 
making enterprises are worth noting. First of all, the 
number of loss-makers is not large, only about 11% of the
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sample. Second, most of these loss-makers are in the food 
processing sector; the rest are largely enterprises 
producing agricultural inputs. During this period both 
food products and agricultural inputs were highly 
subsidised and sold at state-controlled prices that were 
set very low. Third, none of these loss-makers were loss- 
makers at the end of the tax/subsidy process; all received 
a subsidy sufficient to cover their losses. These three 
features, with minor variations, form a consistent pattern 
in the Lista 500 data over the entire period 1983-88.8
This pattern in loss-making enterprises by industry, and 
the selective application of turnover tax and subsidy 1, 
reflect the use of turnover tax and product subsidies as 
tools in product pricing policy. Turnover tax was used to 
raise tax revenue via those products that, at a given 
level of aggregate supply, would command a high price 
relative to production costs. Product subsidies were used 
where central policy dictated a price which was 
insufficient to cover production costs. State control of 
prices thus had a very strong influence on profitability, 
both at the sector and enterprise level. A by-product of 
this policy is that (aside from some obvious cases) it is 
very difficult to identify which are the efficient, truly 
"profitable" sectors, and which are hot. The problem is 
even worse at the enterprise level; only with market- 
clearing prices would it be possible to identify the truly 
"unprofitable" enterprises.
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I will return to the topic of loss-making enterprises in 
the next chapter.
Cross-tabulation bv Profitability
A convenient starting point for analysing the 
redistribution of profit is cross-tabulation according to 
profitability. Such a cross-tabulation "transition 
matrix" was calculated for Hungarian manufacturing by 
Kornai and Matits and reported in Kornai (1986b). Kornai 
and Matits choose four ranges of profitability, defined as 
the ratio of profits to all real assets (including 
inventories). Firms are then categorised according to 
their "original profitability", i.e. profitability before 
all taxes and subsidies. The firms in each of the four 
groups are then categorised according to their "final 
profitability", i.e. profitability after all taxes and 
subsidies. The cross-tabulation matrix is constructed by 
taking each of the four "original profitability" 
categories of firms and calculating the proportions of 
each group that come under the four "final profitability" 
categories. Each element of the matrix thus gives the 
proportion of enterprises from a given original 
profitability category which ends up in a given final 
profitability category. It is important to note that the 
same ranges of profitability are used for the "original" 
and "final" categories.
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The Kornai-Matits cross-tabulation matrix for the 
Hungarian state-owned manufacturing sector in 1982 is 
reproduced below.
Cross-tabulation Matrix for Hungarian State-owned 
Manufacturing. 1982
The matrix contains only the transition proportions, i.e. 
the percentages of enterprises in an original 
profitability category which move into the various final 
profitability categories. The actual numbers of firms are 
not published in Kornai*s article.
Profitability is defined here as profits divided by the 
value of all real assets (including inventories).
Source: Kornai (1986b), and personal communication from 
Prof. Kornai to the author, December 1987.
Hungary 1982 Final Profitability
Loss Low Medium High
Maker 0-6% 6-20% > 20%
Original
Profitability
Loss-Maker
Low Prof'bility 
0- 6%
Medium Prof * ity 
6- 20%
High Prof*bility 
> 20%
Points worth noting:
1. Over three-quarters of firms which began as loss- 
makers ended up as profit-makers. This cited by Kornai as
23.3 50.0 12.2 14.5
3.8 85.3 10.3 0.6
0.0 73.4 20.6 6.0
0.8 39.4 51.5 8.3
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direct evidence of what he has termed the "soft budget 
constraint”: loss-makers are rescued. On the other hand, 
given that bankruptcies in Hungary at this time were 
virtually non-existent, it is surprising that nearly a 
quarter of firms which began as loss-makers remained loss- 
makers. It would be useful to know what devices were used 
to keep them solvent.
2. Very few of the firms which began at a high 
profitability remained highly profitable after profit 
redistribution. Kornai cites this as evidence of an 
egalitarian tendency to reduce the profits of successful 
firms (Kornai 1986b, p. 1698), what he has elsewhere 
labelled "levelling". However, it is not clear that the 
cross-tabulation matrix above is very good evidence of 
this. The problem is that, for example, a single linear 
profit tax, set at a high rate but enforced uniformly, 
could show a similar pattern to that above. Because any 
sort of profit tax will lower the profits of profit- 
makers, a cross-tabulation matrix constructed in the 
manner chosen by Kornai and Matits will typically show a 
substantial proportion of firms moving from a high or 
medium profitability category to a lower profitability 
category. Without further information, such a movement 
therefore cannot be taken as proof that the enterprise tax 
system is egalitarian or progressive.
The source of this latter problem is in the use of the 
same profitability ranges for original and final
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profitability. If net tax revenues (i.e. all taxes minus 
all subsidies) paid by enterprises are large - if the 
enterprises are a significant source of tax revenue to 
redistributed to other sectors - then any system of profit 
taxes will lower the profitability of at least some 
enterprises.
We can compensate for this problem by calculating final 
profitability categories as described at the beginning of 
this chapter. That is, we multiply the original 
profitability categories by (1 - the aggregate net tax 
rate on original profit), i.e. we multiply by the 
aggregate rate of retention of original profit. (The same 
adjustment was suggested independently by Matits (n.d.).)
The justification is as follows: if a hypothetical, 
revenue-neutral tax reform were introduced such that the 
profits of all firms were taxed at the same rate (and the 
losses of all loss-makers were subsidised at this same 
rate), the categorisation by profitability any given firm 
would remain unchanged. That is, under this hypothetical, 
"impartial”, linear tax/subsidisation system, a firm whose 
original profitability was high would also have a high 
final profitability, a firm whose original profitability 
was medium would also have a medium final profitability, 
etc. A cross-tabulation matrix for an economy which 
introduced such a tax system would in fact be an identity 
matrix, with ones down the diagonal and zeros everywhere 
else. This means we have a useful benchmark for our
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revised cross-tabulation matrices? deviations from the 
identity matrix measure deviations from a perfectly 
impartial linear tax/subsidy system.
In Poland, net tax revenues paid by enterprises are large; 
if we constructed cross-tabulation matrices for our sample 
of Polish enterprises without adjusting final 
profitability categories in this way, the potential for 
misinterpretation could be great. Note, however, that if 
net tax revenues are zero, the distortion disappears 
because the categories for original and final 
profitability are the same. Data in Matits (n.d., Table 
4) give an aggregate net tax rate on original profit of 
23% for Hungarian manufacturing in 1982. This is 
substantially lower than the tax rate for our sample but 
still large enough to allow possibly significant 
distortions as a result of not correcting final 
profitability categories.9
The cross-tabulation matrices constructed using our 
modified final profitability categories for our Polish 
sample, 1983-88, are contained in Tables 5.10-5.15. Below 
is reproduced the matrix for 1988, and for comparison, the 
cross-tabulation matrix for 1988 constructed using the 
same method as Kornai and Matits (identical original and 
final profitability categories). Several points relating 
these cross-tabulations should be noted.
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1988 Cross-tabulation Matrix 
Modified Final Profitability Categories
Final Profitability
Total
Original
Profitability
Loss
Maker
Low
0-3.2%
Medium
3.2-10.5
High
>10.5%
Row
Loss-Maker 0 9 35 12 56
0.0 16.1 62.5 21.4 11.2
Low Prof'bility 0 48 19 1 68
0-6.8% 0.0 70.6 27.9 1.5 13.6
Medium Prof'ity 0 16 156 19 191
6.8-22.7% 0.0 8.4 81.7 9.9 38.3
High Prof'ity 0 2 76 106 184
> 22.7% 0.0 1.1 41.3 57.6 36.9
Column 0 75 286 138 499
Total 0.0 15.0 57.3 27.7 100.0
1988 Cross-tabulation Matrix 
Unmodified Final Profitability Categories
Final Profitability
Total
Original
Profitability
Loss
Maker
Low
0-6.8%
Medium
6.8-22.7
High
>22.7%
Row
Loss-Maker 0 32 23 1 56
0.0 57.1 41.1 1.8 11.2
Low Prof'bility 0 64 4 0 68
0-6.8% 0.0 94.1 5.9 0.0 13.6
Medium Prof1ity 0 121 70 0 191
6.8-22.7% 0.0 63.4 36.6 0.0 38.3
High Prof'ity 0 32 119 33 184
> 22.7% 0.0 17.4 64.7 17.9 36.9
Column 0 249 216 34 499
Total 0.0 49.9 43.3 6.8 100.0
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1. Each cell contains both the number of enterprises and 
the percentage of enterprises in that row found in that 
cell. This enables us to judge the significance of the 
various categories in relation to the total number of 
firms. No correction for varying size of firms is made, 
however.
2. As noted earlier, Kornai and Matits used the value of 
all real assets including inventories to calculate 
profitability. We use real assets only, with the cut-offs 
for original profitability modified accordingly.
3. Kornai and Matits' calculations were based on the 
entire Hungarian state manufacturing sector. Our sample 
differs in at least two respects. First, we have data on 
only the 500 largest enterprises in Polish industry. 
Second, we deliberately exclude the firm Polmos from our 
sample, for reasons discussed earlier. The exclusion of 
Polmos, and hence alcoholic beverages, from our sample has 
a significant effect on the aggregate net taxation rate 
and hence on our modified final profitability categories.
4. Our Polish data set contains data on most but not all 
taxes and subsidies. Our coverage of taxes and subsidies 
is probably roughly comparable to that used by Kornai and 
Matits in calculating their cross-tabulation matrix. From 
the matrix it is clear that there is a positive, though 
perhaps weak, correlation between original and final 
profitability. Kornai and Matits (1984) report other
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results stemming from the same project. In this paper 
they distinguish four stages of profitability, and 
concentrate on the redistribution from original profits 
(stage 1) to "profits according to the balance sheet" 
(stage 3) and "profitability after redistribution" (stage 
4). The definition of "final profitability" used in the 
cross-tabulation matrix is based on balance sheet profits 
(communication from Prof. Kornai to the author, December 
1987) and thus may best correspond to stage 3 in the 
Kornai-Matits paper. Kornai and Matits (1984, p. 232) 
report figures for the correlation between original 
profitability and stage 3 and stage 4 profitability 
consistent with this. Their correlation coefficient 
between original and stage 3 profitability in 1979 is
0.29, and in 1980 is 0.28, i.e. weakly positive and 
consistent with the cross-tabulation matrix for 1982. The 
correlation coefficient between original and stage 4 
profitability, on the other hand, is 0.07 in 1979 and 
-0.01 in 1980. I report Polish correlation coefficients 
in the next section.
5. The bias induced by using unmodified final 
profitability categories is readily apparent. For 1988, 
when unmodified categories are used, about half of the 
sample have a low final profitability; when the categories 
are adjusted as described above, over half have a medium 
final profitability and only 15% a low final 
profitability.
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6. The main conclusion that follows from the Polish 
cross-tabulation matrices using adjusted final 
profitability categories (Tables 5.10-5.15) is as follows. 
The cross-tabulations for all years are very similar.
They show that the enterprise tax/subsidy system was 
consistently progressive rather than linear. The most 
marked deviation from linearity was in the treatment of 
loss-makers; not only were they all bailed out, but most 
had a final profitability which was either medium or high. 
Deviations from linearity were much less for profit-making 
enterprises.
A similar conclusion about the tax/subsidy system follows 
from an examination of the correlation between original 
and final profitability.
Profitability Correlation Coefficients
It is useful to have a single number which summarises the 
pattern of profit redistribution. The sample correlation 
coefficient r between original and final profitability is 
a convenient measure. It has the useful property that if 
taxes on enterprise profits / subsidies on enterprise 
losses were based on a single linear' rate with no 
exemptions, the correlation coefficient between original 
and final profitability would be one.10 The correlation 
coefficient is therefore related to our cross-tabulation 
matrices (using adjusted final profitability categories),
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with the difference that it provides a single measure 
which does not depend on an arbitrary categorisation of 
original profitability.
Below are two tables summarising the correlation between 
original and final profitability for the years 1983-88. 
Correlations for all enterprises taken together and for 
the subcategories of enterprises by profitability are 
given. No attempt is made to correct for the varying 
sizes of enterprises. The definitions and data are the 
same as those used in constructing the cross-tabulation 
matrices, with the exception that here we used the subset 
of 393 enterprises for which we have data in all six 
years. This means the changes in the correlation 
coefficients are not affected by changes in the sample of 
enterprises.
It is worth re-emphasising here that the exclusion of the 
enterprise Polmos makes a huge difference in our results. 
Because of the tax revenue generated by alcoholic 
beverages, Polmos has an original profitability which is 
enormous and a final profitability which is unexceptional. 
When Polmos is included in the sample the overall 
correlation coefficient drops to about 0.20; furthermore, 
changes in the taxes paid by Polmos completely swamp the 
changes in the taxes/subsidies of the other enterprises as 
reflected in the correlation coefficient.
The first table presents values of the sample correlation
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coefficient £. Stars indicate statistical significance 
under the null hypothesis that the true correlation 
coefficient r is normally distributed with mean zero; one 
star (two stars) means we can reject the hypothesis that 
the correlation coefficient is equal to zero at the 5%
(1%) level (a two-tailed test).
If we want to gauge the significance of the changes of 
non-zero correlation coefficients, we are faced with a 
statistical difficulty, because when the true r has a non­
zero mean the sample r has a distribution which is not a 
simple function and we cannot easily calculate standard 
errors, etc. However, Fisher has shown that
z = — In 1 + ^
2 1 - r
is approximately normally distributed with mean
/z = — In 1 + r
2 1 - r
and variance l/(n-3), where n is the sample size (Mood 
1950, p. 314). The second table below presents values of 
Fisher's z, together with standard errors. (Note that the
values of z approximate those of r when both are small.)
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Correlation of Original and Final Profitability
6 Year Sample, 1983-88 (393 enterprises)
I. Sample correlation coefficients
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
All
Enterprises .48** .45** .33** .28** .40** .47**
Bv Oriainal
Profitabilitv
Loss-Makers -.55** -.60** -.55** -.61** -.57** -.41**
Profit-Makers .51** .48** .41** .44** .52** .68**
of which 
Low .36** .25* .29* .20 .28* -.10
Medium .39** .21* .36** .38** .40** .51**
High . 32** .29** .12 .15 . 24** .67**
II. Fisher's z measure of correlation
(standard errors in parentheses)
All
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Enterprises . 52** .48** .35** . 29** .42** .51**
Bv Oriainal 
Profitabilitv
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
Loss-Makers -.61** -.69** -.62** -.71** -.65** -.43**
(.15) (.14) (.13) (.14) (.15) (.14)
Profit-Makers .56** .53** . 44** .48** .57** .83**
of which
(.05) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.05)
Low .38** .25* .30* .20 .29* -.10
(.12) (.13) (.14) (.13) (.13) (.14)
Medium .42** .21* .38** .40** .42** .56**
(.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.08)
High . 33** .30** .12 .15 .25** .81**
(.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09)
indicates significantly different from zero in a two- 
tailed test at the 5% level
indicates significantly different from zero in a two- 
tailed test at the 1% level
There was a steady overall decline 1983-86 in the 
linearity ("neutrality", "unbiasedness") of the enterprise 
tax/subsidy system, as measured by r and z. This occurred 
at the same time as a steady decline in the net taxation
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rate of profits (see Table 5.7). A possible explanation 
would be an increase in tax exemptions and ad hoc 
subsidies over this period? further evidence is needed 
here. The apparent increase in the linearity of the 
tax/subsidy system in 1987-88 is slightly encouraging.
The correlation coefficients are generally higher than 
those Kornai and Matits calculated for Hungarian 
manufacturing; however, differing accounting definitions, 
sample coverage, and sample sizes, suggest caution in the 
comparison.
The treatment of firms whose original profit was negative,
i.e. loss-makers, was particularly perverse. The 
significant and negative correlation indicates that of the 
loss-making enterprises, those with the lowest original 
profitability on average ended up with the highest final 
profitability. Tax/subsidy treatment of profit-making 
firms also deviated significantly from linearity, but 
original and final profitability were usually still 
related? both r and z were in the range of .3 to .5 over 
the period. When we move from profit-makers as a group to 
the three sub-categories of profit-making enterprises, we 
see that values of r and z fall noticeably across the 
board. Medium-profitability enterprises appear to have 
faced the most consistently linear tax/subsidy policy. 
High-profitability enterprises have had an uneven time? in
1985-86 original and final profit were not significantly 
correlated at all, but 1987 brought some improvement and 
in 1988 the correlation was quite high.
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These correlations should however be interpreted with some 
caution. The correlations for profit-makers as a whole 
are always higher than the correlations for the separate 
categories, a feature which is not intuitively attractive. 
The fact that pooling the sample / increasing the sample 
size leads to an increase in the correlation measures does 
make comparisons with the Kornai-Matits correlations 
somewhat easier; they had a rather larger sample (over 
1,000 enterprises) but still had lower correlation 
coefficients. Furthermore, movements in the former seem 
to be driven primarily by movements in the correlation for 
the high profitability category. This may be because of 
the sensitivity of the correlation measures to extreme 
outliers: the high profitability category is not bounded 
from above. It may be, for example, that large jump in 
the correlation for the high profitability category (and 
maybe even for the sample as a whole) is caused by a very 
large jump in the final profitability of just a few 
enterprises.
This concludes the general survey of the Lista 500 data.
In the next chapter I turn to the specific question of 
whether in fact enterprises in the Lista 500 were bailed 
out by the state if they fell into financial difficulties.
201
Table 5.1: Effects of Profit Redistribution
on Profit Rates, 1983
Profit Rate = Profit per Real Fixed Capital, in %
Profit Rate According
to Profit Definition 1 2 3 • 4
Entire Sample 11.3 5.3 8.4 3.6
Bv Industrv
Fuel & Energy 37.0 8.1 9.0 2.2
Metallurgy 1.6 1.5 3.3 1.7
Electro-Machinery 16.4 10.9 12.3 5.4
Chemicals 8.2 6.4 8.1 3.1
Bldg Materials etc 9.3 7.9 7.8 2.5
Wood & Paper 7.0 5.5 6.1 3.2
Light Industry 21.8 8.7 9.8 4.2
Food Industry -1.3 -7.6 9.3 4.6
Bv Oriainal Profitabilitv 
Loss-Makers -8.8 -8.9 3.3 2.0
Low Profitability 3.5 3.3 4.2 2.4
Medium Profitability 12.6 10.0 10.5 4.7
High Profitability 49.6 19.2 20.0 6.1
Bv Final Profitabilitv
Low Profitability 1.1 0.4 2.6 1.4
Medium Profitability 15.4 6.2 9.9 3.9
High Profitability 29.2 21.4 24.9 11.0
Start profitability cut-offs are approximately 
0.00 %, 6.80 %, and 22*70 %
Final profitability cut-offs are approximately 
0.00 %, 2.15 %, and 7.17 %
Average net tax rate is 68.4 percent 
Sample of 477 enterprises
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Table 5.2: Effects of Profit Redistribution
on Profit Rates. 1984
Profit Rate « profit per Real Fixed Capital, in %
Profit Rate According 
to Profit Definition 1 2  3 4
Entire Sample 11.5 5.6 8.7 4.
Bv Industrv
Fuel & Energy 34.2 7.0 7.8 2.
Metallurgy 3.4 3.3 4.8 2.
E1ectro-Machinery 16.1 10.7 12.7 6.
Chemicals 7.6 5.5 7.9 3.
Bldg Materials etc 7.9 5.8 6.1 2.
Wood & Paper 7.8 5.2 6.2 3.
Light Industry 26.8 10.8 12.0 5.
Food Industry 2.3 -5.8 8.9 4.
Bv Oriainal Profitabilitv 
Loss-Makers -7.1 -7.8 4.1 2.
Low Profitability 3.1 2.8 4.1 2.
Medium Profitability 11.9 9.9 10.6 5.
High Profitability 49.1 18.4 19.3 7.
Bv Final Profitabilitv
Low Profitability 1.5 0.3 2.6 1.
Medium Profitability 14.7 6.6 9.8 4.
High Profitability 30.5 20.4 24.9 13.
Start profitability cut-offs are approximately 
0.00 %, 6.80 %, and 22.70 %
Final profitability cut-offs are approximately 
0.00 %, 2.44 %, and 8.16 %
Average net tax rate is 64.1 percent 
Sample of 499 enterprises
1
5
4
5
4
4
2
3
4
2
3
2
7
3
4
1
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Table 5.3: Effects of Profit Redistribution on Profit 
Rates. 1985
Profit Rate = Profit per Real Fixed Capital, in %
Profit Rate According 
to Profit Definition 1 2  3 4
Entire Sample 11.6 5.8 9.2 4.
Bv Industrv
Fuel & Energy 28.1 6.7 7.7 2.
Metallurgy 3.1 2.9 4.3 2.
Electro-Machinery 16.1 11.2 13.0 6.
Chemicals 8.9 6.6 9.4 3.
Bldg Materials etc 6.6 4.1 5.0 1.
Wood & Paper 11.3 8.7 10.1 4.
Light Industry 29.0 10.1 11.8 4.
Food Industry 1.6 -6.5 9.4 4.
Bv Oriainal Profitabilitv 
Loss-Makers -7.2 -7.8 4.0 1.
Low Profitability 3.6 3.4 4.4 2.
Medium Profitability 13.2 10.6 11.6 5.
High Profitability 48.9 19.0 20.2 8.
Bv Final Profitabilitv
Low Profitability 1.9 0.4 3.0 1.
Medium Profitability 15.4 7.0 10.5 4.
High Profitability 29.1 20.4 26.2 13.
Start profitability cut-offs are approximately 
0.00 %, 6.80 %, and 22.70 %
Final profitability cut-offs are approximately 
0.00 %, 2.45 %, and 8.18 %
Average net tax rate is 64.0 percent 
Sample of 498 enterprises
2
4
0
6
7
6
6
9
4
9
3
4
1
3
5
3
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Table 5.4: Effects of Profit Redistribution on Profit 
Rates. 1986
Profit Rate = Profit per Real Fixed Capital, in %
Profit Rate According 
to Profit Definition 1 2 3 4
Entire Sample 10.4 5.5 9.0 4.
Bv Industrv
Fuel & Energy 27.6 5.2 7.0 2 .
Metallurgy 3.4 3.3 4.5 2.
Electro-Machinery 14.2 10.4 12.6 6.
Chemicals 6.5 4.7 8.3 3.
Bldg Materials etc 5.5 3.5 4.2 1.
Wood & Paper 6.2 4.5 6.4 2.
Light Industry 28.2 12.7 14.1 6.
Food Industry 2.2 -4.6 11.0 5.
Bv Oriainal Profitabilitv 
Loss Makers -8.8 -8.8 4.8 2.
Low Profitability 3.5 3.3 4.3 2.
Medium Profitability 12.7 10.5 11.3 5.
High Profitability 45.9 18.5 20.0 9.
Bv Final Profitabilitv
Low Profitability 1.6 0.7 3.2 1.
Medium Profitability 14.6 6.9 10.6 4.
High Profitability 26.3 20.1 28.1 16.
Start profitability cut-offs are approximately 
0.00 %, 6.80 %, and 22.70 %
Final profitability cut-offs are approximately 
0.00 %, 2.88 %, and 9.63 %
Average net tax rate is 57.6 percent 
Sample of 499 enterprises
4
3
2
8
7
6
7
0
6
6
3
4
2
4
9
1
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Table 5.5; Effects of Profit Redistribution on Profit
Rates. 1987
Profit Rate = Profit per Real Fixed Capital, in %
Profit Rate According 
to Profit Definition 1 2  3
Entire Sample 11.6 7.4 10.5
Bv Industrv
Fuel & Energy 24.9 4.9 6.2
Metallurgy 5.4 5.2 6.4
Electro-Machinery 15.1 11.9 13.4
Chemicals 9.7 8.0 11.5
Bldg Materials etc 6.4 4.6 5.5
Wood & Paper 9.1 7.5 8.8
Light Industry 27.9 15.7 16.9
Food Industry 2.6 -3.8 11.5
Bv Oriainal Profitabilitv
Loss-Makers -17.1 -17.2 8.1
Low Profitability 3.1 3.0 4.2
Medium Profitability 13.2 11.5 12.4
High Profitability 43.0 21.5 22.5
Bv Final Profitabilitv
Low Profitability 1.9 1.4 3.8
Medium Profitability 15.7 8.8 11.6
High Profitability 27.3 22.9 30.3
Start profitability cut-offs are approximately 
0.00 %, 6.80 %, and 22.70 %
Final profitability cut-offs are approximately 
0.00 %, 3.40 %, and 11.36 %
Average net tax rate is 50.0 percent 
Sample of 498 enterprises
4
5.8
2.4 
2.8
8.5 
6.4 
2.3 
4.2
7.8
6.8
5.0
2.3
6.7
12.3
1.8
6.1
19.2
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Table 5.6: Effects of Profit Redistribution on Profit
Rates. 1988
Profit Rate = Profit per Real Fixed Capital, in %
Profit Rate According 
to Profit Definition 1 2  3
Entire Sample 12.1 7.5 11.5
Bv Industrv
Fuel & Energy 33.7 6.5 7.1
Metallurgy 8.0 7.9 8.6
Electro-Machinery 16.4 13.2 14.1
Chemicals 10.0 8.5 11.3
Bldg Materials etc 6.2 4.4 5.2
Wood & Paper 9.1 7.9 8.6
Light Industry 27.4 16.1 17.1
Food Industry -8.5 -15.5 12.9
Bv Oriainal Profitabilitv
Loss-Makers -26.4 -26.4 8.6
Low Profitability 2.8 2.6 4.0
Medium Profitability 13.7 12.0 12.9
High Profitability 48.8 24.4 25.1
Bv Final Profitabilitv
Low Profitability 2.8 2.2 3.6
Medium Profitability 15.2 8.5 12.8
High Profitability 29.4 22.3 34.5
Start profitability cut-offs are approximately 
0.00 %, 6.80 %, and 22.70 %
Final profitability cut-offs are approximately
0.00 %, 3.16 %, and 10.55 %
Average net tax rate is 53.5 percent 
Sample of 499 enterprises
4
5.6
3.0
3.7
7.4
5.5
2.6
4.6 
7.4
6.7
4.9
1.9 
6.3
12.1
1.7
6.1
18.2
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Table 5.7: Net Tax Rate on Original Profit, in %
Data used is for all available enterprises in each year 
(Polmos is excluded).
All
1983 1984 ”1985 1986 1987 1988
Enterprises 68.4 64.1 64.0 57.6 50.0 53.5
Bv Oriainal 
Profitabilitv
Loss-Makers 122.5 131.3 127.0 130.0 129.0 118.6
Pro f it-Makers 76.1 71.4 71.4 68.3 58.9 63.8
of which
Low 32.6 27.1 36.5 34.2 25.4 31.4
Medium 63.0 56.3 59.0 57.6 49.0 54.1
High 87.8 84.2 83.4 80.0 71.4 75.2
Note: Net tax rate = (Profit 1 - Profit 4) / Profit
Table 5.8: Net Tax Rate on Oriainal Profit. in %
Data used is :for only those enterprises for which we have
data for every year (Polmos is excluded).
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
All
Enterprises 70.2 68.1 66.7 60.7 51.5 52.4
Bv Oriainal
Profitabilitv
Loss-Makers 125.8 135.0 127.7 130.5 128.3 117.7
Prof it-Makers 76.7 73.9 73.7 70.8 61.5 66.0
of which
Low 32.1 29.4 41.7 34.4 25.8 31.2
Medium 63.1 58.0 60.5 60.4 51.0 55.0
High 88.1 85.3 84.4 80.6 72.7 76.7
Note: Net tax rate = (Profit 1 - Profit 4) / :Profit 1
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Table 5.9: Loss-making Enterprises in 1988
Sample of 500 largest state-owned industrial enterprises 
(Polmos is included).
Total number of loss-makers 56
of which
Food Processing 43
of which
meat products 23
food oil products 6
poultry products 5
grain products 5
sugar products 3
Other Industry 13
of which
fodder production 6
fertiliser production 3
Note: Coal-mining excluded.
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Table 5.10; Cross-tabulation bv Profitabilitv. 1983
(Modified final profitability categories are used)
1983 Final Profitability
Total
Original
Profitability
Loss
Maker
Low
0-2.1%
Medium 
2.1-7.2
High 
> 7.2%
Row
Loss-Maker 1 18 40 3 62
1.6 29.0 64.5 4.8 13.0
Low Prof'bility 0 35 55 1 91
0-6.8% 0.0 38.5 60.4 1.1 19.1
Medium Prof*ity 0 5 154 29 188
6.8-22.7% 0.0 2.7 81.9 15.4 39.4
High Prof'ity 0 2 63 71 136
> 22.7% 0,0 1.5 46.3 52.2 28.5
Column 1 60 312 104 477
Total 0.2 12.6 65.4 21.8 100.0
Table 5.11: Cross-tabulation bv Profitabilitv. 1984 
(Modified final profitability categories are used)
1984 Final Profitability
Total
Original
Profitability
Loss
Maker
Low
0-2.4%
Medium 
2.4-8.2
High 
> 8.2%
Row
Loss-Maker 2 22 36 8 68
2.9 32.4 52.9 11.8 13.6
Low Prof'bility 0 36 43 1 80
0-6.8% 0.0 45.0 53.8 1.3 16.0
Medium Prof'ity 0 10 156 35 201
6.8-22.7% 0.0 5.0 * 77.6 17.4 40.3
High Prof'bility 0 5 59 86 150
> 22.7% 0.0 3.3 39.3 57.3 30.1
Column 2 73 294 130 499
Total 0.4 14.6 58.9 26.1 100.0
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Table 5.12; Cross-tabulation bv Profitability. 1985
(Modified final profitability categories are used)
1985 Final Profitability
Column
Total
1
0.2
93
18.7
281
56.4
123
24.7
Total
Original
Profitability
Loss
Maker
Low
0-2.4%
Medium 
2.4-8.2
. High 
> 8.2%
Loss-Maker 1 28 38 9
1.3 36.8 50.0 11.8
Low Prof'bility 0 47 27 0
0-6.8% 0.0 63.5 36.5 0.0
Medium Prof'ity 0 13 142 30
6.8-22.7% 0.0 7.0 76.8 16.2
High Prof'bility 0 5 74 84
> 22.7% 0.0 3.1 45.4 51.5
Row
76
15.3
74
14.9
185
37.1
163
32.7
498
100.0
Table 5.13: Cross-tabulation bv Profitabilitv. 1986 
(Modified final profitability categories are used)
1986 Final Profitability
Total
Original
Profitability
Loss
Maker
Low
0-2.9%
Medium 
2.9-9.6
High 
> 9.6%
Loss-Maker 2 16 36 11
3.1 24.6 55.4 16.9
Low Prof'bility 0 53 33 1
0-6.8% 0.0 60.9 37.9 1.1
Medium Prof'ity 0 18 144 27
6.8-22.7% 0.0 9.5 * 76.2 14.3
High Prof'ity 0 3 88 67
> 22.7% 0.0 1.9 55.7 42.4
Column 2 90 301 106
Total 0.4 18.0 60.3 21.2
Row
65
13.0
87
17.4
189
37.9
158
31.7
499
100.0
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Table 5.14; Cross-tabulation bv Profitabilitv. 1987
(Modified final profitability categories are used)
1987 Final Profitability
Total
Original
Profitability
Loss
Maker
Low
0-3.4%
Medium
3.4-11.4
High
>11.4%
Row
Loss-Maker 0 13 29 11 53
0.0 24.5 54.7 20.8 10.6
Low Prof'bility 0 54 29 1 84
0-6.8% 0.0 64.3 34.5 1.2 16.9
Medium Prof'ity 0 18 145 23 186
6.8-22.7% 0.0 9.7 78.0 12.4 37.3
High Prof*ity 0 2 90 83 175
> 22.7% 0.0 1.1 51.4 47.4 35.1
Column 0 87 293 118 498
Total 0.0 17.5 58.8 23.7 100.0
Table 5.15: Cross-tabulation bv Profitabilitv. 1988 
(Modified final profitability categories are used)
1988 Final Profitability
Total
Original
Profitability
Loss
Maker
Low
0-3.2%
Medium
3.2-10.5
High
>10.5%
Row
Loss-Maker 0 9 35 12 56
0.0 16.1 62.5 21.4 11.2
Low Prof'bility 0 48 19 1 68
0-6.8% 0.0 70.6 27.9 1.5 13.6
Medium Prof'ity 0 16 156 19 191
6.8-22.7% 0.0 8.4 ‘ 81.7 9.9 38.3
High Prof'ity 0 2 76 106 184
> 22.7% 0.0 1.1 41.3 57 . 6 36.9
Column 0 75 286 138 499
Total 0.0 15.0 57.3 27.7 100.0
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Notes to Chapter 5
1. This chapter is a revised version of "Redistribution of 
Profit, Financial Flows, and Economic Reform in Polish 
Industry: Evidence from the *Lista 500'", presented at the 
Symposium on Monetary Policy, Financial Flows, and Reforms 
in Centrally Planned Economies, Gerzenzee,' Switzerland, 2- 
4 March 1989. Parts of this chapter appeared (in somewhat 
different form) in "State-Owned Enterprises in Poland: 
Taxation, Subsidisation, and Competition Policies", Paper 
prepared for the PHARE Project, DGII, European Commission, 
February 1990.
The work on the Lista 500 arises from a project 
directed by Stanislaw Gomulka of the London School of 
Economics and funded by the Suntory-Toyota International 
Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines. While most 
of the chapter was written I was an IREX Developmental 
Fellow, and I also benefited from a productive visit to 
the European University Institute in the course of 
analysing the data. The generous financial support of 
STICERD and IREX and the hospitality of the EUI are 
gratefully acknowledged. I would also like to thank 
Staszek Gomulka, Mario Nuti, Janos Kornai, and Tadeusz 
Baczko, for suggestions, support and encouragement. I 
would like to thank as well the Swiss National Fund for 
Scientific Research, the Dept, of Political Economy of the 
University of Geneva, and Prof. Pawel Dembinski, for 
making participation in the symposium possible.
2. Rocznik Statvstvcznv 1989, p. 117, and Lista 500 1988.
3. In 1985 and 1987 Azoty W^oc^awek reported very large 
losses according to profit 3 and profit 4, but with no 
indication of how these losses would have been covered. 
Furthermore, the Lista 500 data also show that in these 
years the same enterprise reported non-negative figures 
for its enterprise development fund as a percentage of its 
profit 3, which appears inconsistent with the reported 
negative values of profit 3.
4. By definition, subsidy 1 s financial result - 
accumulation + turnover tax. If we calculate subsidy 1 
for 1987 using aggregate figures for all state-owned 
enterprises we obtain the figure of 2055.2 billion z^oty; 
all state subsidies in 1987 amounted to 2527.2 billion 
z^oty. Data from the Rocznik Statvstvcznv 1988, pp. 99, 
113.
5. Later years of the Lista 500 dataset provide a figure 
which is very close to our subsidy 1. .1 have used the 
definition of subsidy 1 as a residual for all years, 
however, for consistency reasons.
6. To be precise, for 1983-87 the figure given is based on 
the fixed capital stock in 1982 zloty, probably for 1982, 
with subsequent years calculated by adding investment in 
current prices. The 1988 figure is a similar mixture of a 
1986 base in 1986 prices plus investment in subsequent
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years in current prices.
7. With the differences that the food branch minus alcohol 
would not be profitable, and the coal branch is not 
profitable. See e.g. the Rocznik Statvstvcznv Przemvslu 
1988, pp. 114-121.
8. It is worth noting the two main gaps in the Lista 500 
data regarding loss-makers: the coal branch (deliberately 
excluded from the data), and the milk products branch 
(whose individual enterprises were too small to make the 
Lista 500, but whose combined subsidy in 1988 was nearly 
as large as the official Polish defence budget).
9. Though these distortions may still be minimal. For
example, it may be the case that in Hungary, as in Poland, 
all alcohol is produced by one firm in the manufacturing 
sector which is very highly taxed. It could well be that 
if the tax revenues of such a firm were excluded, the net 
tax rate would be near zero. More information on the 
construction and use of the Kornai-Matits data would be 
necessary before we could assess the scale of distortion, 
if any.
10. More specifically, the correlation would be one if 
there were both a linear tax on profits and an additional
(possibly zero) lump-sum tax proportional to the
enterprise capital stock. A tax along the lines of the 
latter was in fact implemented in Poland beginning in 1989 
(the so-called "dividend”).
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Chapter 6: How Polish Enterprises Are Subsidised1
Introduction
This chapter is devoted specifically to an analysis of 
rescues of loss-making enterprises. The focus of the 
chapter will be the distribution of subsidies to state- 
owned enterprises. In particular, I will use the 
Lista 500 data for the period 1983-87 to look for evidence 
that subsidies are adjusted on an ad hoc, enterprise- 
specific, ex post basis, and that a policy of bailouts of 
ailing enterprises is in operation. In Kornai's 
terminology, I am looking for evidence of a "soft budget 
constraint". Although anecdotal evidence for the 
existence of a bailout policy in the East European 
socialist economies is fairly abundant, hard evidence 
based on detailed enterprise-level data has been much 
scarcer. This chapter is an attempt to help fill this 
gap.
As we shall see, the evidence in support of the above 
characterisation of the Polish subsidy system is quite 
strong. Specifically, the main subsidy distributed to 
enterprises responds very clearly to changes in pre­
subsidy enterprise profit. For loss-makers, a change in 
subsidy is explained almost completely by a change in pre­
subsidy profits, and is nearly one-to-one - i.e. an 
increase in pre-subsidy losses is very predictably matched 
by a 60-90% increase in subsidy. Profit-makers that
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receive the subsidy are also compensated in this way, but 
on a much smaller scale: about 15-30% of a decrease in 
pre-subsidy profit would be covered by an increase in 
subsidy. In short, during the period covered by the data, 
the budget constraints of Polish state-owned enterprise 
were, in fact, "soft".
The Allocation of Subsidy 1
As we saw in the previous chapter, a significant though 
not very large fraction of the Lista 500 sample (typically 
10%—15%) is composed of loss-makers according to original 
profit, but at most one or two of these are loss-makers 
according to final profit. It is what I call subsidy 1 
which eliminates these losses.
A good idea of how the state distributes subsidy 1 can be 
had from a cross-tabulation showing enterprise 
profitability according to profit 2 (pre-subsidy 
profitability) vs. profitability according to profit 3 
(post-subsidy profitability). For our purposes it is now 
probably more informative to use the same profitability 
categories for both pre- and post-subsidy profitability? 
any movement within the cross-tabulation matrix therefore 
arises only from the receipt of a subsidy and not from 
differences between the pre- and post-subsidy 
profitability categories. For comparability with the 
cross-tabulation matrices of the previous chapter, the
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pre-subsidy profitability categories are derived from the 
original profitability categories used earlier, with a 
correction for turnover tax paid.2
Below is reproduced the cross-tabulation for the 1987 
allocation of subsidy 1; the results for other years are 
very similar. The aggregate subsidy rate (total subsidy 1 
/ total profit 2) for the sample was quite substantial at 
42.5%, raising profitability from 7.37% to 10.51%. The 
most striking feature of the cross-tabulation matrix is 
again the treatment of loss-makers. All 57 loss-makers 
became profitable after receipt of subsidy 1, and nearly 
all reached the level of either medium or high 
prof itability.
1987 Cross-tabulation Matrix. Allocation of Subsidy 1
Post-Subsidy 1 Profitability
Row
Total
Pre-Subsidy 1 
Profitability
| Loss 
| Maker
| Low 
| 0-4.3%
| Medium | High 
|4.3-14.5| >14.5%
II
II
Loss Maker 0 6 36 15 57
0.0 10.5 63.2 26.3 11.4
Low Prof'bility 0 30 22 0 52
0-4.3% 0.0 57.7 42.3 0.0 10.4
Medium Prof'ity 0 0 187 17 204
4.3-14.5% 0.0 0.0 91.7 8.3 41.0
High Prof'ity 0 0 0 185 185
> 14.5% 0.0 0.0 0.0 100. 0 37 .1
Column 0 36 245 217 498
Total 0.0 7.2 49.2 .43.6 100.0
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Nevertheless, we cannot conclude from the cross-tabulation 
matrix alone that subsidy 1 is used simply as a rescue 
subsidy. As I pointed out briefly in Chapter 2, the mere 
presence of enterprise subsidies is not proof that budget 
contraints are "soft"? the subsidies must be conditional 
on the enterprise facing financial difficulties. First of 
all, loss-makers are the main, but not the only, 
recipients of subsidy 1. In 1987, for example, loss- 
makers accounted for 70% of all subsidy 1. The cross­
tabulation matrix shows that some low and medium 
profitability enterprises receive subsidy 1. Indeed, even 
some high profitability enterprises receive some payment 
of subsidy 1, as is evidenced from the table below showing 
aggregate pre- and post-subsidy profitability.
Effects of Subsidy 1 Allocation on Profit Rates. 1987
Profit Rate According 
to Profit Definition 2 3
Entire Sample 7.4 10.5
Bv Pre-Subsidv Profitabilitv
Loss Makers -9.4 5.4
Low Profitability 2.7 3.7
Medium Profitability 9.0 9.8
High Profitability 23.6 24.7
More fundamentally, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
the subsidies received are simply lump-sum subsidies. If 
this were the case, then the profit-maximisation motive
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would not be affected by the subsidisation, and enterprise 
incentives would not be affected. We also cannot exclude 
the possibility that subsidies are granted on the basis 
of, say, output sold. We saw in the previous chapter that 
a large part of the pattern of subsidisation can be 
explained by Polish pricing policy, in particular food 
pricing policy. If output prices are held artificially 
low by state regulations (which was often the case in 
Poland in this period), then a per unit subsidy would be a 
logical policy instrument to implement. If it is indeed 
the case that Polish industrial subsidies were per unit 
subsidies which did not depend on enterprise profitability 
per se, the absence of post-subsidy loss-makers would not 
necessarily indicate a policy of bailouts was in 
operation. We need therefore to investigate the data more 
closely.
An Econometric Investigation of Rescues
The Polish budget distinguishes between two types of 
subsidy. Some of the subsidies are product-specific (in 
Polish, dotacie przedmiotowe. "objective subsidies"); 
others are enterprise-specific (dotacie podmiotowe. 
"subjective subsidies"). The former are supposed to 
compensate enterprises for unfavourable output or input 
prices? for example, until August 1989 meat processing 
enterprises had to sell their output at state-set prices 
which were very low. The latter might be paid, for
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example, to old enterprises with high operating costs. 
According to Polish statistics, only a tiny fraction of 
subsidies are supposed to be enterprise-specific: in 1987, 
for example, total subsidies to enterprises amounted to 
2527 billion z^oty, of which only 0.1 billion were 
officially enterprise-specific.3
There is, however, anecdotal evidence that all these 
subsidies are allocated according to a number of informal, 
enterprise-specific criteria. An enterprise with a 
serious liquidity problem might, for example, be granted 
an extra subsidy which appears in the books as a product- 
specific subsidy. Unfortunately, the Lista 500 data gives 
only aggregate figures for subsidies received by each 
enterprise, rather than separate data on the two types of 
subsidies. Nevertheless, we can still try to discover 
from the Lista 500 data the apparent criteria by which 
subsidies are allocated.
I will be looking at the following questions. First, I 
will try to estimate a “state subsidisation function”.
That is, I will estimate a reduced form equation which 
gives the subsidy received by the enterprise as a function 
of a number of variables, most importantly enterprise 
sales and enterprise costs. Second,' I will look for 
evidence that the subsidisation treatment of loss-makers 
is different from the subsidisation of profit-makers.
That is, I will look for evidence that the state rescues 
loss-makers.
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Notation is as follows:
i Subscript identifying a specific enterprise
j Subscript identifying a specific product
t Subscript identifying the year
N Total number of enterprises
Subsidy received by enterprise i in year t (from 
Polish dotacie. "subsidy”) 
sit Total sales of enterprise i in year t
S^ -jt Total sales of product j by enterprise i in
year t
Total costs (materials, labour, etc)
MCit Material costs
NMCj^ Non-material costs ( = C - MC)
Total costs of producing product j by enterprise 
i in year t 
Original profit ("profit 1", S^-C^t)
Vector of other enterprise-specific variables 
€j^ Error term
Denote the enterprise-specific lump-sum subsidy as a^, the 
product-specific subsidy rate in year t on sales S as (3^ , 
the product-specific subsidy rate on material costs MC as 
and the product-specific subsidy rate on non-material 
costs NMC as By assumption the enterprise-specific
lump-sum subsidy does not vary systematically over time. 
The allocation of the subsidy may also depend on other 
enterprise-specific variables Z. Our initial equation in 
levels thus looks like
Dit = ai + ^tsit + rtMCit + 5tNMCit
+ zitr + uit (i)
We can also write equation (1) in terms of profit, sales 
and costs, e.g.:
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Dit = ai + (/3+r)Sit + (5-r)NMCit - T7Tit
+ zitr + uit (!')
If the enterprise-specific lump-sum subsidy a  ^is small 
(or, what is less likely, the same for all enterprises) 
and there are no other enterprise-specific fixed effects, 
then estimation of (1) in level form is straightforward.4 
If, however, we suspect the presence of such fixed 
effects, we must eliminate by differencing (1) before 
estimating. I therefore estimate
(Dit”Dit-l) “ ^tsit " ^t-lsit-l + rtMCit “ rt-lMCit-l
+ StNMCit - S f l ^ i t - l
+ zitrt “ zit-lrt-l + 6 (2)
where e = u^t-Uit-1*
Interpretation of the regression coefficients is 
straightforward. If the coefficients on sales and costs 
are all insignificant then subsidies are lump-sum and/or 
arbitrary in the sense of being unrelated to sales or 
costs. A coefficient on sales which is greater than zero 
indicates a proportional subsidy on sales; positive 
coefficients on costs indicate proportional subsidies on 
inputs. If the coefficient on sales is negative, the 
coefficients on costs positive, and all of the same 
absolute value, then the subsidy is essentially a 
profit/loss subsidy: negative profits are subsidised, 
positive profits are taxed. Similarly, if the coefficient
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\on sales is negative, the coefficient on material costs 
positive and of the same absolute value, and the 
coefficient on non-material costs small and/or 
insignificant, then the subsidy is essentially a value- 
added subsidy.
In Poland, different products attract (in theory) 
different subsidy rates. We can get around this problem 
to some extent as follows. First, we can run separate 
regressions for groups of enterprises producing specific 
products. In practice this is a reasonable procedure only 
for meat-processing firms (of which there are over 20).
Second, the Polish Statistical Yearbook (Rocznik 
Statvstvcznv) lists the products which attract subsidies 
for domestic sales (as well as aggregate figures for the 
size of the subsidy on each product). The Lista 500 data 
unfortunately does not give data for sales and costs by 
product? however, it does give for each enterprise a 3- 
digit industrial classification. We can therefore group 
enterprises according to the subsidised product in which 
they appear to specialise. This means I can try to 
estimate the subsidy rate specific to product j by using 
the 3-digit industrial classification as a proxy for a 
single product, and assuming that every enterprise 
produces only one such product. That is, I use the 
enterprise industrial classification combined with 
enterprise sales as a proxy for sales of specific 
products.
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Denote the subsidy rate in year t on sales S of product j 
as 0jt,the subsidy rate on material costs MC of product j 
as and the subsidy rate on non-material costs NMC of
product j as £jt. The equation in levels looks like
Dit “ ai + ^ltsilt + TltMcilt + 5ltNMCilt + •••
+ 0jtsijt + TjtMCijt + ijtNMCijt + •••
+ zitr + uit (3)
where sijt = MCijt = firm i is not
classified as a
NMCj^£ = 0 . manufacturer of
product j
sijt = sit' MCijt = Mcit if firm 1 isclassified as a
NMCjij. = NMC^ manufacturer of
product j
To eliminate the enterprise-specific subsidy I again 
estimate the equation in difference form.
To learn if loss-makers are subsidised differently from 
profit-makers, I will use the switching regressions 
technique (Quandt 1958, 1960). We hypothesise that there 
is an observable variable with a critical value X*.
• • ^  » c IFirms with Xj^ < X are subsidised according to one set of 
rules, and firms with X^ j. > X* are subsidised according to 
another set of rules. If all firms were the same size 
(with respect to both capital and labour), the natural 
choice for the switching variable X would be profit 2, 
original profit minus turnover tax, because subsidies are
224
added to profit 2 to yield profit 3. We would hypothesise 
that enterprises with a profit 2 lower than a critical 
value X* may be subsidised on more generous terms than 
enterprises with a profit 2 higher than X*. There is 
considerable heterogeneity in firm size, however, and so 
we have to normalise. I will use for X the value of 
profit 2 per worker. This seems reasonable given the then 
Polish government's well known fear of worker unrest. A 
portion of retained profit is used by enterprises for 
worker bonuses. For a given subsidy, an enterprise with a 
low profit 2 per worker is less likely to have cash left 
over for bonuses than, an enterprise with a high profit 2 
per worker. When I estimate the model in difference form, 
the switching variable is the average profit 2 per worker 
over the two years.
The technique works as follows. Take for example equation 
(1), suppressing the time subscript and using superscripts 
1 and 2 to denote the two different subsidy regimes. I 
postulate that subsidisation takes two different forms:
Di = <*i + + 51NMCi
+ ZjJ1 + u1! for < X* (4a)
Di = <*i + jS2Si + r2MCi + <S2NMCi
+ Z^ 2 + u2! for Xi > X* (4b)
1 9  . . .where ux and u* are normally distributed with mean zero
and standard deviations a^ and tJ2. The critical value of
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X* is unknown and is to be estimated along with the other 
parameters in the equations.
The log of the likelihood function for the breakpoint X* 
occurring between X^ and X^+1 is given by
L(i) = -N ln(sqrt(27r)) - N/2
- i ln(RSsVi) - .QT^illn(RSS2/ (N-i)) (5)
2 2
where RSS1 and RSS2 are the residual sums of squares of 
maximum likelihood estimates done separately on the two 
samples of firms, (4a) and (4b) (see Quandt 1958). The 
maximum likelihood estimates of the other parameters in 
(4a) and (4b) are also given by separate maximum 
likelihood estimation of the two equations.
In practice, I first rank the sample of firms according to 
Xit? I will use the convention of ranking from lowest to 
highest. I then conduct a global search over all i for 
the breakpoint which maximises the log-1ikelihood function 
in (5). A breakpoint according to profit 2 per worker,
iHc • • • •X , which maximises (5) corresponds to a breakpoint
• • • , according to the ranking by profit 2 per worker, l .
Since the MLE residual sums of squares and the MLE 
parameter estimates are also the OLS sums of squares and 
parameter estimates, this means to obtain all the 
parameter estimates I need only obtain, for every possible 
breakpoint i, OLS estimates for the two portions of the
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sample (low X and high X) separately, and choose the 
breakpoint i* which maximises (5). For a sample of N 
firms, this means I have to obtain slightly less than 2N 
sets of OLS estimates.5 Given the number of observations 
(500 firms in each of 5 years), this is a practical 
procedure, and has the distinct advantage of guaranteeing 
a global maximum; we shall see later that local maxima 
tend to be common.
The advantage of using the switching regressions technique 
is that our hypothesis may be more general; I ask if low 
profitability firms are treated differently from high 
profitability firms, and what is the value of the cut-off 
point between low and high profitability. That is, I do 
not have to being with the hypothesis that loss-makers are 
treated differently from profit-makers, i.e. that 0 is the 
critical X*. (If we knew X* a priori, we could use a Chow 
test to test its significance.)
To test the significance of X* I use a likelihood ratio 
test; the test statistic is LR = -21n(X), where the 
likelihood ratio X is given by (RSS^/i*)(RSS2/(N-i*))N“i* 
/(RSSu/N)n, and RSSU is the unrestricted sum of squares 
of an MLE/OLS regression over the entire sample. The %2 
with r+2 degrees of freedom would normally be used as an 
approximation to the distribution of LR, where r is the 
number of regressors (including the constant) in equation 
4a (or of course 4b). There is a problem here, however, 
since the conditions under which the x distribution is
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an acceptable approximation to the distribution of LR are 
not fulfilled here (Quandt 1958, p. 876? Mood 1950, 
pp. 211, 259). The test statistic LR is still useful, 
however. The reasons for the violation of these 
conditions are less serious in this cross-section 
application than in the usual time series analysis 
application of the technique?6 Quandt (1960) has 
calculated some observed distributions for LR? it has also 
been reported that in some applications a x2 distribution 
with 3 degrees of freedom may give an acceptable 
approximation to LR (Goldfeld and Quandt 1976, p. 8). 
Farley, Hinich and McGuire (1975) present evidence that 
application of a Chow test at the estimated breakpoint, 
used as if i* were known a priori, may give satisfactory 
results.7
An additional useful test is the Farley-Hinich (F-H) test 
(Farley, Hinich and McGuire, 1975). The F-H test is for 
the presence of two separate regimes (vs. the null 
hypothesis that the data is produced by one regression). 
Unlike the Quandt switching regressions procedure, the F-H 
test is only a test for the existence of two regimes? it 
does not tell us the dividing point between the two 
regimes. It is, however, a useful further test 
statistic.8
Before moving on to discussing in detail the methodology 
used and the results obtained, I should return briefly to 
the observation problems mentioned in Chapter 2. The
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first problem arose because of randomness in the 
environment; if an enterprise that would otherwise run 
into difficulties is lucky, it won't need to be rescued. 
This is not a problem here, however, since we have a large 
number of enterprises and a substantial number of 
observations on each, and the enterprises are unlikely to 
all always be lucky. The second problem arose because 
although a rescue policy might be in place and influence 
enterprise behaviour, the result may be to make rescues 
unnecessary. This problem is also alleviated to some 
extent by the number of observations we have; with a large 
number of enterprises and a reasonably long period, we 
would expect some enterprises to get into difficulties 
sometimes. The problem is also a problem only if we don't 
find evidence that a rescue policy is in place, but it 
isn't a problem if we do find positive evidence that a 
rescue policy is in fact in place. That is, the problem 
is that we can't'prove*a rescue policy doesn't exist; but 
we can stillpprove' it does exist, and in fact this is what 
we find below.
Notes on the Data and the Variables Used
The discussion above assumes the data is in real terms.
In fact, the data is in nominal terms, and furthermore 
Poland experienced an acceleration in inflation during 
this period. For our purposes this is only a problem when 
I difference to eliminate the firm-specific fixed effect
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a^, since by assumption a^ doesn't vary over time. I 
therefore deflate all the nominal variables into 1984 
z^oty using the implicit deflator for sales in socialised 
industry as reported in the Rocznik Statvstvcznv. The 
exception is the switching variable profit 2 per worker. 
Since the rationale for normalising by the number of 
workers is workers' welfare, in this case I deflate by the 
implicit deflator for consumption'goods.9
All available enterprise observations are used, but (as in 
the previous chapter) with the two exceptions of Polmos 
and (in 1985 and 1987) the fertiliser producer Azoty 
W^oc^awek.
The size of the subsidy granted to an enterprise may well 
be influenced by variables besides the product produced 
and the costs incurred. Not all are observable? for 
example, an enterprise manager with good political 
connections should be better at squeezing extra subsidies 
out of the centre than a manager without such connections. 
We have, however, some other possibilities for which data 
is available and which can be included in the regressions: 
(1) Turnover tax: some subsidised enterprises have to pay 
turnover tax (essentially a sales tax paid by producers). 
It may be the case that a loss-making enterprise which has 
to pay a large turnover tax bill will receive a subsidy in 
order to meet its turnover tax obligations. (2) The size 
of the firm: a large enterprise may be better at 
bargaining with the centre. I cannot use the enterprise's
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sales as a measure of size/bargaining power, since I a m  
using sales to capture sales subsidies. I use instead the 
enterprise's employment level. (3) The monopoly power of 
the firm: an enterprise which accounts for most of the 
national output of a category of product may have extra 
bargaining power. I measure monopoly power by first 
dividing the enterprise's sales by national output of all 
products within the enterprise's 3-digit industrial 
classification number, and then subtracting 0.2, the 
average for the Lista 500 for enterprise sales/national 
output. The result is a measure of monopoly power which 
is positive if above average and negative if below 
average. (4) The wages paid by the enterprise: an 
enterprise may be able to convince the centre to pay a 
larger subsidy if it can show that it needs the cash to 
pay its workers a decent bonus. More specifically, it may 
be successful in lobbying for a subsidy if it can show its 
workers are underpaid relative to all industrial workers, 
or if they are underpaid relative to all workers in their 
industrial sector. I calculate these two "wage gap" 
variables as the difference between the actual wage bill 
of the enterprise (wL) and the enterprise's wage bill if 
the relevant benchmark wage was paid (w*L).
Unfortunately, the data present a bit of a problem in the 
use of these wage gap variables. Data on wages include 
the bonus which is paid out of final profits. The 
subsidy, our dependent variable, contributes to final 
profits and thus to bonuses. For this reason I use a 
lagged wage gap variable in the equation.
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As mentioned earlier, we have a largish number of 
observations for only one category of output (meat 
products, 22-24 enterprises)• This means when I use 
industry-specific sales/costs variables (e.g. equation 4), 
I will be relying on relatively few degrees of freedom to 
estimate our coefficients. For such situations caution is 
called for, and I will often estimate equations with as 
few explanatory variables (as many degrees of freedom) as 
possible.
A word of caution is also in order regarding the data on 
material and non-material costs. These are not given 
directly in the data? rather, material costs are 
calculated using a peculiar measure of labour productivity 
which is supplied in the Lista 500 data, and non-material 
costs are simply total costs minus material costs. 
Unfortunately, the exact definition of the labour 
productivity measure (and thus material costs) is slightly 
unclear. (NB: data on material and non-material costs is 
unavailable for 1983.)
Empirical Results
Discussion of the results is organised into four parts:
(1) OLS estimates of equations (1) and (2) for meat 
processing enterprises alone; (2) OLS estimates for 
enterprises making the products which attract the largest
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product-specific subsidies; (3) switching regressions 
analysis for enterprises producing these subsidised 
products; (4) switching regressions analysis for 
enterprises that receive any significant sum from the 
state in the form of subsidy 1.
Definitions of the variables presented in the tables can 
be found in Table 6.1, "Regression Variables: Symbols 
Used".
OLS Results: Meat Enterprises Only
Table 6.2 presents the basic OLS statistics for the final 
forms of the regressions with meat enterprises only. 
Heteroscedasticity was suspected on a priori grounds, and 
Goldfeld-Quandt tests on equations (1) and (2) often 
indicated its presence. For this reason equations (1) and
(2) were estimated using weighted least squares, the 
weight being enterprise sales. The Goldfeld-Quandt test 
applied to the WLS estimates showed no clear pattern of 
heteroscedasticity (Table 6.2, column 5). (All the 
results discussed below in sections 2-4 also used WLS; 
again, the WLS estimates show no clear pattern of 
heteroscedasticity.)
The R2 in these regressions was quite high for a cross- 
section sample; even in the regression in differences, the 
Rbar2 varied from 0.55 to 0.85. The Farley-Hinich
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statistic was significant in only one regression (1985- 
86), suggesting that meat enterprises are not subsidised 
differently depending on their profit 2 per worker. Note, 
however, that these meat enterprises were nearly always 
loss-makers. The insignificance of the F-H statistic here 
means only that subsidy rates for this group of loss- 
makers do not seem to vary with profitability.
Table 6.3 summarises the coefficient estimates for the 
final specification of all the regressions. Only the 
coefficients on sales, material costs, and nonmaterial 
costs were consistently significant. The constant term 
for the levels regression was always insignificant and is 
not reported. Each coefficient is estimated either two or 
three times: once in the levels regression (subscripted t 
in equation 1), once as the lead variable in the 
difference regression (subscripted t in equation 2), and 
once as the lag variable in the difference regression 
(subscripted t-1 in equation 2). These three estimates 
correspond to the three columns in Table 6.3.
The results of the various regressions follow a clear and 
consistent pattern. The coefficient on sales is negative; 
the coefficients on material and nonmaterial costs are 
positive; the magnitudes of all the coefficients are 
similar, especially in any given year; the magnitudes are 
typically 0.6-0.9, i.e. not far from unity; and the 
coefficients are typically very significant. In short, 
subsidy 1 is allocated as a profit/loss subsidy, with
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adjustment for changes in enterprise losses near (but not
at) 100% (recall that meat processors are nearly always 
loss-makers). When a meat processing enterprise's losses 
increase, then, roughly speaking, the enterprise's subsidy 
1 increases to compensate for 60%-90% of the increase in 
losses. When the enterprise's losses decrease, again its 
subsidy 1 decreases by a nearly matching amount. Note 
that the response of subsidy 1 to changes in sales is 
especially perverse; if sales go up without a 
corresponding increase in costs, the enterprise's subsidy 
1, far from going up, actually declines.
Three other points are worth noting. First, the 
coefficients in the difference regressions are typically 
lower than the coefficients in the levels regression, 
though usually not significantly. This can be interpreted 
as weak evidence for the existence of enterprise-specific 
fixed effects. Second, the lowest estimated magnitudes 
for the coefficients was for the 1984 parameters. In 
fact, in 1984 three meat processing enterprises had a 
positive pre-subsidy profit 2 ; in all other years all 
meat-enterprises were loss-makers. We will return to this 
point later when we examine the evidence that profit- 
making enterprises are subsidised at a much lower rate. 
Third, although all the coefficients in a given year are 
typically similar in magnitude, this does not always stand 
up to rigorous statistical testing. That is, we sometimes 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients have the same 
magnitude.
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OLS Results: Maior Product-Specific Subsidies
Here WLS was applied to equation (3). The major subsidy 
categories were fertiliser, meat, poultry, grain, and 
sugar. Different products were allowed to have different 
subsidy rates, but the variance of the error and the 
coefficients on the variables besides sales and costs were 
assumed to be the same for all products. Since none of 
these other variables was consistently significant and 
were therefore left out of the final specification of the 
regressions, the estimation procedure for the final 
reported results was in fact the SURE technique. The 
number of observations was small for enterprises in some 
product categories, and to preserve degrees of freedom a 
single coefficient was used for all costs (in place of two 
coefficients for material and nonmaterial costs).
Basic regression statistics are reported in Table 6.4. 
Unfortunately, the lack of degrees of freedom for some 
products meant the Goldfeld-Quandt and Farley-Hinich 
statistics could often not be calculated. The available 
F-H results do, however, strongly indicate the existence 
of a regime shift according to pre-subsidy profit per 
worker.
Table 6.5 presents the estimated coefficients, organised 
by product category. This time the results are somewhat
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mixed. Fertiliser enterprises, in the levels regressions, 
appear to have a roughly 100% profit/loss subsidy: the 
sales coefficients are about -1, the costs coefficients 
are about +1, all very significant. The differences 
regressions, however, are rather different. The 
coefficients vary a lot and often are insignificant. I 
suspect in this case misspecification, perhaps because of 
the presence of enterprise-specific fixed effects and 
perhaps because we are estimating a single equation when 
in fact we have two separate subsidy regimes operating 
(see below).
Results for meat processing enterprises are again as 
described above. Poultry enterprises have a similar 
pattern in levels, but with (significant) coefficients of 
a smaller magnitude, typically 0.3-0.5. In differences, 
the coefficients are even smaller and not statistically 
significant. Grain processing enterprises show the same 
pattern as the meat processing enterprises. Finally, the 
results for sugar enterprises are inconsistent and vary 
over time. Sometimes (e.g. 1985) the pattern resembles 
that of the meat and grain enterprises (significant 
coefficients in levels and differences, with magnitudes 
not far from 1); other times (e.g. 1987) the pattern 
resembles that of the poultry enterprises (significant but 
small coefficients in levels, insignificant in 
differences).
The significant Farley-Hinich statistic suggests I may be
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estimating a misspecified equation; and in fact the 
inconsistent results by product may be explained by 
patterns of profitability in the different product groups. 
Table 6.6 shows, for each of the product categories, the 
total number of enterprises, and the number of loss-makers 
according to the different profit definitions, for each 
year. Note that the two product groups which gave a 
consistent picture of a high rate profit/loss subsidy - 
meat and grain - are also the two groups whose enterprises 
nearly always made pre-subsidy losses (i.e. losses 
according to profit 2). Note also that the product group 
which gave a consistent picture of a low rate profit/loss 
subsidy - poultry - is also the group whose enterprises 
nearly always made pre-subsidy profits. Finally, note 
that the remaining two product groups - fertiliser and 
sugar - had both inconsistent regression results and a 
mixture of profit-making and loss-making enterprises.
The hypothesis which emerges from the foregoing is that 
the losses of loss-makers are positively subsidised at a 
high rate and the profits of profit-makers are negatively 
subsidised (i.e. taxed) at a low rate. A more general 
hypothesis is to say that there is a cut-off point in 
profitability, not necessarily zero? I can then use the 
switching regressions technique to estimate the cut-off 
point and the tax/subsidy rates for the two groups of 
enterprises. Ideally I would simply apply the switching 
regressions technique to the regressions just described, 
but unfortunately this is not possible. The problem is
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that, when we divide the sample in two as we look for the 
best cut-off point, we often don't have sufficient degrees 
of freedom for a successful regression on one of the two 
halves. Say, for example, that in one product group there 
is a single enterprise whose profitability is much higher 
than the rest in that group (e.g. poultry or sugar in 
1987) . When we divide the sample in two, in one part we 
will have all but one of these enterprises, and in the 
other other part, just the one very profitable enterprise 
representing that product group. We cannot estimate two 
coefficients (the product-specific sales and costs rates) 
in levels, let alone four coefficients (the same, for two 
years) in differences, in that part of the sample, and so 
the technique fails.
To apply the switching regressions technique, we must 
therefore make a leap of faith, and pool the data. I 
abandon the use of product-specific subsidy rates, and 
assume that subsidy rates vary only with profit 2 per 
worker. Above the critical value of profit 2 per worker, 
subsidisation by sales, material costs, and nonmaterial 
costs takes place at rates which are the same for all 
enterprises and products, and below this critical value, 
at different rates which are the same for all enterprises 
and products. This leap of faith is* justified to some 
extent by the regression results just described. The 
estimates for grain and meat enterprises, for example, 
were very similar, because, the argument goes, they had 
similar loss-making patterns.
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Switching Technique Results: Maior Product-Specific
Subsidies
Because I am pooling data and do not need to worry about 
guaranteeing sufficient degrees of freedom to estimate 
product-specific coefficients, I can now expand the sample 
to include product-specific subsidies for which I have 
only a few observations: fish products and fodder 
production. Again WLS is used. Results are presented 
here only for estimation of the differences regression, 
because of the suspected presence of enterprise-specific 
fixed effects.
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 6.7. 
The pattern is clear and statistically very significant: 
there is a regime shift according to profit 2 per worker, 
and the critical value of profit 2 per worker is about 
zero. For example, in the 1986-87 regression, profit 2 
per worker ranged from -2.142 to 0.491 million z^oty per 
worker. The breakpoint was found to be between 
observations 43 and 44 out of a total of 66, i.e. not too 
close to either of the endpoints. The critical value was 
between 0.092 and 0.103 million z^ ot'y per worker, i.e. not 
far from zero. It is statistically very significant: the 
test statistic LR is 73.33, which is very large indeed.
By comparison, the critical level for a x2 statistic with 
3 degrees of freedom at the 1% confidence level is 11.341.
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The estimated statistic also appears very significant when 
we use Quandt's Monte Carlo estimates as a rough guide.
For a switching regression with an intercept and one 
independent variable, Quandt estimates at about 99% the 
probability that LR < 42 (Quandt 1960, Table 3).10
Figure 6.1a plots the likelihood function according to the 
value of profit 2 per worker; figure 6.1b, according to 
observation number. In both figures is it clear that the 
likelihood function is well-behaved, and the estimated 
maximum is a clear global maximum. The pattern for the 
other regressions is similar. Note, by the way, the 
presence of a number of local maxima, suggesting that the 
use of numerical methods to find the breakpoint could be 
dangerous.
Chow statistics for the entire sample (testing at the 
estimated breakpoint), and Farley-Hinich statistics for 
both the entire sample and for the two portions 
separately, are also presented in Table 6.7. Both the 
Chow and Farley-Hinich statistics indicate the presence of 
a change in regime, which adds to our confidence that the 
critical values estimated are not spurious. The F-H 
statistics applied to the two portions of the samples 
separately suggest that there is no further nonlinearity 
in the upper portions; that is, profit-makers are not 
differentiated by profit 2 per worker in how they are 
subsidised. The results for the loss-maker portion are 
less clear; in two of the four regressions (1984-85 and
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1986-87) there may be further such nonlinearities. I will 
return to this point later.
Table 6.8 reports the regression results in detail. For 
each estimation, results for both the pooled data and for 
the lower and upper portions separately, are reported. As 
before, the only significant variables were sales, 
material costs, and nonmaterial costs. The pattern for 
the loss-making portions is very similar to that for the 
meat enterprises: the coefficient on sales is negative, 
the coefficients on costs positive; the magnitudes are all 
about the same, between 0.75 and 1.0; and all the 
coefficients are very significant. Again, roughly 
speaking, loss-makers have their losses subsidised at a 
marginal rate approaching 100%. The pattern for the 
profit-making portion is similar, but the subsidy rate is 
much lower, between 0 and 50%. And again, this 
description is, statistically speaking, only approximate, 
since I sometimes reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients on sales and costs have the same absolute 
magnitude (but again the difference is small even when 
significant).
Switching Technique Results: Major Subsidy Recipients
Our final set of results applies to all enterprises that 
received a "significant" subsidy 1, here defined as at 
least 10 million z^oty (in the second year). Typically,
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nearly half the Lista 500 enterprises receive a subsidy 1 
on this scale. Note that for the estimation here to be 
unbiased we need to assume that the combined error term e 
(s is independent of the level of subsidy l.11
Table 6.9 presents the switching technique results. The 
numbers are very similar to those for the major product- 
specific subsidies discussed above, with the following 
differences: the sample size is now considerably larger, 
and the range of observed profit 2 per worker is also 
larger; the estimated critical value of profit 2 per 
worker is now consistently very close indeed to zero; and 
its statistical significance, as measured by 2 * the log 
likelihood, is huge. Figures 2a and 2b show the log of 
the likelihood function for the 1986-87 regression; again, 
the maximum is clearly global (and again, local maxima are 
common). The results for the other regressions are 
similar.
Table 6.10 presents the regression results in detail.
Again the numbers are very similar to those for the major 
product-specific subsidies. The main difference here is 
that in addition to the sales and costs variables, 
turnover tax and our measure of market power (MONOP) are 
also statistically significant.12 The fact that turnover 
tax is now significant and wasn't previously is due simply 
to the fact that for the first time I have included in our 
sample a large number of enterprises that actually pay 
this tax. The coefficient on turnover tax is very much
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like the coefficients on costs: positive and near unity 
for the loss-makers, positive but small for the profit- 
makers. In other words, enterprises are compensated for 
changes in turnover tax by corresponding changes in 
subsidy 1; loss-makers are compensated at, nearly a 100% 
rate, profit-makers at a much lower rate.
The coefficient on MONOP is negative and significant but 
usually only in the profit-making portion of the sample.
i
Exactly why an increase in market share should lead to a 
decrease in subsidy 1 is not clear. One possibility is 
that an increase in market share means the enterprise need 
be less reliant on the centre for subsidies. More work is 
needed here.
Summary of Results
Subsidy 1 responds to changes in pre-subsidy enterprise 
profit. For loss-makers, a change in subsidy 1 is 
explained almost completely by a change in pre-subsidy 
profits, and is nearly one-to-one - i.e. an increase in 
pre-subsidy losses is very predictably matched by a 60-90% 
increase in subsidy 1. Profit-makers that receive 
subsidy 1 are also compensated in this way, but on a much 
smaller scale, i.e. about 15-30% of a decrease in profit 1 
would be covered by an increase in subsidy 1. For loss- 
makers that must pay turnover tax, changes in this tax are 
compensated by changes in subsidy 1; if e.g. an
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enterprises has to pay more turnover tax for some reason, 
it is likely to receive an increase in subsidy 1 in 
compensation. Again, profit-makers are also compensated 
in this way for turnover tax changes, but to a much lesser 
degree. The only other variable which seems to affect the 
allocation of subsidy 1 is market share, which has a small 
but significantly negative impact for profit-making 
enterprises. No other variables displayed a significant 
and consistent effect on subsidy 1. In short, a state
policy of bailouts in in operation.
Possible lines to follow in future work are as follows.
To begin with, one can argue that the estimated model in 
differences is in fact misspecified. The switching 
variable for the differences formulation is average 
profit 2 per worker over the two years. This means that 
all enterprises are in one regime for both years, or in 
the other regime for both years. Better would be to allow 
enterprises to move from one regime to the other over the 
two years. A change in the estimation procedure along 
these lines would probably not, however, lead to 
significant differences in the results because of the 
relatively small number of enterprises that actually move 
from one regime to the other. Incidentally, recall that 
the F-H statistic for lower portion of the switching 
regimes sample sometimes showed the continued presence of
nonlinearity. The above misspecification may be its
source.
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A second possibility worth investigating relates to the 
nature of the switching variable. Above I simply assumed 
a priori that it was profit 2 per worker. Naturally, it 
would be better to allow for a number of different 
switching variables, and let the data tell us which 
switching variables if any are significant. Goldfeld and 
Quandt (1972, chapter 9) discuss a generalised switching 
regimes method which allows precisely this type of 
analysis. Unfortunately it requires the use of numerical 
methods, but it may be worth exploring nonetheless.
The policy implications of the analysis in this chapter 
are quite clear. The effects of the Polish subsidy system 
on enterprise incentives during this period were of course 
serious. A loss-making enterprise had little reason to 
try to cut costs or increase sales if these gains would 
largely disappear in the form of a decrease in subsidy. 
Competition among all firms is blunted when it is common 
knowledge that the ultimate punishment for inefficiency - 
bankruptcy - does not exist. A major challenge facing the 
Polish reformers today is to implement a tax/subsidy 
system which is clearly outlined and consistently applied, 
and which is not arbitrarily adjusted to suit the needs of 
individual enterprises. In short, what is needed is the 
introduction of the rule of law, in particular the rule of 
economic law. The methodology outlined in this chapter 
should allow us to measure the success of the Polish 
reformers in introducing the rule of economic law, once 
the necessary data becomes available.
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Table 6.1; Symbols Used in Regression Results
VARXXXYY
VAR = Variable used
SALE = Value of total enterprise sales (incl. exports)
S = Same as SALE
COST =* Value of all costs of production
C = Same as COST
MCOST = Materials costs
NMC = Non-materials costs
TTAX = Turnover tax
SUB1 = Subsidy 1
MONOP = Market share
WGAP = Wage gap relative to the average industrial wage
BWGAP = Wage gap relative to the average for that
3-digit industrial branch
XXX « Industrial classification (if relevant)
123
231
233
234 
241 
243 
261
artificial fertilizer 
meat products 
poultry products 
fish products 
grain products 
sugar 
fodder
YY = Year or Years
87 = Value of Variable in 1987 
86 = Value in 1986
••• etc•
76 = Value in 1987 - Value in 1986 
= Growth 1986-7
65 = Value in 1986 - Value in 1985 
= Growth 1985-6
54 = Value in 1985 - Value in 1984 
= Growth 1984-5
••• etc•
EXAMPLES
SALE86
SUB176
S23176
Value of total sales in 1986 
Change in Subsidy 1, 1986-7 
Change in sales of meat, 1986-7
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Table 6.2; Regression Results. Meat Products Enterprises
Basic (OLS) regression statistics
Dep Var Obs/DoF «* / Rbar^ G-Q (p-value) F-H (p-value)
Levels .
SUB 187 22/18 0.911 / 0.897 0.904 (0.538) 0.425 (0.788)
SUB 186 24/20 0.959 / 0.952 1 .806 (0.245) 0 .660 (0.629)
SUB 185 24/20 0.918 / 0.906 0.721 (0.649) 0.891 (0.492)
SUB 184 23/19 0.898 / 0.881 0.160 (0.967) 0.998 (0.439)
SUB 183 24/21 0.937 / 0.931 0.108 (0.996) 1 .963 (0.156)
First D i fferences
SUB 176 22/16 0.673 / 0.570 0.902 (0.526) 1 .135 (0.409)
SUB 165 24/18 0.824 / 0.775 3.341 (0.135) 7.779 (0.001)
SUB 1 54 23/17 0.648 / 0.545 0.178 (0.905) 1.619 (0.231)
SUB 1 43 23/18 0.877 / 0.850 0.166 (0.945) 1 .007 (0.452)
G-Q = Goldfeld-Quandt test for heteroskedasticity 
F-H * Farley-Hinich statistic
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Table 6.3: Regression Results. Meat Products Enterprises
OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses!
Levels First Differences
t t-1
SALE87 -0.883748
(0.085066)
-0.769912
(0.191751)
MCOST87 0.946250
(0.077887)
0.792776
(0.191985)
NMC87 0.918790
(0.074313)
0.644251
(0.326768)
SALE86 -0.882983
(0.052947)
-0.898787
(0.120940)
-0.826741
(0.183351)
MC0ST86 0.933282
(0.049453)
0.878725
(0.111513)
0.833504
(0.190112)
NMC86 0.954156
(0.054017)
0.705181
(0.166321)
0.717477
(0.320344)
SALE85 -0.637593
(0.059825)
-0.520606
(0.154356)
-0.676424
(0.134619)
MC0ST85 0.710088
(0.057739)
0.595592
(0.145555)
0.676903
(0.132130)
NMC85 0.779133
(0.062127)
0.595954
(0.171196)
0.447055
(0.200305)
SALE84 . -0.504185 
(0.068826)
-0.509778
(0.108496)
-0.491488
(0.181881)
MCOST84 0.564215
(0.069791)
0.532958
(0.112220)
0.555542
(0.171504)
NMC84 0.639735
(0.058859)
0.600171
(0.098659)
0.524824
(0.175357)
SALE83 -0.902612
(0.058837)
-0.904694
(0.105147)
COST83 0.934607
(0.053125)
0.904355
(0.086830)
Note: The constant term for the levels regressions is not 
reported, as it was always insignificant.
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Table 6.4: Regression Results. Halor Subsidised Industries 
(fertiliser, meat, poultry, grain, sugar)
Basic (OLS) regression statistics 
Coefficients on sales and costs are industry-specific.
Dep Var Obs/DoF
Levels 
SUB 187 
SUB 186 
SUB 185 
SUB 184 
SUB 183
52/43
64/53
66/55
65/54
69/58
2 2 Rc / Rbar
992
990
985
988
994
First Pi fferences 
SUB 176 51/35 0.809
SUB 165 63/43 0.955
SUB 154 63/43 0.964
SUB 143 63/43 0.943
0.990
0.988
0.983
0.986
0.993
0.727
0.935
0.949
0.918
G-Q (p-value) T-H (p-value)
3.421 (0.026) 
0.934 (0.552) 
0.855 (0.617) 
n. a.
0.346 (0.979)
n. a 
n. a 
n. a 
n. a
1.651 (0.140) 
2.557 (0.014) 
2.347 (0.022) 
3.454 (0.002) 
4.540 (0.000)
n. a 
n. a 
n. a 
n. a
n.a. = not available
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Table 6.5: Regression Results, Maior Subsidised Industries 
OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses)
Levels First Differences
t t-1
Industrv 123: Fertiliser
S12387 -1.143051
(0.024913)
-1.064490
(0.301123)
C12387 1.266468
(0.022107)
1.305857
(0.204113)
S12386 -1.049312
(0.040224)
0.238367
(0.377518)
-0.994239
(0.334781)
C12386 1.121368
(0.032313)
0.011653
(0.248377)
1.209464
(0.202441)
S12385 -1.051215
(0.053364)
-0.696075
(0.104445)
0.956583
(0.520280)
C12385 1.113854
(0.045679)
0.939361
(0.176098)
-0.688062
(0.371603)
S12384 -0.908411
(0.049070)
-0.386605
(0.091221)
-0.595748
(0.134425)
C12384 0.994412
(0.043619)
0.478153
(0.055597)
0.845612
(0.236243)
S12383 -0.950960
(0.052238)
-0.261714
(0.097917)
C12383 1.030578
(0.049615)
0.326071
(0.072865)
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Table 6.5; Regression Results, Maior Subsidised Industries
(continued)
OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses)
Levels First Differences
t t-1
Industry 231 - Meat products
S23187 -0.852490
(0.078784)
-0.825207
(0.185493)
C23187 0.913968
(0.070234)
0.840842
(0.188764)
S23186 -0.881881
(0.108930)
-0.956606
(0.135032)
-0.904688
(0.166013)
C23186 0.932876
(0.099057)
0.914067
(0.127436)
0.907781
(0.174900)
S23185 -0.653057
(0.118540)
-0.558895
(0.167622)
-0.729397
(0.148546)
C23185 0.727526
(0.111028)
0.633809
(0.157296)
0.706265
(0.150520)
S23184 -0.588514
(0.142556)
-0.586885
(0.090624)
-0.491103
(0.207159)
C23184 0.656626 
(0.137546)
0.603004
(0.098112)
0.552216
(0.194611)
S23183 -0.897619
(0.116595)
-0.883302
(0.103318)
C23183 0.934546
(0.105427)
0.869167
(0.082126)
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Table 6.5: Regression Results. Maior Subsidised Industries
(continued)
OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses)
Levels First Differences
t t-1
Industry 233 - Poultry products
S23387 -0.595872
(0.128280)
-0.279958
(0.159080)
C23387 0.675168
(0.134768)
0.348733
(0.182271)
S23386 -0.392194
(0.249161)
-0.322249
(0.294764)
-0.366414
(0.295649)
C23386 0.461545
(0.254422)
0.333468
(0.296207)
0.433384
(0.269378)
S23385 -0.407767
(0.174114)
-0.075052
(0.116620)
-0.313258
(0.239885)
C23385 0.464974
(0.179952)
0.095535
(0.123471)
0.319475
(0.223556)
S23384 -0.221495
(0.239134)
0.147605
(0.212560)
0.068031
(0.171250)
C23384 0.280329
(0.253524)
-0.048504
(0.230550)
-0.061773
(0.168168)
S23383 -0.267657
(0.153053)
-0.035964
(0.169979)
C23383 0.319926
(0.161556)
0.069377
(0.185996)
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Table 6.5; Regression Results. Maior Subsidised Industries
(continued)
OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses^
Levels First Differences
t t-1
Industry 241 - Grain products 
(Insufficient observations for 1987)
S24186 -0.877455
(0.102579)
-0.637747
(0.216196)
C24186 1.019729
(0.071913)
0.567887
(0.233884)
S24185 -0.818081
(0.067664)
-0.743858
(0.102827)
-0.882477
(0.171415)
C24185 0.954873
(0.048479)
0.836043
(0.083336)
0.721016
(0.122159)
S24184 -0.859068
(0.120065)
-0.612461
(0.108843)
-0.757183
(0.163010)
C24184 1.002113
(0.083693)
0.827306
(0.083722)
0.865357
(0.134606)
S24183 -0.992663
(0.092608)
-0.515956
(0.122504)
C24183 1.053619
(0.057646)
0.757224
(0.072523)
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Table 6.5; Regression Results. Maior Subsidised Industries
(continued)
OLS coefficients (standard errors in parentheses)
Levels First Differences
t t-1
Industry 243 - Sugar
S24387 -0.360255
(0.085413)
-0.108109
(0.134969)
C24387 0.422267
(0.092601)
0.161784
(0.185113)
S24386 -0.545723
(0.151601)
-0.625023
(0.179332)
-0.299099
(0.137168)
C24386 0.635871
(0.176397)
0.734850
(0.200900)
0.359184
(0.196495)
S24385 -0.841917
(0.107541)
-0.611089
(0.129703)
-0.838237
(0.118347)
C24385 0.906771
(0.111536)
0.649954
(0.168823)
0.917373
(0.123697)
S24384 -0.502766
(0.230576)
-0.288701
(0.169047)
-0.339735
(0.200670)
C24384 0.548793
(0.227142)
0.302193
(0.189585)
0.371429
(0.220430)
S24383 -0.928999
(0.079659)
-0.443944
(0.139680)
C24383 1.058340
(0.083973)
0.502611
(0.149029)
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Table 6.6: Loss-Makers and Profit-Makers. 
Maior Subsidised Industries 1983-7
Year
Total no. of 
enterprises
of which, lossmakers according to: 
Profit 1 2  3 4
Fertiliser enterprises - industry 123
1983 7 2 2 0 0
1984 7 3 3 0 0
1985 6 3 3 0 0
1986 7 4 4 0 0
1987 7 2 2 0 0
Meat enterprises - industry 231
1983 24 24 24 0 0
1984 23 19 20 1 2
1985 24 24 24 0 0
1986 24 24 24 0 0
1987 22 22 22 0 0
Poultry enterprises -- industry 233
1983 13 1 1 0 0
1984 14 0 0 0 0
1985 15 2 2 0 0
1986 15 0 0 0 0
1987 12 1 1 0 0
Grain eriterprises - industry 241
1983 13 13 13 0 0
1984 11 11 11 0 0
1985 10 10 10 0 0
1986 7 7 7 0 0
1987 5 5 5 0 0
Sugar eiiterprises - industry 243
1983 12 3 3 0 0
1984 10 5 5 0 0
1985 11 3 3 0 0
1986 11 0 0 0 0
1987 11 1 1 0 0
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Table 6.7: Switching Regressions.
Maior Subsidised Industries 
(fertiliser, meat, poultry, fish, grain, sugar, fodder)
Switching variable is P2LRT, profit 2 per worker in 1984 
z/oty.
Coefficients on independent variables (sales, material 
costs, non-material costs) are assumed not to vary by 
industry.
Results are for the model in first differences only.
Switching Regressions:' Basic Results
Eqn Search grid 
boundaries 
Lower Upper
Breakpt/
Sample
Size
Lower Upper , 
Bound Bound 
P2LRT
LR
86-87 -2.142 0.491 43/66 0.092 0.103 73.33
85-86 -1.908 0.442 45/73 -0.011 -0.003 73.83
84-85 -1.650 0.260 40/73 -0.181 -0.169 56.35
83-84 -2.060 0.246 44/73 -0.213 -0.181 63.77
LR = likelihood ratio test statistic
Switching Regressions: Farlev-Hinich and Chow Statistics
(P-values in parentheses)
Eqn Farley-Hinich Statistic 
Entire Lower Upper 
sample portion portion
Chow
Statistic
86-87 3.08 3.53 0.58 11.28
(0.011) (0.009) (0.742) (0.000)
85-86 7.90 1.39 1.68 10.33
(0.000) (0.249) (0.191) (0.000)
84-85 6.60 2.68 1.75 9.91
(0.000) 0.035) (0.158) (0.000)
83-84 3.86 1.65 1.43 17.56
(0.004) (0.174) (0.258) (0.000)
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Table 6.8: Switching Regressions. Major Subsidised Industries
Regression Results in Detail
1. 1986-1987
Dep variable 
Mini mum 
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R-squared 
Residual SS 
Total SS
SUB 176 
- 0 . 1 2 0  
66
Weight is 
0.857 
0.038 
0.269
Va r
SALE87
SALE86
MCOST87
MCOST86
NMC87
NHC86
Wei ghted 
Mean 
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1.013131 
0.968960 
0.999440 
0.140704 
0.104065
OLS RESULTS: Entire Sample
Mean 
Maxi mum
Degrees of freedom 
inverse of sale87 
Rbar-squared 
Std error of est 
Log like
Coef
0.621157 
0.536576 
0.668210 
0.581262 
0.744959 
0.649256
Std
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
. Error 
050154 
060621 
067420 
075041 
063367
0.. 026 
0.255 
60
0.845 
0.025 
152.1711
0.077518
T-Stat 
12.385 
8.851 
9.911 
-7.746 
11.756 
-8.376
P-vaIue 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000
OLS RESULTS: 1st Portion
Dep variable 
Mini mum 
Observations 
Weighted LS 
R-squared 
Residual SS 
Total SS
SUB176 Mean
-0.120 Maxi mum
43 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale87 
0.938 Rbar-squared
0.016 Std error of est
0.255 Log like
0.032
0.255
37
0.930 
0 . 0 2 1  
109.1174
Va r
SALE87
SALE86
MC0ST87
MC0ST86
NMC87
NMC86
Weighted 
Mean 
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1.047640 
1.042866 
1.096818 
0.163684 
0.134529
Coef
0.745871
0.637461
0.765736
0.654788
0.841038
0.805627
Std. Error 
0.060229 
0.080727 
0 . 086789 
0. 106165 
0.088700 
0.120303
T-Stat P- value 
12.384 0.000
7.896 0.000
8.823 0.000
-6.168 0.000 
9.482 0.000
-6.697 0.000
OLS RESULTS: 2nd Portion
Dep variable 
Mini mum 
Observations 
Wei ghted LS 
R-squared 
Res i duaI SS 
Total SS
SUB 176 Mean
-0.026 Maximum
23 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale87 
0.871 Rbar-squared
0.001 Std error of est
0.010 Log like
0.016 
0.054 
1 7
0.833 
0.009 
79.7162
Va r
SALE87
SALE86
MC0ST87
MC0ST86
NMC87
NMC86
Weighted 
Mean 
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0.948614 
0.830788 
0.817385 
0.097741 
0.047112
Coef
0. 151656 
0.352869 
0.206287 
0.437857 
0 .393692 
0.399782
Std. Error 
0.053364 
0.042127 
0.072348 
0.049939 
0 . 088790 
0.046232
T-Stat P- value 
-2.842 0.011
8.376 0.000
2.851 0.011
-8.768 0.000
4.434 0.000
-8.647 0.000
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Table 6.8; Switching Regressions. Haior Subsidised Industries
(conti n u e d )
2. 1985-1986
Regression Results in Detail
Dep variable 
H i n imum 
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R - squared 
Residual SS 
Total SS
OLS RESULTS: Entire Sample
SUB 165 Mean
-0.131 Maxi mum
73 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale86 
0.805 Rbar-squared
0.067 Std error of est
0.343 Log like : 151.6646
033
345
67
790
032
Va r
SALE86
SALE85
MC0ST86
MC0ST85
NMC86
NMC85
Wei ghted 
Mean 
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0.926255 
0.990052 
0.881228 
0.104230 
0.121782
Coef
0.697732 
0.622611 
0.836537 
0.748577 
0.668574 
0.689779
Std..Error 
0.070287 
0.095717 
0.073609 
0.101366 
0.079380 
0.064280
T-Stat 
-9.927 
6.505 
11.365 
-7.385 
8.422 
-10.731
value
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
OLS RESULTS: 1st Portion
Dep vari able 
Mini mum 
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R - squared 
Residual SS 
Total SS
SUB 165 Mean
-0.131 Maxi mum
45 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale86 
0.888 Rbar-squared
0.030 Std error of est
0.271 Log like
0 .055 
0.345 
39
0.874
0.028
100.5495
Va r
SALE86
SALE85
MC0ST86
MCOST85
NMC86
NMC85
Weighted 
Mean 
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0.934223 
1.066481 
0.937042 
0.134236 
0.151324
Coef
0.879897
0.672891
0.955398
0.760471
1.017137
0.900520
Std. Error 
0.095766 
127877 
082266 
121632 
102354 
074822
T-Stat 
-9.188 
5.262 
11.613
252
937
-12.035
P-vaIue 
0.000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000
OLS RESULTS: 2nd Portion
Dep variable 
Mini mum 
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R - squared 
ResiduaI SS 
Total SS
SUB 165 Mean
-0.059 Maxi mum
28 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale86 
0.794 Rbar-squared
0.003 Std error of est
0.015 Log like
- 0.002 
0 .029 
22
0.748
0 . 0 1 2
88.0313
Va r
SALE86
SALE85
MC0ST86
MC0ST85
NMC86
NMC85
Weighted 
Mean 
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0.913449 
0.867219 
0.791525 
0.056005
0.074304
Coef
0.325966 
0.470066 
0.327143 
0.473344 
0.298114 
0.424083
Std. Error 
0.048010 
0.060774 
0.060722 
0.067504 
0.049459 
0.077851
T-Stat 
-6.790 
7. 735 
5 .388 
-7.012 
6.027 
-5.447
P-vaIue 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000
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Table 6.8: Switching Regressions. Maior Subsidised Industries
(conti n ued)
3. 1984-1985
Regression Results in Detail
Dep var i abl e 
Mini mum 
Observat ions 
Weighted LS 
R-squared 
Residual SS 
Total SS
OLS RESULTS: Entire Sample
SUB 154 Mean
-0.222 Maximum
73 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale85 
0.854 Rbar-squared
0.036 Std error of est
0.245 Log like : 174.4427
005
153
67
843
023
Var
SALE85
SALE84
MC0ST85
MC0ST84
NMC85
NMC84
Wei ghted 
Mean 
1.000000 
1.018648 
0.954681 
0.790433 
0.136414 
0.312203
Coef
0.712012
0.622379
0.807189
0.695989
0.732995
0.761058
Std.. Error 
0.051419 
0.071516 
0.048699 
0.075761 
0.061763 
0.048019
T-Stat 
-13.847 
8.703 
16.575 
-9.187 
1 1 . 8 68  
- 15.849
P-vaIue 
0.000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000
OLS RESULTS: 1st Portion
Dep variable SUB154 Mean 0.009
Mini mum -0.222 Maximum 0.153
Observations 40 Degrees of freedom 34
Wei ghted LS Weight is inverse of sale85
R-squared 0.937 Rbar-squared 0.928
ResiduaI SS 0.014 Std error of est 0.020
Total SS 0.217 Log like 103.0153
Var
SALE85
SALE84
MC0ST85
MC0ST84
NMC85
NMC84
Weighted 
Mean 
1.000000 
1.031915 
1.016153 
0.774518 
0.183390 
0.443286
Coef
0.830718
0.825732
0.948287
0.928350
0.838050
0.926915
Std. Error 
0.064469 
105216 
056915 
106803 
069864 
054415
T-Stat P-value 
12.886 0.000 
7.848 0.000
16.661 0.000 
-8.692 0.000
11.995 0.000
17.034 0.000
OLS RESULTS: 2nd Portion
Dep variable 
Mini mum 
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R-squared 
Res i duaI SS 
Total SS
SUB154 Mean
-0.082 Maxi mum
33 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale85 
0.831 Rbar-squared
0.005 Std error of est
0.027 Log Ii ke
0.00008899 
0.047 
27
0.800
0.013
99.6020
Var
SALE85
SALE84
MC0ST85
MC0ST84
NMC85
NMC84
Weighted 
Mean 
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1.002567 
0.880168 
0.809723 
0.079475
0.153314
Coef
0.531234 
264556 
634402 
364858 
456062 
215922
Std. Error 
0.056308 
0.058878 
0.056721 
0.067167 
0.071902 
0.0614*46
T-Stat P-value 
-9.434 0.000
4.493 0.000
11.185 0.000
-5.432 0.000
6.343 0.000
-3.514 0.002
262
Table 6.8; Switching Regressions. Major Subsidised Industries
(continued)
4. 1983-1984
Regression Results in Detail
Dep variable 
Mini mum 
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R-squared 
Residual SS 
Total SS
OLS RESULTS: Entire Sample
SUB 143 Mean
-0.188 Maxi mum
73 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale84 
0.809 Rbar-squared
0.064 Std error of est
0.336 Log like : 153
.006
.168
68
.798
.031
3128
Var
SALE84
SALE83
MCOST84
NMC84
C0ST83
Weighted 
Mean 
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0.955110 
0.772569 
0.320753 
1.063447
Coef
0.464800
0.431716
0.696891
0.694194
0.671715
Std..Error 
0.074514 
0.054561 
0.066856 
0.049824 
0.043450
T-Stat
-6.238
7.913
10.424
13.933
-15.459
P-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
OLS RESULTS: 1st Portion
Dep variable 
Mini mum 
Observat i ons 
Wei ghted LS 
R-squared 
Residual SS 
Total SS
SUB 143 
-0.188 
44
Mean 
Maxi mum
Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale84 
0.947 Rbar-squared
0.017 Std error of est
0.315 Log like
- 0 . 0 1 0  
0. 168 
39
0.942 
0 . 0 2 1  
1 10.9282
Var
SALE84
SALE83
MCOST84
NMC84
COST83
Weighted 
Mean 
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0.937872 
0.752872 
0.424092 
1.153532
Coef
0.763339
0.757346
0.835750
0.843824
0.818721
Std. Error 
0.074177 
0.062999 
0.06041 0 
0.040173 
0.037030
T-Stat
10.291
1 2 . 0 2 2
13.835
21.005
22.109
P-value 
0 .000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000
OLS RESULTS: 2nd Portion
Dep vari able 
Mini mum 
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R-squared 
Res i duaI SS 
Total SS
SUB 143 Mean
-0.043 Maximum
29 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale84 
0.461 Rbar-squared
0.010 Std error of est
0.019 Log like
Var
SALE84
SALE83
MCOST84
NMC84
C0ST83
Weighted 
Mean 
1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0.981264 
0.802454 
0.163963 
0.926766
Coef
0. 102753 
0.244545 
0.007010 
0.218508 
0.413091
Std 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0 . 
0.
. Error
085081
088649
102605
103450
108996
0 . 0 0 1
0.091
24
0.371
0 . 0 2 1
74.2704
T-Stat 
1 .208 
2.759 
0 . 068 
2.112 
-3.790
P-value 
0 .239 
0 . 0 1 1  
0.946 
0.045 
0 . 0 0 1
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Table 6.9; Switching Regressions. Maior Subsidy Recipients
Major subsidy recipients are defined as all enterprises 
whose subsidy 1 equals or exceeds 10 million z^oty (in the 
second year).
Switching variable is P2LRT, profit 2 per worker in 1984 
z/oty.
Coefficients on independent variables are assumed not to 
vary by industry.
Results are for the model in first differences only.
Switching Regressions: Basic Results
Eqn Search grid 
boundaries 
Lower Upper
Breakpt/
Sample
Size
Lower Upper 
Bound Bound 
P2LRT
LR
86-87 -0.941 0.974 76/242 0.092 0.103 232.4
85-86 -0.820 0.763 88/245 0.080 0.081 220.7
84-85 -0.883 0.682 79/240 0.044 0.048 194.3
83-84 -0.618 0.549 76/223 0.039 0.042 133.3
LR = likelihood ratio test statistic
Switching Regressions: Farlev-Hinich and Chow Statistics
(P-values in parentheses)
Eqn Farley-Hinich Statistic 
Entire Lower Upper 
sample portion portion
Chow
Statistic
86-87 15.88 3.15 0.75 25.38
(0.000) (0.003) (0.678) (0.000)
85-86 10.06 1.09 1.07 23.50
(0.000) (0.384) (0.387) (0.000)
84-85 19.41 3.53 0.42 21.89
(0.000) (0.001) (0.934) (0.000)
83-84 5.92 1.64 2.02 16.09
(0.000) (0.124) (0.042) (0.000)
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Figure 6.2a; Log of the Likelihood Function According to
Value of Switching Variable, 
Haior Subsidy Recipients
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Figure 6.2b: Log of the Likelihood Function According to 
Observation Number, Maior Subsidy Recipients
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Table 6.10: Switching Regressions. Haior Subsidy Recipients
Regression Results In Detail
1. 1986-1987
OLS RESULTS: Entire Sample
Dep vari able SUB 176 Mean 0‘.006
Mini mum -0.178 Maximum 0.255
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R-squared
Weight
0.
242 Degrees of freedom 
is inverse of sale87 
585 Rbar-squared 0.
232
569
Res iduaI SS 0.197 Std error of est 0.029
Total SS 0.475 Log I i Ice I i hood 517.1765
Var
Wei ghted 
Mean Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-value
SALE87 1.000000 -0.519297 0.036203 -14.344 0.000
SALE86 0.973937 0.506516 0.040021 12.656 0.000
TTAX87 0.042202 0.526896 0. 105714 4.984 0.000
TTAX86 0.046440 -0.547213 0.095742 -5.715 0.000
MCOST87 0.751479 0.590712 0.046616 12.672 0.000
MCOST86 0.742859 -0.565927 0.048402 -11.692 0.000
NMC87 0.155230 ' 0.563660 0.051900 10.860 0.000
NMC86 0.151615 -0.518139 0.055598 -9.319 0.000
M0N0P87 0.115792 -0.094307 0.080438 -1.172 0.241
M0N0P86 0.118484 0.114097 0.081433 1.401 0.161
OLS RESULTS: 1st Portion
Dep variable SUB176 Mean 0.017
Mini mum - 0.178 Maxi mum 0.255
Observations 76 Degrees of freedom 66
Weighted
R-squared
LS Weight is inverse of sale87 
0.857 Rbar-squared 0.837
Residual SS 0.058 Std error of est 0.030
Total SS 0.402 Log Ii keIihood 165.2399
Var
Wei ghted
Mean Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-value
SALE87 1.000000 -0.805842 0.059571 -13.527 0.000
SALE86 1.021419 0.780046 0.070450 11.072 0.000
TTAX87 0.016895 1.841471 0.451787 4.076 0.000
TTAX86 0.019988 -1.483673 0.370794 -4.001 0.000
MC0ST87 0.963957 0.960044 0.071345 13.456 0.000
MC0ST86 0.998165 -0.905137 0.083433 - 10.849 0 .000
NMC87 0.164492 0.825547 0.098004 8.424 0.000
NMC86 0.145491 -0.846155 0.123581 -6.847 0.000
M0N0P87 0.094329 -0.250232 0.170394 - 1.469 0.147
M0N0P86 0.098264 0.134564 0.161032 0.836 0.406
OLS RESULTS: 2nd Portion
Dep variable 
Minimum
SUB176 
-0.061
Mean 
Maxi mum
0 . 0 0 1
0.090
Observations: 166 Degrees of freedom: 156
Weighted LS : Wei ght is inverse of saIe87
R- squared : 0.431 Rbar-squared : 0.398
Residual SS : 0.035 Std error of est : 0.015
Total SS : 0.061 Log likelihood : 468 . 1580
Weighted
Var Mean Coef Std. Error T - S t a.t-. P-value
SALE87 1.000000 -0 . 1 65233 0.027122 -6.092 0’.000
SALE86 0.952198 0.209944 0.028064 7.481 0.000
TTAX87 0.053789 0. 129147 0.059753 2.161 0. 032
TTAX86 0.058551 -0 .206930 0.054737 -3.780 0.000
MC0ST87 0.654200 0.234194 0.035642 6.571 0.000
M CO S T 86 0.625972 -0.277533 0.036279 -7.650 0.000
NMC87 0.150989 0.269540 0.041024 6. 570 0.000
NMC86 0.154419 -0.330579 0.036847 -8.972 0.000
M0N0P87 0.125619 -0.181511 0.048053 -3.777 0.000
M0N0P86 0.127742 0.196658 0.049062 4 .008 0.000
Table 6.10; Switching Regressions. Maior Subsidy Recipients
(continued)
Regression Results In Detail
2. 1985-1986
OLS RESULTS: Entire Sample
Dep variable SUB165 Mean 0-.018
Mini mum -0.131 Maximum 0.577
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R-squared
Weight
0.
245 Degrees of freedom 
is inverse of sale86 
808 Rbar-squared 0.
235
801
Residua I SS 0.157 Std error of est 0.026
Total SS 0.817 Log I i kelihood 553.2646
Var
Wei ghted 
Mean Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-value
SALE86 1 .000000 -0.558166 0.033273 -16.775 0.000
SALE85 0.917299 0.473310 0.038784 12.204 0.000
TTAX86 0.045974 0.780252 0.093430 8.351 0.000
TTAX85 0.046784 -0.717425 0.094829 -7.565 0.000
MC0ST86 0.762505 0.696577 0.037265 18.692 0.000
MC0ST85 0.684690 -0.603211 0.042986 -14.033 0.000
NMC86 0.162579 0.801576 0.032771 24.460 0.000
NMC85 0.153653 -0.716022 0.033008 -21.692 0.000
M0N0P86 0.115791 0.161436 0.113754 1.419 0.156
M0N0P85 0.113494 -0.151157 0.111870 -1.351 0.177
OLS RESULTS: 1st Portion
Dep variable 
Mini mum 
Observat1ons 
Uei ghted LS 
R-squared 
Residual SS 
Total SS
SUB 165 Mean
-0.131 Maxi mum
88 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale86 
0.927 Rbar-squared
0.051 Std error of est
0.690 Log likelihood
0.044
0.577
78
0.918
0.025
203.5064
Wei ghted
Var Mean Coef
SALE86 1 .000000 -0.736506
SALE85 0.924999 0.587275
TTAX86 0.020092 1 . 156052
TTAX85 0.025265 - 1 .045630
MCOST86 0.963036 0.873530
MC0ST85 0.866985 -0.718248
NMC86 0.152013 0.926621
NMC85 0.141441 -0.862531
M0N0P86 0.098148 0.079833
MONOP85 0.089610 -0.049296
Std. Error T-Stat P-value
0.051305 - 14.356 0.000
0.064636 9.086 0.000
0.226246 5.110 0.000
0.208658 -5.011 0.000
0.049324 17.710 0.000
0.061656 - 1 1 .649 0.000
0.047011 19.711 0.000
0.043947 - 19.627 0.000
0.228766 0.349 0.728
0.225412 -0.219 0.827
OLS RESULTS: 2nd Portion
Dep variable SUB 165 Mean 0.004
Minimum -0.056 Maxi mum 0.058
Observations 157 Degrees of freedom 147
Weighted LS Weight is inverse of sale86
R-squared 0.206 Rbar-squared 0.157
Res i duaI SS 0.026 Std error of est 0.013
Total SS 0.033 Log likelihood 460.1176
Wei ghted
Var Mean Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-value
SALE86 1.0 0 00 00 -0.124278 0.029941 -4.151 0 .000
SALE85 0.912983 0.096569 0.029628 3 .259 0.001
TTAX86 0.060481 0.215348 0.060914 3.535 0.001
TTAX85 0.058846 -0. 187222 0.060799 -3.079 0 .002
M COS T 86 0.650105 0.171502 0.037792 4.538 0 .000
MC0ST85 0.582512 -0.142260 0.036530 -3.894 0 .000
NMC86 0.168501 0.207309 0.041481 4 . 998 0 .000
NMC85 0.160498 -0. 16461 2 0.042760 -3.850 0 .000
M0N0P86 0.125680 -0.137414 0.070916 -1 .938 0 .055
M0N0P85 0.126882 0. 141096 0.069814 2.021 0 . 045
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Table 6.10: Switching Regressions. Halor Subsidy Recipients
(continued)
Regression Results In Detail
3. 1984-1985
Dep variable 
N i nimum 
Observat ions 
Weighted LS 
R-squa red 
Residual SS 
Total SS
OLS RESULTS: Entire Sample
SUB 154 Mean
-0.411 Maxi mum
240 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale85 
0.709 Rbar-squared
0.200 Std error of est
0.686 Log likelihood
0.008
0.225
230
0.697
0.029
510.3740
Wei ghted
Var Mean Coef
SALE85 1.000000 -0.503115
SALE84 0.964893 0.457261
TTAX85 0.045765 0.647059
TTAX84 0.041296 -0.612461
MCOST85 0.755593 0.611744
MCOST84 0.626841 -0.545279
NMC85 0.168526 0.666504
NMC84 0.263076 -0.643257
MONOP85 0.110842 -0. 183650
M0N0P84 0.110113 0. 199596
Std. Error T-Stat P-value
0.035838 -14.039 0.000
0.043636 10.479 0.000
0.090664 7.137 0.000
0.107495 -5.698 0.000
0.037576 16.280 0.000
0.047703 - 11 .431 0.000
0.033755 19.745 0.000
0.034566 - 18.609 0.000
0.178048 - 1.031 0.302
0.176758 1 . 129 0.259
OLS RESULTS: 1st Portion
Dep vari able SUB 154 Mean 0.015
Mini mum -0.411 Maxi mum 0.225
Observat ions 
Weighted LS 
R-squared
Weight
0.
79 Degrees of freedom 
is inverse of sale85 
907 Rbar-squared 0.
69
895
Residua I SS 0.057 Std error of est 0.029
Total SS 0.615 Log I i keIihood 173.4766
Var
Weighted
Mean Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-value
SALE85 1 .000000 -0.808374 0.067514 - 11.973 0.000
SALE84 1 .015500 0.634174 0.083694 7.577 0.000
TTAX85 0.020857 1 .101091 0.221320 4.975 0.000
TTAX84 0.017986 -0.823262 0.320469 -2.569 0.012
MC0ST85 0.971704 0.875008 0.054959 15.921 0.000
MC0ST84 0.746267 -0.688075 0.077107 -8.924 0 .000
NMC85 0. 149207 0.840788 0.044815 18.761 0 .000
NMC84 0.374895 -0.801772 0.054467 - 14.720 0.000
MONOP85 0.085118 0.031407 0.353090 0.089 0.929
M0N0P84 0.084642 0.075713 0.367732 0.206 0.837
OLS RESULTS: 2nd Portion
Dep variable 
Mini mum 
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R-squared 
Residual SS 
Total SS
SUB154 Mean
-0.048 Maxi mum
161 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale85 
0.342 Rbar-squared
0.043 Std error of est
0.065 Log likelihood
0.004
0.141
151
0 .303 
0.017 
434 .0668
Weighted
Var Mean Coef
SALE85 1 .000000 - 0^ 167647“
SALE84 0.940061 0 . 195757
TTAX85 0.057987 0 . 1 58343
TTAX84 0.052734 -0.190259
MC0ST85 0 .649551 0. 182248
MC0ST84 0.568241 -0.198862
NMC85 0. 1 78005 0.261898
NMC84 0.208208 -0.304709
MONOP85 0.123464 -0.100161
H0N0P84 0.122611 0.101448
Std. Error T-Stat P-value
0.029440 -5.695 0.000
0.033058 5.922 0 .000
0.063945 2.476 0.014
0.074127 -2.567 0.011
0.036819 4.950 0.000
0.041353 -4.809 0.000
0.041951 6.243 0.000
0.038103 -7.997 0.000
0.121795 -0.822 0.412
0.120469 0.842 0.401
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Table 6.10: Switching Regressions. Haior Subsidy Recipients
(continued)
4. 1983-1984
Dep varIable 
M i nimum 
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R- squared 
Residual SS 
Total SS
Regression Results in Detail
OLS RESULTS: Entire Sample
SUB 143 Mean
-0.236 Maximum
223 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale84
0.747 Rbar-squared : 0.738
0.163 Std error of est : 0.028
0.647 Log likelihood : 488.4563
O'. 006 
0.236 
214
Wei ghted
Var Mean Coef Std. Error T-Stat P-value
SALE84 1.000000 -0.460778 0.034935 -13.190 0.000
SALE83 0.946630 0.490792 0.033659 14.582 0.000
TTAX84 0.046099 0.466093 0.086730 5.374 0.000
TTAX83 0.037305 -0.496899 0.096100 -5.171 0.000
MC0ST84 0.658688 0.669802 0.031426 21.313 0.000
NMC84 0.272216 0.710319 0.033346 21.301 0.000
COST83 0.889445 -0.711524 0.029706 -23.952 0.000
MONOP84 0.107026 -0.400845 0.191888 -2.089 0.037
M0N0P83 0.107571 0.378657 0.187606 2.018 0.044
OLS RESULTS: 1st Portion
Dep variable SUB 143 Mean : 0.004
Mini mum -0.236 Maximum : ■ 0.236
Observat i ons 76 Degrees of freedom: 67
We i ghted LS Weight is i nverse of sal e84
R- squared 0.916 Rbar-squared : 0.906
Residual SS 0.050 Std error of est : 0.027
Total SS 0.588 Log likelihood : 170.9118
Wei ghted
Var Mean Coef
SALE84 1.000000 -0.624774
SALE83 0.936145 0.688325
TTAX84 0.016534 0.666618
TTAX83 0.010757 -0.768675
MCOST84 0.735890 0.813341
NMC84 0.383582 0.888238
C0ST83 1.071476 -0.886246
M0N0P84 0.072543 - 1 .052713
M0N0P83 0.070963 0.957317
Std. Error T-Stat P-value
0.060027 - 10.408 0.000
0.056001 12.291 0.000
0.156075 4.271 0.000
0.173706 -4.425 0.000
0.050909 15.976 0.000
0.043961 20.205 0.000
0.041272 -21.473 0.000
0.491166 -2.143 0. 036
0.497514 1 .924 0.059
OLS RESULTS: 2nd Portion
Dep variable 
Mini mum 
Observat i ons 
Weighted LS 
R-squared 
Residual SS 
Total SS
SUB 143 Mean
-0.041 Maxi mum
147 Degrees of freedom
Weight is inverse of sale84 
0.195 Rbar-squared
0.046 Std error of est
0.057 Log likelihood
0.008
0.091
138
0. 148 
0.018 
384.1802
Weighted
Var Mean Coef
SALE84 1.000000 -0.131142
SALE83 0.952050 0.099314
TTAX84 0.061384 0. 101336
TTAX83 0.051031 -0.058418
MCOST 84 0.618774 0.210284
NMC84 0.214638 0.269529
C0ST83 0.795333 -0. 182813
M0N0P84 0.124853 -0.278679
MONOP83 0 . 126497 0.263020
Std. Error T-Stat P-value
0.036349 -3.608 0 .000
0.038895 2 .553 0.012
0.074109 " T T367 ‘ 0 7 TT4
0.087344 -0.669 0.505
0.043390 4 . 846 0 .000
0.049760 5.417 0.000
0.045646 -4.005 0 .000
0.145292 -1.918 0 .057
0.141382 1 .860 0 .065
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Notes to Chapter 6
1. This chapter arises from a project directed by 
Stanislav Gomulka of the London School of Economics and 
funded by the Suntory-Toyota International Centre for 
Economics and Related Disciplines. The author held an 
IREX Developmental Fellowship while much of the analysis 
presented in this chapter was developed. The generous 
financial support of STICERD and IREX are gratefully 
acknowledged. I would also like to thank Staszek Gomulka, 
Mario Nuti, Saul Estrin, Richard Quandt, and seminar 
audiences at the London School of Economics and the School 
of Slavonic and East European Studies for suggestions, 
support and encouragement.
2. That is, I obtain the pre-subsidy categories by 
multiplying the original profitability categories by the 
aggregate rate of turnover tax.
3. Rocznik Statvstvcznv 1988. p. 99.
4. The very small figure for enterprise-specific subsidies 
given by the official Polish statistics suggests 
estimation in levels may be OK.
5. It is slightly less because I cannot conduct the global 
search too close to the endpoints. That is, I cannot 
begin by dividing our sample of N firms into 1 low X firm 
and N-l high X firms, because I cannot run an OLS 
regression on the 1 low X firm alone.
6. Time series analysis is the more common application of 
the simple switching regressions; there the search is for 
the point in time when parameters shifted. Since sampling 
over time is usually discrete, the derivative of the 
likelihood function will not vanish at the maximum, 
violating one of the conditions making a x distribution 
acceptable^ In our application, however, the switching 
variable X is continuous, making it more plausible to 
assert that the derivative will vanish. See Quandt (1958, 
p. 876n7).
7. Their evidence, based on Monte Carlo experiments, show 
that the likelihood ratio test has moderately more power 
than a Chow test in the middle of the sample, moderately 
less at the ends.
8. The F-H test is best interpreted as follows. The 
breakpoint between the two regression regimes is 
determined by the variable X. At the critical value X , 
there is a discrete shift in the regression coefficients. 
The F-H procedure approximates this discrete shift with a 
continuous shift in the (slope) coefficients based on X.
In essence a single OLS regression is run where instead of 
estimating, say, /3S^ , I estimate (p+<pXi)S^ (there is a 
separate <p for each exogenous variable) . The F-H test is 
basically a test of the joint significance of the
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estimated <f>*s. It does not allow for shifts in the 
intercept, however. See Farley, Hinich and McGuire 
(1975).
9. In practice the two deflators differ only slightly.
10. Quandt presents Monte Carlo estimates of the 
distribution of LR based on sample sizes of 20, 40 and 60. 
The distribution of the right-hand tail was essentially 
independent of the sample size used. To be more precise, 
he estimates that [P(LR) < 42] *= 0.987; the 95% confidence 
interval for this estimate is 0.96 to 0.996. (These 
numbers vary very slightly for the different sample 
sizes.)
11. This is clearly untrue for the individual error terms 
Uj^ and u ^ _ 1, but is not an unreasonable assumption for 
their difference.
12. Note that because MONOP measures the market share of 
the enterprise, it is not weighted as part of the WLS 
procedure.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
Below I briefly summarise the main findings presented in 
this dissertation. The emphasis here is on the 
relationship of the dissertation with existing work, and 
on the directions for possible future research.
The first contribution of Chapter 2 was to suggest a 
single consistent interpretation of Kornai's notion of the 
"soft budget constraint", namely that socialist 
enterprises that are in difficulties are rescued by the 
centre. This idea of Kornai's has been criticised by some 
as a "soft concept", but I argued that this particular 
interpretation is consistent with most of his writings.1 
I was then able to relate this concept of Kornai's to 
previous work in the field, notably by Hayek and von 
Mises. The chapter then presented two formal models of 
enterprise behaviour when a state policy of bailouts 
exists, i.e. when budget constraints are soft. The two 
main contributions of these simple models were, first, to 
show that in principle the effects of such a policy on 
enterprise performance are ambiguous (others who have 
written on this subject have typically assumed that budget 
softness leads to poorer performance); and second, to show 
that, since rescue subsidies are conditional in nature, 
empirical studies of budget softness will face1the problem^ - 
that budgets may be soft and yet no subsidies observed.
The main contribution of Chapter 3 was to present a formal
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argument explaining whv budget constraints may be soft. 
Previous authors have typically simply assumed the budget 
constraints of socialist enterprises are soft without 
explaining why. Kornai's explanation simply states that 
the socialist state is "paternalistic"; he does not say 
why the socialist state behaves differently from the state 
in a Western market economy. The argument of Chapter 3 is 
that the socialist state rescues enterprises in 
difficulties because it is unable to commit itself in 
advance to a policy of "no rescues". In this view, the 
state in a Western market economy behaves differently not 
because it is not "paternalistic" (it has roughly the same 
"tastes" as the socialist state), but because the 
institutional and legal systems of a Western democracy 
afford a measure of (credible) commitment to a policy of 
"no bailouts". The totalitarian socialist state, by 
building a "reputation for toughness", can obtain the 
benefits of commitment, but I argued that this reputation 
could not be maintained once the socialist state ceased to 
be totalitarian and Stalinist excesses moved further and 
further into the past.
The model of Chapter 3 illustrated a number of other 
features commonly observed in socialist economies. One 
such feature, to which I devoted some attention, is 
"storming" or rush-work to meet a deadline. The existing 
literature on storming typically blames storming in part 
on the presence of deadlines by which time output targets 
must be fulfilled. I was able to show, by use of the
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model in Chapter 3 and two models in an appendix, that 
this explanation is incorrect: deadlines do not 
necessarily lead to a storming work pattern. Indeed, they 
may just as easily lead to an "anti-storming” pattern.
Of the existing game-theoretic models of the centre- 
enterprise relationship, most have assumed that the centre 
lacks information about the enterprise (typically its 
productive capacity). The model of Chapter 3, in 
contrast, assumed that the centre was perfectly informed 
about the enterprise but that the enterprise lacked 
information about the centre (namely its preferences). A 
model incorporating both types of imperfect information 
would be a natural next step. Such a model would be 
particularly informative about the nature of state 
bailouts, since one explanation offered for these bailouts 
is that the centre is not sure if the enterprise really 
needs the bailout or not, and chooses to rescue rather 
than take the chance of failing to help an enterprise that 
really does need central assistance.
Chapters 2 and 3 examined some of the incentive aspects of 
state bailouts. There is as well an "economic natural 
selection” aspect of the subject: if the state bails out 
failing enterprises, then all enterprises survive, not 
just the "fittest”. The study of "economic natural 
selection" is not yet well developed, however, and so 
rather than ask the question "what are the effects of 
suspending the process of economic natural selection via a
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bailout policy", I asked the question which logically 
precedes it, namely "what are the effects of the presence 
of economic natural selection". Chapter 4 presented a 
model based on the "evolutionarily stable strategy" 
concept used by biologists and game theorists. The main 
result of the model is a demonstration that only when 
firms lack strategic power is it generally true that 
profit-maximisers are the best survivors; when firms have 
strategic power the best survivors are those that engage 
in "over-competitive", "spiteful" behaviour (as defined by 
Hamilton). The implications of this for the bailout 
question are not clear, however. It is not necessarily 
the case that such "over-competitive" behaviour is a "bad 
thing" and that therefore suspending economic natural 
selection via a bailout policy would be a good thing. 
Recall, for example, the Nash quantity-setting oligopoly 
example from Chapter 4: the profit-maximising result is 
for firms to earn oligopoly profits by restricting output, 
but the economic natural selection result is the 
competitive result, i.e. price equals marginal cost. The 
"over-competitive" result is thus socially preferable to 
the profit-maximising result.
The analysis in Chapter 4 and the appendix could be 
extended in a number of ways. One possibility would be to 
develop a fuller dynamic version of the model of 
Chapter 4. As was pointed out there, a firm may be a good 
survivor relative to its competitors at any particular 
point in time, but to achieve this its behaviour may have
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to be so spiteful and self-damaging at times that it is 
infrequently observed. A second possibility, more 
relevant to the evolutionary game theory model presented 
in the appendix, is to recognise that typically (in both 
economics and in biology) a competitor in a population 
interacts with some individuals more than others.
Chapters 5 and 6 presented the results of an empirical 
investigation of bailouts of enterprises, using 
enterprise-level panel data for Polish industry 1983-88.
In Chapter 6 I estimated a simple model designed to reveal 
whether low profitability enterprises were subsidised 
differently from high profitability enterprises, and if 
so, in what way. The results of the estimation were quite 
robust and can be summarised as follows: in Poland during 
this period, product subsidies were in fact used as profit 
subsidies, and while profit-makers had their profits 
subsidised at a low marginal rate (15-30%), loss-makers 
were in fact "bailed out" in the sense that their losses 
were subsidised at a high marginal rate (60-90%) and after 
the subsidy process loss-makers nearly always became 
prof it-makers.
I should note here that because the data sample included a 
large number of loss-making enterprises, the observation 
problem described in Chapter 2 was not encountered. Loss- 
makers whose losses increased had to be rescued by the 
state or they would have become insolvent.
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Very little previous empirical work on socialist 
enterprises exists; the only work comparable to that in 
Chapters 5 and 6 to my knowledge was that done by Kornai 
and Matits on Hungarian state-owned enterprises. They too 
looked for evidence that enterprise budget constraints 
were "soft”, but in my view their evidence was not 
entirely convincing. The main problem was they did not 
demonstrate that taxes and subsidies were adjusted on an 
ad hoc, enterprise-specific, ex post basis. Their results 
could conceivably been generated by a hightycomplex 
tax/subsidy system, with many product-specific rates and 
fixed ex ante lump sum taxes. The motivation behind the 
method used in Chapter 6 was to test whether this could in 
fact be the case.
The model and estimation method in Chapter 6 could be 
developed further in a number of ways. One interesting 
possibility would be to use a technique developed by 
Goldfeld and Quandt to look for regimes switches based on 
more than one variable. It is probably simplistic to say 
that the only determinant of how an enterprise is 
subsidised is its pre-subsidy profit/loss per worker. 
Perhaps profit in absolute terms, rather than per worker, 
is more appropriate; perhaps the size of the labour force, 
or the nature of the enterprise's output, are also 
factors.
Finally, I should stress again the usefulness of the model 
for evaluating the success of enterprise reform. The
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revolutions in Eastern Europe have put in place new 
governments, most of which have stated their intention to 
move to a Western-type market economy. Just how 
successful they will be is not at all clear.' With respect 
to the subject of this dissertation - bailouts of 
enterprises - it is very possible that this practice will 
continue (indeed, it is not uncommon in Western 
economies). The model presented in Chapter 6 will allow 
us to test the success of these new governments in 
abandoning the old habits and implementing a sensible 
tax/subsidy system that is implemented fairly and 
according to the rule of law.
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Notes to Chapter 7
1. I can note here as well that Prof. Kornai has read the 
three chapters of this dissertation that make reference to 
the '‘soft budget constraint", and has not indicated to me 
that this interpretation is incorrect. (In fact, he 
rather liked all three papers.)
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